Sudden stops, productivity, and the exchange rate∗

Laura Castillo-Martínez†
December 28th, 2018

Job Market Paper
[click here for latest version]

Abstract

Following a sudden stop, real exchange rates can adjust through a nominal exchange rate depreciation, lower domestic prices, or a combination of both. This paper makes four contributions to understand how the type of adjustment shapes the response of macroeconomic variables, in particular productivity, to such an episode. First, it documents that aggregate TFP systematically collapses after a sudden stop under a flexible exchange rate arrangement while it moderately improves within a currency union. Second, using firm-level data for two sudden stops in Spain, it shows that the difference in the productivity response is largely driven by firm entry and exit dynamics. Third, it proposes a small open economy DSGE framework with firm selection into production and endogenous markups to explain the empirical findings. The model nests three mechanisms through which a sudden stop affects productivity: a pro-competitive, a cost, and a demand channel. While only the former operates when the nominal exchange rate adjusts, all three mechanisms are active under a currency union. The model delivers general conditions under which the positive impact of the demand channel on TFP dominates. Fourth, it uses a quantitative version of the model to revisit the relative performance of exchange rate policies after a sudden stop.

JEL Classification: D24, E52, F32, F41, O57.

Keywords: Productivity, sudden stops, monetary policy, reallocation, entry, exit.

∗First draft: February 2018. I am indebted to Ricardo Reis and Silvana Tenreyro for their continual guidance and support throughout this project. In addition, I would like to thank Miguel Almunia, Pol Antrás, Miguel Bandeira, Charlie Bean, Gianluca Benigno, Andrew Bernard, Francesco Caselli, Wouter Den Haan, Tiloka De Silva, Ethan Ilzetzki, Keyu Jin, Per Krusell, Ben Moll, Nicklas Moneke, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Kevin Sheedy, Catherine Thomas, John Van Reenen, Shengxing Zhang and all other participants at the LSE macroeconomics and trade seminars, the 2018 Belgrade Young Economists Conference, the 23rd Spring Meeting of Young Economists, the “International Finance: Do Exchange Rates Still Matter?” Workshop at the Université de Lille, the 2018 Econometric Society European Winter Meeting, the PhD Candidates Workshop at the ECB and the 43 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía for helpful comments and discussions. This research benefited from the support of Club Financiero Español and the Bank of Spain. All errors are my own.

†Centre for Macroeconomics and London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. E-mail: l.castillo-martinez@lse.ac.uk.
1 Introduction

The procyclicality of productivity is a well-established empirical fact in macroeconomics; productivity rises in booms and falls in recessions (Basu and Fernald (2001)). This is not only an essential feature of closed-economy business cycle models, but a crucial ingredient in balance of payment crises. The disruption of economic activity that accompanies unexpected reversals in capital flows, also known as sudden stops, is associated with declines in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). The recent European sovereign debt crisis challenges this interpretation: in this instance, productivity improved moderately as the external adjustment unfolded. The fact that it took place within a currency union, another singularity of this episode, emerges as a potential explanatory factor and raises the following question: what is the relationship between sudden stops, productivity and the prevailing exchange rate regime? How does accounting for this complement the inherited wisdom on fixed versus floating regimes?

This paper studies how the type of real exchange rate realignment shapes the response of macroeconomic variables, in particular productivity, to a sudden stop. It shows that it shows that the difference in the productivity response is largely driven by firm entry and exit dynamics. Internal devaluations, as opposed to nominal depreciations, lead to greater exit of unproductive firms, contributing to positive aggregate TFP growth through a so-called cleansing effect. This implies that incorporating firm dynamics and allowing for demand effects in an otherwise standard open economy framework is key to capturing the observed cyclicalities under different exchange rate regimes. The result is that the type of external adjustment, whether nominal or real, affects macroeconomic performance even in the absence of nominal rigidities.

Section 3 provides systematic evidence on the behavior of macroeconomic variables during a sudden stop for both developed and developing economies during the 1990-2015 period. I use a new criterion to identify sudden stops that captures both the episodes discussed previously in the literature as well as the recent Southern-European cases. I classify sudden stops according to the prevalent exchange rate regime and evaluate the response of macroeconomic variables in each regime using an event study approach. Two regularities stand out: first, aggregate TFP systematically collapses under flexible exchange rate arrangements, while it improves, albeit moderately, within currency unions. Second, in a currency union, there is a larger decline in employment and a greater contraction in consumption as a share of GDP following a sudden stop. In order words, the increase in aggregate TFP comes at the expense of a greater domestic contraction.

To disentangle the drivers of aggregate TFP performance, Section 4 presents micro evidence in the form of firm-level data from the manufacturing sector. More specifically, I exploit survey

---

1 Several authors have argued that the cyclicality of total factor productivity and labor productivity relative to inputs has reduced or even reversed since the mid-1980s in the US; see Gali and Van Rens (2014) and Fernald and Wang (2016).

2 This paper uses the terms productivity and TFP interchangeably.
data during two sudden stop episodes that occurred in Spain: the 1992-93 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis and the 2009-13 European sovereign debt crisis. During the former, the national currency, the peseta, depreciated on multiple occasions and TFP fell by over 10 percent. During the second episode, Spain was a member of a currency union and could only regain competitiveness by lowering wages. In this case, TFP increased by 10 percent.

The firm-level analysis of these two episodes uncovers the following empirical findings. First, changes in productivity are concentrated in the lower tail of the firm productivity distribution in both episodes. Second, while productivity was declining at the firm-level during both crises, unproductive exiting firms contributed substantially more to TFP growth in the 2009-2013 sudden stop. Third, the 2009-13 sudden stop had a cleansing effect on productivity while the 1992-93 sudden stop did not. Finally, there is suggestive evidence that links heterogeneity in price markups with changes in allocative efficiency throughout the full sample.

Based on the previous evidence, Section 5 develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a micro-structure borrowed from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to study the behavior of productivity, output and employment during a sudden stop. The model features a small open economy with quasi-linear quadratic preferences and firm heterogeneity in productivity. This gives rise to firm selection into production and endogenous variable markups. I extend this model by including leisure in the consumer’s utility function, thereby deriving the labor supply decision. This provides a new channel through which the wage level and individual firm profits interact.

To allow a role for policy, I introduce nominal rigidities in the wage setting process. The central bank chooses the nominal exchange rate as its main policy tool and two extreme regimes are discussed: a currency union, characterized by a credible commitment to keep the nominal exchange rate constant; and a strict wage inflation targeting regime, where the flexible wage equilibrium is always implemented. A sudden stop is an exogenous shock to the risk premium component of the interest rate that domestic consumers pay for international borrowing. By increasing the return on foreign denominated bonds, the domestic economy is forced to save internationally and increase net exports through a real exchange rate depreciation.

Section 6 uses a partial equilibrium version of the model to build intuition on how it is able to generate the observed TFP patterns following a sudden stop. The key insight is that aggregate productivity is proportional to the domestic productivity threshold. The threshold represents the minimum productivity level at which a firm can generate positive profits and, thus, select into the domestic market. It therefore suffices to understand how the threshold moves after a sudden stop to learn about its effect on aggregate productivity.

In equilibrium, the domestic threshold is entirely determined by the number of active firms in the market and the wage level. Therefore, there are three mechanisms through which a shock can affect productivity. First, the threshold increases with the number of active firms, as greater
competition lowers profit margins for all firms and then requires a higher level of productivity to remain profitable. This is the pro-competitive channel. Second, higher wages increase the costs of production for all firms, lowering again their profit margin and calling for a higher productivity level. This is the cost channel. Third, higher wages also increase the demand for overall consumption by increasing households' labor income. This, instead, increases the firm profit margin and relaxes the productivity requirement. This is the demand channel.

The effect of a sudden stop on the domestic productivity threshold will hinge on the relative strength of these conflicting forces. This, in turn, depends on how the real exchange rate adjustment is conducted. More precisely, whether it takes place through the depreciation of nominal exchange rates or a lower wage level. Consider the two polar cases, in the first case the nominal exchange rate bears the full brunt of the adjustment: only the pro-competitive channel works, fewer firms import, and productivity falls unambiguously. In contrast, when the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the wage adjusts completely and all three channels operate, resulting in a quantitatively ambiguous overall effect. The model delivers conditions under which the demand channel dominates, allowing a sudden stop to generate a productivity improvement in a currency union.

Section 7 extends the analysis to general equilibrium by calibrating the model using Spanish macroeconomic data as well as the firm-level evidence presented in Section 4. I simulate the response of the economy to an unexpected exogenous increase in the country risk premium component of the interest rate under the two alternative exchange rate policy regimes. The model predictions mimic a sudden stop episode: the economy runs a current account surplus and the real exchange rate depreciates. The responses of macroeconomic variables match the empirics along many dimensions: GDP and consumption fall, with a more pronounced drop of the latter under the currency union regime. Moreover, relative employment dynamics are correctly captured by the generated impulse response functions with the currency union experiencing greater volatility, although the model does not generate an absolute decline in employment under a floating regime.

The baseline general equilibrium framework fully captures the empirically documented TFP fact: productivity falls when the real exchange rate depreciation translates one-to-one into a nominal depreciation, while it increases as the devaluation takes place through wages instead. This result is not only robust to alternative parameterizations of the model, but also to a range of extensions to the baseline set-up presented in Section 8.

Finally, to evaluate the overall performance of exchange rate regimes following a sudden stop, Section 9 studies how TFP improvements translate into welfare gains by computing the cumulative output loss under a currency union and a floating arrangement. These findings show that while higher nominal rigidities are more harmful in a currency union, at low levels of wage stickiness, the floating arrangement performs worse. The latter effect is driven by the opposing effect of lower wages and appreciated exchange rates on the cost of entering the market, which
can partly compensate for the drop in domestic demand in the currency union.

The results contrast with the standard view that both exchange rate regimes would lead to similar economic outcomes in the event of an external adjustment in a perfectly flexible world. To better understand this finding, I explore further how the relative performance of regimes depends also on the labor income share, the degree of firm heterogeneity and the complementarity of foreign and domestic labor inputs. I also show that results are robust to evaluating performance either by the cumulative consumption loss or by a utility-based welfare measure.

2 Relation to the literature

This paper combines several strands of the literature at the intersection of international finance, trade theory and firm dynamics.

First, it focuses on sudden stops, as defined by Calvo (1998), abrupt and unexpected reversals in foreign capital inflows. It follows the empirical research that documents regularities among historical sudden stop episodes including Calvo et al. (2004), Guidotti et al. (2004), Calvo and Talvi (2005) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) and contributes to their previous analysis in three ways: by modifying the Calvo sudden stop identification methodology to account for gradualism, by expanding the time frame and the set of economies traditionally considered, and by classifying episodes according to the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate. The results show that previous findings - current account adjustment, depreciation of the real exchange rate and fall in output and TFP - apply to economies with flexible exchange rates but not fully to currency unions.

Related, several articles propose amendments to the standard open economy neoclassical model with flexible exchange rates in order to reconcile theoretical predictions with the observed behavior of macroeconomic variables, especially TFP, during a sudden stop. For example Meza and Quintin (2007) allow for endogenous factor utilization, Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Christiano et al. (2004) and Mendoza (2006) introduce advanced payments of inputs and Mendoza (2010) directly assumes that exogenous productivity shocks trigger the collateral constraints that drive sudden stops. I bring an alternative explanation to the table: selection into production.

Second, while the goal of the paper is not the normative analysis per se, the implications of the model link to the floating versus fixed exchange rate debate initiated by Friedman (1953). Cúrdia (2007), Braggion et al. (2009) and Fornaro (2015), among others, argue that policy rules that target inflation are superior in terms of welfare to those that prioritize exchange rate stability. More recently, Farhi et al. (2013) Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) and Galí and Monacelli (2016) have emphasized the interaction of wage flexibility and the exchange

---

3This is not, however, the first paper to classify the massive reversals that Southern-European countries experienced between late 2009 and 2011 as sudden stop episodes (see Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and Gros and Alcidi (2015) for an earlier discussion).
rate regime. Accounting for firm dynamics preserves the importance of nominal rigidities in evaluating the relative performance of policy rules, while it allows for different outcomes across regimes even in their absence.

The third strand of the literature to which this paper closely relates is trade models of heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003), which emphasize firm selection into domestic and international markets by featuring fixed production and exporting costs. Even though the main focus of these papers is on the welfare effects of trade liberalizations, the real exchange rate depreciation that results from a balance of payment crisis resembles an asymmetric trade liberalization. This makes the New New Trade Theory framework a suitable starting point for this analysis.

Unlike the canonical Melitz (2003) model, I do not restrict attention to competition in the labor market and incorporate pro-competitive effects of trade by departing from constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. In doing so, I follow Bernard et al. (2003), Feenstra (2003), Behrens and Murata (2006) and, more specifically, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), to feature endogenous variable markups. This allows me to defuse, at least in the short-run, the negative dependence between domestic and exporting cutoffs that drives the baseline result in the Melitz (2003) model. I preserve, however, the role that wages play in such model within the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework. My approach is to modify the quasi-linear-quadratic preferences proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) and assume that leisure is the homogeneous good. The result is that the demand for differentiated varieties is no longer independent of labor income and a new demand effect of wages emerges.

While most of the standard trade models are static, this paper is closer to the subset within the trade literature interested in firm dynamics and business cycles. The most notable reference is Melitz and Ghironi (2005), which embeds the steady-state version of the Melitz (2003) model into a two country DSGE setting. To gain tractability, however, Melitz and Ghironi (2005) assume that all firms that enter the market generate positive profits and, thus, firm exit is exclusively determined by exogenous death shocks. As opposed to a framework in which the presence of fixed production costs drives firms generating negative profit out of the market.

Bilbiie et al. (2008) and Bilbiie et al. (2014) introduce price adjustment costs in a closed-economy DSGE
Finally, this paper is connected to the literature that studies the contribution of reallocation to TFP growth. Two theoretical arguments have been put forward to date. On the one hand, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that increases in allocative efficiency that involve closing gaps in the return of inputs increase aggregate productivity. On the other hand, Caballero et al. (1994)’s interpretation of Schumpeter et al. (1939)’s creative destruction emphasizes the role of reallocation among new and incumbent firms as an important factor of growth. The paper presents a model based on the second current, emphasizing the cleansing effect of internal devaluations, but discusses both conjectures in the empirical analysis.

The pre-crisis slowdown of productivity in Southern Europe has prompted an increasingly popular narrative that links declining TFP and enhanced misallocation with capital inflows. Papers on this topic are often grouped according to the margin of misallocation suggested: Benigno and Fornaro (2014) considers a model of misallocation between a tradable and a non-tradable sector; Dias et al. (2016), García-Santana et al. (2016), Reis (2013) and Gopinath et al. (2017) show, and formalize in the latter two cases, that resources were also misallocated within sectors. My work contributes to these hypotheses in two dimensions: from the empirical side, I show that the negative relationship between capital flows and TFP growth in Southern Europe is symmetric, that is, productivity improved as the crisis hit and foreign capital retrenched. From the theoretical side, I provide an alternative framework that reconciles both sets of papers by endogenizing firms’ decision to export and, thus, the size of the exporting sector. In addition, I abstract from the theoretical emphasis on capital that characterizes these papers and consider an alternative dimension of misallocation: variable markups.

3 Aggregate productivity during a sudden stop

How do unexpected capital flow reversals affect macroeconomic performance? To answer this question I proceed in three steps: (i) establishing a criterion to identify sudden stops; (ii) classifying episodes by exchange rate regime; and (iii) characterizing the behavior of several macroeconomic variables using a standard event study approach.

3.1 Data and methodology

Following Cavallo and Frankel (2008), I define a sudden stop as an episode in which there is a substantial decline in the capital account surplus together with a reduction in the current account deficit and a simultaneous recession. I develop an algorithm that classifies as a sudden stop a period that contains at least one year during which (i) the financial account surplus has fallen at least one standard deviation below its rolling average; (ii) there is a simultaneous decline in the current account deficit (or an equivalent decline in foreign reserves); and (iii)
GDP per capita contracts.\textsuperscript{10} The start and end of each episode is marked by the first and last year within the period in which the financial account surplus is half a standard deviation below the rolling average.\textsuperscript{11} The two latter requirements ensure that the capital flow reversals captured by the algorithm strictly qualify as sudden stops. First, by requiring that the financing disruption is accompanied by an appropriate macroeconomic adjustment. Second, by ruling out booming episodes that display similar characteristics, for example a positive trade shock.

Annual data on the current and capital accounts for all available countries comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database (IFS) for the period 1990-2015 and complemented with data on GDP per capita growth from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database.\textsuperscript{12}

The total number of episodes is 78, representing 5.2\% of total available country/year observations in the sample.\textsuperscript{13} The criterion successfully captures all traditional sudden stop episodes previously discussed by the literature - mostly occurring around the 1994/5 Tequila crisis, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 1998 Russian default - as well as the most recent balance of payment crisis in the peripheral economies of the European Union.\textsuperscript{14}

I build on Ilzetzki et al. (2017) updated \textit{de facto} coding system as opposed to relying on declared exchange rate regime reported to the IMF in order to classify episodes. In my baseline results, I consider as prevalent the exchange rate regime that is in place during the last year of the sudden stop. There are four different cases: a currency union, a hard peg, a soft peg and a floating arrangement.\textsuperscript{15} Out of the 78 episodes identified, 11 occur within a currency union (8 in the Euro Area and 3 in the West African Economic and Monetary Union), 14 in a hard peg system, 26 in a soft peg regime and 25 in a floating arrangement.

To characterize the behavior of the macro-economy as a sudden stop unfolds I use data on GDP, final private consumption, employment, total factor productivity, current account deficit and real exchange rate. All variables are compiled from the World Development Indicators except for Total Factor Productivity, TFP, that is collected from the Conference Board’s Total

\textsuperscript{10}This contrasts with Cavallo and Frankel (2008), who consider a reduction in the financial account surplus that is two standard deviations above the mean standard deviation for the corresponding decade.

\textsuperscript{11}Refer to Appendix A.1 for further details.

\textsuperscript{12}I do not consider countries which are small, both in terms of population (below one million inhabitants) and in terms of GDP (below one billion USD). The final sample covers 119 countries.

\textsuperscript{13}The total number of episodes is 105. However, I drop one-year long episodes that start in 2009 as these are explained by the global trade collapse rather than by a country-specific reversal of flows. The full list of episodes per country, plus exchange rate classification, can be found in Appendix A.1.

\textsuperscript{14}The methodology does not account for changes in TARGET2 balances in the Eurozone and, thus, prevents me from measuring private capital flows accurately. However, this is not problematic for my purposes as the algorithm already identifies the GIIPS episodes.

\textsuperscript{15}In terms of the Ilzetzki et al. (2017) fine classification, I deviate as follows: (1) I manually divide code 1 into currency union and no separate legal tender, (2) I group codes 2 to 4 under the hard peg category, (3) I group codes 5 to 11 under the soft peg category, (4) I group codes 12 to 14 under the floating arrangement and (5) I rename group 15 as 5 i.e. other categories.
Economy Database and the current account deficit from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database.

Figures 1 and 2 show the mean and median path of each of these aggregate variables during the episodes conditional on their exchange rate classification together with standard error bands. In order to capture the buildup and end phase of each episode, the plot depicts six-year windows that begin two years before the start of each reversal and marks the start and the average duration of a sudden stop with vertical lines. As is standard in much of the literature, I focus on the cyclical component of most of the variables by looking at its percentage deviation from an extrapolated pre-crisis linear trend.\textsuperscript{16}

3.2 Results

Figure 1 illustrates how domestic variables respond to an unexpected reversal of capital flows when the exchange rate is allowed to adjust freely. First, a sudden stop is associated with a contraction in output and consumption, with most of the decline occurring on impact or shortly after. There is also a smooth decline in employment levels, measured as the number of employed workers, and a significant collapse in total factor productivity. The last two graphs capture the response of the external sector: capital outflows coincide with a depreciation of the real exchange rate, represented by a decline in the index plotted in Figure 1. The current account deficit is reduced sharply, almost reaching trade balance as soon as one year after the start of the episode. Finally, the average duration is slightly less than two years.

The results for a currency union are summarized by Figure 2. The response of all variables but TFP is similar, in qualitative terms, to that depicted in the flexible exchange rate case. The unexpected reversal of flows is associated with a decline in output, consumption and employment. There is a gradual reduction in the current account deficit that yet persists four years after the onset of the crisis. In line with this result, the real depreciation is more gentle than in the previous case and the episodes last longer, on average, two and a half years.

The most notable difference across the plots is the behavior of TFP: whereas productivity clearly falls in the first case, in line with the findings of the literature, it remains unchanged or, if anything, improves slightly within currency unions.\textsuperscript{17} A closer look into individual episodes shows that sudden stops in currency unions are preceded by periods of worsening TFP performance which, at least, slow down as the capital flows reversal materializes. In contrast, periods of capital inflows in free-floating regimes are characterized by increasing TFP records that completely flip as soon as the sudden stop hits the economy.

\textsuperscript{16} The current account deficit, expressed as a share of GDP, and the real exchange rate index, with base $t-2$, are the exception.

\textsuperscript{17} Given the reduced sample size in Figure 2, standard error bands are admittedly large to be able to conclude that TFP increases significantly.
There are additional, although arguably minor, differences in responses across regimes that are worth highlighting. Although a quantitative comparison is beyond the scope of this exercise, the decline in employment is more pronounced in Figure 2. This holds in both absolute and relative to GDP terms. Moreover, controlling for the size of output contraction, the fall in private consumption is larger in the currency union.

### 3.3 Robustness

I conduct a battery of robustness checks to evaluate the consistency of these findings. Regarding the exchange rate classification, I consider alternative *de facto* coding systems, such as Shambaugh (2004) and Klein and Shambaugh (2008), that allow for regime changes in higher frequency. I also redo the analysis taking as given the exchange rate regime prevalent at the start of the sudden stop. This is motivated by the fact that, although in most cases countries abandoned pre-existing pegs because of a sudden stop, there are cases in which failed currency pegs led to capital outflows. Moreover, I remove episodes in which the exchange rate regime changed more than once as this is exclusively due to missing data. None of the alternative methods change the main conclusions discussed above.

Regarding the event study, I explore different ways of detrending the data including a one-sided HP filter and alternative pre-crisis sample lengths. I also measure labor input as total hours worked instead of employment. To control for changes in the composition of the sample, I redo the analysis including only episodes for which all six years of data are available. Finally, I control for the degree of economic development and show that results are not driven by advanced versus developing structural differences. Results hold for all of these specifications too.

### 4 Firm-level productivity during a sudden stop

What lies behind the observed difference in TFP performance across exchange rate regimes? This section resorts to micro-evidence to document the role of selection into production and firm-level TFP in explaining aggregate productivity patterns.

#### 4.1 Spain: a tale of two sudden stops

Given limited availability in firm-level data, I use a case study approach to study firm dynamics during a sudden stop. In order to control for country fixed effects, it is preferable to compare episodes occurred within the same economy. Based on the results in Section 3, Spain emerges as a natural candidate. It has experienced two sudden stops in its recent economic history under the two exchange rate regimes of interest: the first coincides with the 1992-93 Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) crisis and the second with the 2009-2013 European sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the Spanish economy has been previously analyzed within the misallocation debate (see Gopinath et al. (2017)) and, thus, makes for an interesting benchmark for comparison.

There are clear parallels between the two episodes regarding the onset. Both were preceded by periods of increasing capital inflows, declining international competitiveness and widening current account deficits. Capital inflows were abruptly reverted following a confidence shock affecting the European integration project: the negative outcome of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in the first case, and the Greek announcement of substantial upward revisions in the government budget deficit more recently. The flight of international investment led to an urgent correction of misaligned real exchange rates and a boost in exports in order to close the trade gap.

The response of exchange rate policy to these events, however, diverted significantly. While the peseta was devalued in three occasions during the 1992-93 crisis, Spain already shared a common currency with its largest trading partners by 2009 and underwent a process of internal devaluation. Consistent with my previous results, TFP fell following the nominal depreciation in 1992, while it increased during the 2009-13 period. I take these episodes as representative of sudden stops under floating arrangements and currency unions, respectively, and use firm-level data to explore what is driving the observed aggregate TFP pattern.

4.2 Data

I use firm-level data from the Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE, in Spanish) managed by the SEPI Foundation, a public entity linked to the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations. The ESEE surveys all manufacturing firms operating in Spain with more than 200 workers and a sample of firms between 10 and 200 workers, providing a rich panel dataset with over 1,800 firms for the period 1990-2014. It covers around 35 percent of value added in Spanish manufacturing and provides information on each firm’s balance sheet together with its profit and loss statement.

---

19 There are two other countries which have experienced sudden stops under different exchange rate regimes: Finland and Italy. The episodes also correspond to the ERM and the European sovereign debt crisis. The focus on Spain is partly driven by data availability.
20 In 1992, the peseta was first devalued by 5% on September 17th, known as Black Wednesday, when the pound and the lira abandoned the ERM altogether. A further 6% was devalued on November 23rd, with a third devaluation taking place in May 1993.
21 It can be argued that Spain does not strictly classify as a floating exchange rate regime in 1992-93 as it remains a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, a multilateral party grid of exchange rates established in 1979. However, the repeated realignments of its central rate against the deutsche mark implied that the overall devaluation of its currency was even larger than that of the floating currencies such as the pound. In order words, despite the formal membership of the ERM, the exchange rate effectively behaved as flexible.
22 Large firms will be overrepresented in my sample. Given that firms that enter are typically small while those that exit range from small to medium-sized, this could potentially weaken the role of extensive margin in my analysis. Keeping this caveat in mind, my findings should be interpreted as a lower bound.
The main advantage of ESEE, especially over the ORBIS dataset compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD), is that it closely captures the extensive margin of production.\(^{23}\) This is particularly true for the exit of firms as the dataset clearly differentiates between firms that decide not to collaborate in a given year, firms that exit the market and firms that are affected by a split-up, a merger or an acquisition process. In addition, firms that resume production or collaboration with the survey are re-included in the sample and properly recorded. As for entry, new firms are incorporated every year in order to minimize the deterioration of the initial sample. These include all entrants with more than 200 workers and a random selection representing 5% of those with 10 to 200 workers.

There are other advantages of the ESEE dataset that are also worth highlighting. It is the only dataset with reliable financial information going back as early as the beginning of the 1990s, allowing me to study the 1992-93 episode. It also provides firm-level records of the value of exports which is most often subject to stringent confidentiality rules in Spain.\(^{24}\) Finally, I drop the entire firm record, instead of the corresponding firm-year observation, when conducting standard consistency checks on the data. The reason is that I want to prevent firms disappearing (and maybe then reappearing) in the sample strictly due to the cleaning procedure. This is important to correctly capture entry and exit to the market. The efforts devoted to ensure consistency and accuracy during the ESEE data collection process minimize the loss of observations resulting from this requirement. I only leave out firms that report zero or negative values of value added or capital stock.

### 4.3 Estimating firm-level TFP

I measure real output as nominal value added divided by an output price deflator. Obtaining an appropriate industry-specific output price deflator series has proved to be challenging for two reasons. First, the data needs to go back in time at least until 1990, while Eurostat series, the standard source, only start around 2000. Instead, I use the producer price index provided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (NSI). Second, the ESEE provides its own industry classification based on the sum of the three-digit NACE Rev.2 codes to 20 manufacturing industries. Given that the mapping is not strictly one-to-one, deriving corresponding industry-

\(^{23}\)The other existing firm-level dataset, as used in García-Santana et al. (2016), is the Central Balance Sheet Data (Central de Balances Integrada, CBI, in Spanish) owned by the Bank of Spain and only accessible to in-house economists. This alternative dataset, however, is built using the same source of data that constitutes the Spanish input for ORBIS, annual financial statements that firms are obliged to submit to the Commercial Registry, and, thus, is subjected to the same criticism. Please check Almunia et al. (2018) for more details.

\(^{24}\)To the best of my knowledge, the only available dataset is the foreign transactions registry collected by the Bank of Spain containing transaction-level data which can be aggregated to the firm-level using the firm’s fiscal identifier as done in Almunia et al. (2018). Given the administrative nature of the dataset, however, only large operations are recorded. Moreover, the minimum reporting threshold changed from 12,500 to 50,000 euros in 2008, hindering the possibility of correctly measuring the extensive margin of exports.
specific deflators requires implementing a weighting strategy.\textsuperscript{25} My approach is to use sector contribution to total manufacturing value added in 2018, also provided by the NSI, as the relevant weight.\textsuperscript{26}

I follow the literature in using the wage bill, deflated by the above price series, instead of employment to measure the labor input, in order to control for heterogeneity in labor quality across firms. To measure capital stock I use two different variables given existing data restrictions: for the 1990-1999 period I use total real net capital stock whereas for the 2000-2014 period I use the book value of fixed assets deflated by the price of investment goods from the Spanish National Statistics Institute.\textsuperscript{27,28}

The standard practice is to estimate industry output elasticities for capital and labor by regressing value added on input choices and to compute firm-level productivity as the Solow residual.\textsuperscript{29} When performing the first step, two potential problems emerge. First, productivity is unobservable and strongly correlated with input choices. A simple OLS regression will therefore deliver biased estimates of the desired elasticities because of simultaneity. Second, there is a selection bias due to the fact that firm survival is related to the unobserved productivity level: firms that remain in the sample tend to be the most productive ones.

To overcome the former issue, I follow the proxy variable approach (see Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)) among the possibilities offered by the literature.\textsuperscript{30} Intuitively, this method substitutes unobserved productivity by a proxy variable in the original regression; where a proxy variable is an observable input or choice variable for which the mapping with respect to productivity is assumed to be invertible. Coefficients of the inputs that do not enter this mapping, mainly labor, can be non-parametrically estimated using OLS in a first stage. The remaining coefficients, capital, are estimated next by exploiting the zero correlation assumption between the unexpected component of productivity and the input choice using GMM. I use materials deflated by the output price deflator as the proxy variable. To account for labor dynamics, however, I implement the refinement introduced by Ackerberg et al. (2015) that consists of identifying all coefficients in the second stage by using conditional (as opposed to

\textsuperscript{25}For example, manufacturing industry with ESEE code 7 (paper) corresponds to NACE Rev.2 codes 171 and 172.

\textsuperscript{26}The NSI provides weightings for the 2010-2018 period only. I use 2018 figures, as opposed to taking an average or an alternative year, because 2018 is the only year for which there are no missing values.

\textsuperscript{27}Total real net capital stock is defined as the value of the stock of total net capital at 1990 constant prices which I simply convert into base year (2015) prices.

\textsuperscript{28}I conduct several robustness exercises in order to check whether the change in the capital stock measure has an impact on the results. First, for the years for which the two series overlap, 1993-1999, I estimate that the correlation coefficient at the firm-level is 0.9. Second, for the 1993-1999 period, I estimate the production function using the two series separately and then compare resulting coefficients - for 18 out of 20 industries the differences are of magnitude $\pm0.5$ on average. Finally, I redo the analysis splitting the sample before and after 1999 such that the two series do not interact in any way during the production function estimation stage.

\textsuperscript{29}See Appendix B.1 for a more detailed review of production function estimation techniques.

\textsuperscript{30}The other alternatives are fixed effects, instrumental variables, first order conditions and dynamic panel approach.
unconditional) moments.\footnote{In addition to accounting for labor dynamics, Ackerberg et al. (2015) improves on the Wooldridge (2009)'s extension of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach by allowing for unobserved serially correlated shocks to wages. Their framework also overcomes Gandhi et al. (2016)'s concern regarding the non-identification result of the proxy variable approach by assuming a Leontief production function in materials. As a robustness check, nevertheless, I show that these two alternative methodologies generate firm-level TFP series which are highly correlated with my baseline TFP.}

To control for attrition, I include an intermediate stage in which the probability of survival is estimated by fitting a probit model on materials, labor and capital in the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996). This probability is then included as a regressor in the final stage.

### 4.4 Analysis

Aggregate TFP, defined as the labor-weighted average of firm-level TFP, decreased by 10.87% during the 1992-1993 episode while increased by 10.02% in the 2009-2013 period.\footnote{I consider labor, as opposed to value added, weights when aggregating TFP for two reasons. On the one hand, I will be presenting a theoretical model with labor as the only factor of production where labor shares are the appropriate weight. On the other, large firms in terms of employment are overstated in my sample, as explained above, and, thus, labor weights are consistent with the interpretation of my results as a lower bound.} While consistent with the results of the event study, the granularity of the data allows for a more detailed investigation regarding the drivers of productivity.

**The lower tail** I first document changes in the distribution of firm-level productivity before and after each of the crises. Figure A.1 plots a kernel probability distribution estimate of log TFP before and after a sudden stop for both the 1992-1993 and the 2009-2013 episodes. A number of patterns stand out. First, there is ample heterogeneity in TFP levels among firms in any given year as already highlighted by the literature. Second, the shape of the distribution is reasonably similar and remains unchanged throughout both crisis periods. Third, changes in TFP are not explained by major shifts in the distribution. A visual inspection suggests that the lower tail concentrates most, if not all, of the action: it lengthens as TFP decreases in the former crisis while shortens considerably as TFP increases in the latter case.

Figure 3 summarizes graphically the predominant role of the lower tail by presenting the mean change in log TFP per percentile of the distribution. On average, the change in productivity is close to zero during both episodes across the entire distribution, with the notable exception of the 1% percentile where TFP decreases by 70% during 1991-1993 while increases by 73% during 2009-2013.\footnote{Although the standard errors are admittedly large for the 1% percentiles in both cases, the difference relative to other percentiles is large enough to remain relevant.} Although the standard errors are admittedly large for the 1% percentiles in both cases, the difference relative to other percentiles is large enough to remain relevant.

Estimated moments of the distribution confirm the above hypothesis with higher-order moments experiencing the largest swings.\footnote{Refer to Table A.2 for further details.} During the 1992-93 crisis firms display lower productivity

---

\footnote{In the former case, the 5% percentile also shrinks although by a smaller magnitude, 36%.}
on average and the dispersion of log TFP increases. The increase in dispersion, however, is asymmetric. The distribution of unproductive firms expands while that of productive changes little with the coefficient of skewness declining from -0.40 to -1.24. Moreover, increasing kurtosis, 7.04 versus 10.42, is associated with fatter tails as the probability mass moves away from the shoulders of the distribution. Although the behavior of TFP exactly reverses during the 2009-2013 crisis - productivity increases while dispersion drops - it is still the tails, and especially, the lower tail, that changes the most. In this case, skewness increases from -2.37 to -0.89 while kurtosis shrinks from 27.92 to 7.13.

Decomposing TFP growth

While the above findings already support a narrative of shifting productivity cutoffs, there is yet room for skepticism. It is often the case that firms at the lower end of the productivity scale are small in size and, thus, have negligible effects on the aggregate. A more formal test of growth patterns would therefore consider weighted measures. Moreover, it should aim to disentangle the role of incumbent, entering and exiting firms in shaping TFP changes.

Define aggregate productivity, $Z_t$, as a weighted average of firm-level TFP. Given that the focus is on firm dynamics, I express overall aggregate productivity as the weighted sum of the aggregate productivities of incumbents, $Z_t^C$, entrants, $Z_t^N$, and exiters, $Z_t^E$,

$$Z_t \equiv \sum_{i \in N_t} s_{i,t} Z_{i,t} = s_t^C Z_t^C + s_t^N Z_t^N + s_t^E Z_t^E,$$

where $s_{i,t}$ is the labor share of firm $i$ and $N_t$ the total number of firms in the economy, both at time $t$. In addition, $s_j^j$ is the total labor share and $Z_j^j \equiv \sum_{i \in j} s_{i,t} Z_{i,t}^j$ is the aggregate productivity of firms pertaining to group $j$, where $j = \{C, N, E\}$.

The variable of interest is the change in aggregate productivity from period $t-1$ to period $t$, $\Delta Z_t$. It follows that the relevant groups for the analysis are: incumbents in both periods, firms exiting at period $t-1$ and firms entering in period $t$. This implies that $s_{t-1}^E = s_t^X = 0$. By exploiting the fact that $s_{t-1}^C + s_{t-1}^X = 1$ and $s_t^C + s_t^N = 1$ and using the expression above, I can rewrite the change in aggregate productivity as

$$\Delta Z_t = Z_t^C - Z_{t-1}^C + s_t^N (Z_t^N - Z_{t-1}^N) + s_{t-1}^X (Z_{t-1}^X - Z_{t-1}^C).$$

The interpretation of the above decomposition partly coincides with that of Melitz and Polanec (2015): entrants (exiters) contribute positively to TFP growth when their average productivity is higher (lower) than the incumbents’ counterpart. These contributions are weighted by the labor share of entrants, $s_t^N$, and exiters, $s_{t-1}^X$, respectively.\textsuperscript{35} I abstract, however, from de-

\textsuperscript{35}This version differs from the widely used Foster et al. (2001) decomposition in allowing for differences in the reference productivity for entrants, exiters and incumbents. Intuitively, the contribution of entrants (exiters) is now equal to the change in productivity one would observe if entry (exit) was elided. Moreover, it has a
composing the contribution of incumbents further using Olley and Pakes (1996)’s approach.\textsuperscript{36} Instead, I follow Dias and Marques (2018) in tracking individual incumbent firms over time so that I can distinguish between the contributions of firm-level productivity growth and labor share reallocation among them.

Given the definition of \( Z_{C}^{t} \), the change in aggregate productivity can be further decomposed as:

\[
\Delta Z_{t} = \sum_{i \in C} s_{i,t-1} \Delta Z_{i,t} + \sum_{i \in C} Z_{i,t-1} \Delta s_{i,t} + \sum_{i \in C} s_{i,t-1} \Delta Z_{i,t} + s_{i,t}^{N} \left( Z_{i,t}^{N} - Z_{i-1}^{C} \right) + s_{i,t}^{X} \left( Z_{i,t}^{X} - Z_{i-1}^{C} \right).
\]

The contribution by incumbents maps exactly into that in Foster et al. (2016). The first term measures the contribution of within-firm productivity changes of incumbents weighted by their initial share. The second term captures the contribution of market share reallocation. The third term is known as the cross-effect, it is the covariance of market share and productivity changes for the individual firm.

The results of the TFP growth decomposition for the two sudden stops are summarized in Table 1. The decline in TFP in the 1992-1993 crisis is entirely driven by incumbents. In fact, net entry contributes to positive growth, although the magnitude is small. Among incumbents, there is some reallocation of market shares towards more productive firms. However, it is far from enough to overcome the pronounced fall in within-firm productivity and the cross-term.\textsuperscript{37}

In contrast, the increase in TFP experienced during 2009-2013 is largely driven by net entry, in particular, by unproductive firms exiting the sample. The size of the effect is remarkable, especially given that small and medium firms are underrepresented in the sample. Delving deeper into the characteristics of exiting firms shows that during the 2009-2013 episode, firms that exit the market were, on average, bigger in terms of labor market share (7.01\% versus 2.78) and three times as unproductive in relation to incumbents (27.16\% versus 9.17\%) than their 1992-1993 counterparts. Moreover, the annualized exit rate more than doubled from 4.47\% to 9.19\%.\textsuperscript{38}

Back to Table 1, the contribution of incumbents, although half as important, is also remarkable. It is still the case that average productivity of incumbents is procyclical, yet the positive effect
of the between and cross terms dominate overall. The increase in resource reallocation and a stronger correlation between productivity changes and market share, together with the positive contribution of exiting firms, is consistent with a cleansing effect of the 2009-13 sudden stop which is absent in the 1992-93 episode. The cleansing hypothesis, as discussed by Caballero et al. (1994), argues that crises are periods of accelerated productivity-enhancing reallocations, especially as resources are freed by the exit of unproductive firms. I turn to formally testing the firm-level implications of this interpretation in what follows.

The cleansing hypothesis

According to the literature, there is a tight connection between firm exit, input growth and productivity: models of firm dynamics predict that exit is more likely among low productivity firms whereas high productivity firms are expected to grow by more every period. The cleansing hypothesis suggests that recessions accelerate these dynamics. One should therefore observe a stronger correlation between survival, employment and capital growth and productivity levels during crises. To test whether this is the case for the two sudden stop episodes considered, I adjust the empirical specification proposed by Foster et al. (2016) and Dias and Marques (2018) and run the following set of regressions:

$$ y_{it} = \lambda + \beta t f p_{it} + \delta ss^1_{it} + \gamma ss^1_{it} * t f p_{it} + \mu ss^2_{it} + \theta ss^2_{it} * t f p_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, $$

where $y_{it}$ stands for a set of explanatory variables. It is a dummy variable with value one when a firm reports activity in period $t$ and no activity in period $t + 1$ in the exit specification. It is a quantitative variable measuring employment and/or capital growth in the regressions for input growth. The regressor $ss^1_{it}$ is a dummy variable for the 1992-93 sudden stop, $ss^2_{it}$ is a dummy variable for the 2009-13 sudden stop and $t f p_{it}$ captures the log of firm-level productivity.

For the exit specification, the relationship between survival probability and productivity is expected to be positive and, thus, $\beta < 0$. Under the cleansing hypothesis, this correlation should strengthen during a sudden stop episode and one would anticipate $\gamma < 0$ and $\theta < 0$. Note that the sign of parameters $\delta$ and $\mu$ provide additional insights regarding the interaction terms. They capture the change in exit rate during the sudden stops that is not correlated with productivity. When positive, it suggests that the increase in exit rates during the crises is disproportionally larger for the least productive firms. For the input growth specification, the exact opposite applies.

Results of these regressions are summarized in Table 2. The first column shows the relationship between productivity and the probability of exit. Consistent with earlier findings, firms that exit the market tend to feature lower productivity levels. Focusing on the interaction terms, there is evidence of a cleansing effect only during the second episode. Based on the estimates, 2009-2013 is a period of increasing exit rates, especially among the less productive firms. Note that while the coefficients $\delta$ and $\gamma$ have the correct sign, they are smaller in magnitude than $\mu$ and $\theta$ and, more importantly, not statistically different from zero.

16
The second and third columns support further the predictions of the cleansing hypothesis for the 2009-13 episode. First, note that there is a positive impact of productivity on labor growth as predicted by the literature. Of greater interest, this correlation is even higher during the second sudden stop. Together with the negative sign of coefficient $\mu$, there is evidence that high productivity levels somewhat shielded firms from shrinking during the crisis years. The fourth and fifth columns show the capital growth specifications for completeness. Results, however, are uninformative with estimated coefficients displaying no statistical significance.

To further understand the quantitative relevance of my results, Figure 4 plots the implied differences in exit probability and labor growth between two firms with productivity level one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the sectoral mean during normal times, the 1992-93 sudden stop and the 2009-13 sudden stop. The difference in exit rates is 3.7% in the baseline scenario and increases during sudden stops. While the increase is minor during the 1992-93 episode, up to 4.3%, the implied difference almost doubles in the latter case, 7.1%. The magnitudes of the difference for labor growth follow a similar pattern. The baseline gap between a high productivity and low productivity firm is only of 0.9%, increasing to 1.1% during the first sudden stop and up to 2.6% over the second. Note that results for labor growth are robust to considering the subsample of continuing firms.

**Allocative efficiency** Finally, I evaluate an additional theoretical channel through which reallocation may contribute to TFP growth - increased allocative efficiency. Consider the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework with a final good featuring a CES production function in differentiated intermediates goods that are imperfectly substitutable. Intermediate good producers have standard Cobb-Douglas production technologies, with capital share $\alpha$, and are subject to firm-specific exogenous wedges that distort (i) output, $\tau_{it}^{y}$, and (ii) capital relative to labor, $\tau_{it}^{k}$. The individual intermediate good producer optimization problem delivers the following first-order conditions with respect to labor, $l_{it}$, and capital, $k_{it}$:

\[
MRP_{it}^L = \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\mu} \right) \left( \frac{p_{it}y_{it}}{l_{it}} \right) = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \tau_{it}^{y}} \right) w_{t},
\]

\[
MRP_{it}^K = \left( \frac{\alpha}{\mu} \right) \left( \frac{p_{it}y_{it}}{k_{it}} \right) = \left( \frac{1 + \tau_{it}^{k}}{1 - \tau_{it}^{y}} \right) r_{t},
\]

where $p_{it}y_{it}$ is firm nominal value added, $w_{t}$ is the cost of labor, $r_{t}$ is the cost of capital and $\mu$ is the constant markup of price over marginal cost.

Hsieh and Klenow (2009) formally show that aggregate TFP in this economy is highest when resources are allocated optimally. This is achieved only if firms face equal distortions and marginal revenue products above are equalized.\(^{39}\) Therefore, the degree of dispersion in firm-specific distortions is informative of the degree of misallocation in the economy. As distortions

\(^{39}\)See Appendix B.2 for a brief review of their argument.
are unobservable in practice, I measure the standard deviation of marginal revenue products as a proxy of allocative efficiency and study its evolution over time. Periods of higher TFP should be associated with periods of lower marginal revenue product dispersion and differences in the results for capital and labor can be interpreted as evidence of the different types of wedges that prevail.

I set the capital share to be equal to 0.35 and the constant markup equal to 1.5 as in Gopinath et al. (2017). I first obtain sector-level measures of dispersion in logs which I then aggregate into an economy-wide labor-weighted average using time-invariant weights corresponding to the 2000-2014 labor share average.

Figure 5 reports the within-sector standard deviations of marginal revenue products of capital and labor relative to 1990, which is normalized to one. The dispersion of log MRPK is declining over time until the late 1990s when the trend clearly reverses. During the 2000s there is a gradual increase in dispersion, with the more pronounced hikes taking place from 2005 onwards. This is somewhat interrupted during the recent crisis during which dispersion is reduce slightly with the trend reverting back to the pre-crisis level by the end of the sample. The overall description holds for the dispersion of log MRPL too, although the latter depicts much larger volatility.

The increase in the dispersion of log MRPK during the pre-crisis had already been documented by both Gopinath et al. (2017) and García-Santana et al. (2016) using different datasets for the Spanish manufacturing sector. This result justifies their focus on the role of capital misallocation. The difference here is the pattern of log MRPL; while the former papers had reported a relatively flat (or even declining) path, I find that it follows a similar, yet more pronounced, trend to that of log MRPK. According to the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework, this should be interpreted as evidence of changing external distortions that affect both factors of production. 40 I argue, however, that internal distortions, such as heterogeneity in price markups, would generate observationally equivalent patterns. Moreover, this is a more realistic interpretation given that the constant markup assumption has been long rebated by the industrial organization literature (see Syverson (2004) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) as examples). 41

In sum, the above findings call for a theory of sudden stops that features heterogeneously productive firms, selection into production and endogenous variables markups. All of these elements, together with the exchange rate dimension, are featured in the theoretical model that I develop in the next section.

40 In the model this is represented by an output distortion.
5 Theoretical model

Consider an infinite-horizon small open economy. Time is discrete and indexed by $t$. The economy is populated by a representative household that consumes goods and leisure and engages in financial transactions with foreign investors. There is also a large number of differentiated firms that produce consumption goods using labor supplied by the households, and a monetary authority that sets the nominal exchange rate as the policy instrument.

5.1 A representative household

The representative household derives utility from leisure and the consumption of a set of differentiated goods, indexed by $\omega$, and supplies differentiated types of labor input, indexed by $i$. The lifetime utility is given by:

$$E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(q_t(\omega), L_i^t) \right],$$

(1)

where $E_t$ is the expectation operator conditional on the information set available at time $t$, $\beta$ is the discount factor, $q_t(\omega)$ is the consumption level of variety $\omega$ and $L_i^t$ is the labor supply of type $i$. The period utility function is assumed to be:

$$U(q_t(\omega), L_i) = \alpha \int_{N_t} q_t(\omega) d\omega - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \int_{N_t} q_t(\omega)^2 d\omega - \frac{1}{2} \eta \left( \int_{N_t} q_t(\omega) d\omega \right)^2 - \int_{0}^{1} L_i^t \, di,$$

where $N_t$ is the number of differentiated varieties available in the economy.

Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) preferences are appealing for three reasons. First, they capture love of variety through $\gamma$, which determines the level of product differentiation between consumption goods and is assumed to be strictly positive. As $\gamma$ increases, consumers place higher weight on the distribution of consumption across varieties. Second, the quadratic form gives rise to a linear demand function which ensures the existence of a choke price and an extensive margin of production even in the absence of fixed costs of production. Third, they generate endogenous variable markups, which capture the effect of market competition on firm sales (the so-called pro-competitive effect) as opposed to standard CES preferences.

Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) preferences also depict a second consumption good, which is homogeneous and assumed to be the numeraire, with a linear production technology that pins down the wage in the economy. As endogenous fluctuations in the wage level are relevant in this analysis, this feature of the original functional form is inconvenient. Moreover, in the context of an internal devaluation, it is also interesting to capture any changes in demand patterns that may arise from movements in wages. My approach is to explicitly model the labor supply
decision by assuming preferences that are linear in leisure. The demand parameters $\alpha$ and $\eta$ therefore measure the substitutability between the consumption of differentiated goods and leisure and are also assumed to be strictly positive.

The budget constraint of the representative agent in terms of domestic currency can be written as:

$$\int_{N_t} p_t(\omega) q_t(\omega) d\omega + \epsilon_t B_t = \int_0^1 W_t^i L_t^i \, di + \Pi_t + \epsilon_t R_{t-1} B_{t-1},$$

where $W_t^i L_t^i$ is the income derived from supplying differentiated labor input $i$, $\Pi_t$ is profit received from firms and $\epsilon_t$ denotes the nominal exchange rate, defined as units of domestic currency needed to buy one unit of foreign currency.

The representative household can only engage in financial transactions with foreign investors by trading in risk-free foreign denominated bonds $B_t$, which pay a debt elastic rate of return:

$$R_t = R_t^* + \phi \left( e^{\bar{B} - B_t - 1} \right) + \left( e^{\xi_t - 1} - 1 \right),$$

where $R_t^*$ is the world interest rate and $\bar{B}$ is the steady state level of debt. The only source of uncertainty is $\xi_t$, which is interpreted as a country risk premium shock, similar to that of Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Drechsel and Tenreyro (2017), and assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs. A sudden stop in the model is a positive realization of $\xi_t$: an unexpected increase in the cost of international borrowing that forces the domestic economy to deleverage internationally by expanding net exports.

Labor supply is differentiated: there is a unit continuum of labor types which are imperfect substitutes between them. Firms can aggregate labor types according to

$$L_t = \left( \int_0^1 L_t^i \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \, di \right)^{\theta - 1},$$

where $\theta$ measures the elasticity of substitution. I assume that the representative household supplies all the differentiated labor inputs as in Woodford (2011).

Suppose, for example, that each member of the household specializes in one occupation. The representative household has monopoly power to set the wage for each labor type, $W_t^i$.

Each period the household chooses $q_t(\omega), B_t, L_t^i$ and $W_t^i$ to maximize the expected present discounted value of utility, equation (1), subject to the budget constraint, equation (2), and the demand for type $i$ labor input, which is given by:

$$L_t^i = \left( \frac{W_t}{W_t^i} \right)^\theta L_t.$$
Optimality conditions Given quadratic preferences, it may be the case that not all differentiated goods are demanded by the household. However, when a particular good $\omega$ is consumed, its inverse demand is determined by:

$$\alpha - \gamma q_t(\omega) - \eta Q_t = \lambda_t p_t(\omega), \quad (4)$$

where $Q_t$ is the consumption level over all varieties and $\lambda_t$ is the time $t$ Lagrangian multiplier. Consumption of a given variety decreases with price, the marginal utility of wealth and total consumption.

The optimal decision for the purchase of the foreign asset, $B_t$, delivers a standard Euler equation:

$$\lambda_t = \beta R_t E_t \left[ \frac{\epsilon_{t+1}}{\epsilon_t} \lambda_{t+1} \right]. \quad (5)$$

A higher interest rate and expectations of nominal exchange rate depreciation both increase the returns from foreign investment and, thus, encourage consumer savings.

Solving for the optimal wage for labor type $i$ gives:

$$W^i_t = \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \lambda_t. \quad (6)$$

Intuitively, higher wages increase household’s wealth everything else equal. Given diminishing marginal utility, the Lagrangian multiplier falls. Equation (6) also implies that the optimal flexible wage is equalized across labor types i.e. $W_t = W^i_t$.

Finally, note that the representative household will be willing to satisfy firms’ labor demand as long as the real wage covers the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure:

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} \geq \frac{1}{(\alpha - \eta Q_t) N_t - \gamma Q_t}. \quad \text{(5.2 Firms)}$$

There is a continuum of measure $M$ of domestic firms, each choosing to produce a differentiated variety $\omega$. Labor is the only factor of production and the unit production cost is a concave function in the factor price i.e. $C_t = W^\sigma_t$, where $0 < \sigma \leq 1$ is the labor income share. Firms only differ in the productivity level $z$ which is drawn from a Pareto distribution $1 - G(z) = \left( \frac{1}{z} \right)^k$ with shape parameter $k$ and minimum productivity level equal to one.

---

46 The same is true for the foreign economy: there is a continuum of measure $M^*$ potentially active foreign firms.

47 To rationalize this functional form, suppose there is a second factor of production, land, which is inelastically supplied by households and the production function is Cobb-Douglas in land and labor. If the rental price of land is assumed to be constant, the unit production cost is given by $C_t = \left( \frac{W_t}{\sigma} \right)^\sigma \left( \frac{\kappa}{1-\sigma} \right)^{1-\sigma}$. 

21
The main focus of the paper is the short-run and, as such, cross-country reallocation of firms is not allowed. This implies that the number of potentially active firms in the economy, $M$, is fixed and there is no free entry condition. Firms only choose whether to produce or not in each period based on the profitability for the corresponding period.

Firms can sell their varieties in both the domestic and the export market. Markets are segmented and selling abroad requires incurring a per-unit trade cost $\tau > 1$. While domestic demand for variety $z$, $q^H_t(z)$, is given by equation (4), the foreign demand for a domestic variety $z$, $q^{*F}_t(z)$, is given by:

$$q^{*F}_t(z) = A - B p^{*F}_t(z), \quad (7)$$

where $A$ and $B$ are exogenous given a small-open economy setting. In the spirit of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), Appendix C.1 shows that this small open economy is a special case of the two economy framework where the share of potentially active firms in Home, $n = \frac{M}{M + M^*}$, approaches zero.49

**Optimality conditions** The profit maximization problem delivers the following set of first-order conditions:

$$q^H_t(z) = \max \left\{ \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} \left[ p^H_t(z) - \frac{W^*_t}{z} \right], 0 \right\},$$

$$q^F_t(z) = \max \left\{ \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} \left[ p^F_t - \frac{\tau \epsilon_t (W^*_t)^\sigma}{z} \right], 0 \right\},$$

$$q^{*F}_t(z) = \max \left\{ B \left[ p^{*F}_t(z) - \frac{\tau W^*_t}{\epsilon_t z} \right], 0 \right\},$$

where the expressions for domestically-consumed domestically-produced, henceforth domestic goods, $q^H_t(z)$, and exported goods, $q^{*F}_t(z)$, are given by the optimization of domestic firms while the expression for imported goods, $q^F_t(z)$, results from the optimization of foreign firms. Note that the corresponding prices are also derived from the above expressions.

The labor demand for a domestic firm with productivity level $z$ is given by:

$$L_t(z) = \frac{\sigma q_t(z)}{W^{1-\sigma}_t z}, \quad (8)$$

where $q_t(z)$ will be either $q^H_t(z)$ or $q^{*F}_t(z)$ depending on whether the labor input hired will be used to serve the domestic or the export market.

---

48 Note that this is only true for the baseline set-up. In one of the extensions, I allow for firm entry and exit and study long-run implications instead.

49 In the limit $z^{*F}$ is unaffected by changes in Home, the term $A$ includes the price index, the number of consumed varieties and the marginal utility of wealth in Foreign while the term $B$ is proportional to the marginal utility of wealth in Foreign.
5.3 Aggregation and market clearing

I aggregate firm-level variables and impose market clearing conditions as the building blocks to define the competitive equilibrium.

**Productivity thresholds** Given that firm-level productivity follows a Pareto distribution, the aggregate productivity level for a given market is summarized by a productivity threshold. This is simply the productivity level of the marginal firm that is indifferent between producing or not for a specific market.

On the supply side, the zero profit condition holds for the marginal firm: it optimally sets its price equal to its marginal cost. On the demand side, the linearity of consumer’s demand gives rise to the existence of a choke price. This is the maximum price that can be charged for a given variety at which demand is driven down to zero. By combining these two conditions, the equilibrium thresholds can be expressed as:

\[
\begin{align*}
    z^H_t &= \frac{\gamma + \eta N_t}{\alpha \gamma + \eta P_t} W_t^\sigma, \\
    z^F_t &= \frac{\gamma + \eta N_t}{\alpha \gamma + \eta P_t} \tau \epsilon_t (W_t^*)^\sigma, \\
    z^{*F}_t &= \frac{B A}{\tau W_t^* \epsilon_t},
\end{align*}
\]

where \(z^H_t\) is the productivity threshold for domestic firms serving the domestic market, \(z^F_t\) is the importer threshold and \(z^{*F}_t\) is the exporter threshold. Given the small open economy set-up, the productivity threshold for foreign firms serving the foreign market, \(z^{*H}_t\) is exogenously determined and it is irrelevant for the analysis.

**Number of firms** The number of active firms in the domestic market, \(N_t\) is the sum of domestic firms that serve the domestic market, \(N^H_t\), plus the number of foreign importers, \(N^F_t\). Given the number of existing firms in both markets, \(M\) and \(M^*\), and the Pareto distribution assumption, the number of active firms is given by:

\[
N_t = M \left( \frac{1}{z^H_t} \right)^k + M^* \left( \frac{1}{z^F_t} \right)^k,
\]

where \(\left( \frac{1}{z^H_t} \right)^k\) is the probability that an incumbent has a productivity level above the cutoff and, thus, generates positive profits. Note that because each firm specializes in a particular variety, \(N_t\) is also the number of differentiated varieties available for consumption in the small open economy.

\(^{50}\text{See Section 6 for the formal proof.}\)
**Price level** The aggregate price level is given by the sum of prices of all goods consumed domestically, that is, prices of domestically produced goods consumed domestically and import prices:

\[ P_t = N_t^H \int_{z^H_t} p_t^H(z) \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z^H_t)} \, dz + N_t^F \int_{z^F_t} p_t^F(z) \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z^F_t)} \, dz. \]

Combined with the optimal price expressions that result from the firm’s maximization problem and the number of active firms in equilibrium, given by equation (12), the above expression is considerably simplified to read:

\[ P_t = \frac{2k + 1}{2k + 2} \frac{W_t N_t}{z^H_t}. \] (13)

The aggregate price level is determined by the number of firms and the average effective marginal cost. The former follows by definition, the latter from the individual firm’s optimization problem. Firms charge higher prices whenever their cost of production increase. This is the case when the wage level is high but also when the individual productivity level is low. As the average productivity level in the economy depends positively on the domestic threshold, the aggregate price level decreases in \( z^H_t \).

**Wage level** I introduce nominal rigidities in the form of sticky information, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002), in the wage setting process. The representative household updates its information set for each labor type it supplies with a probability \( \mu \). The aggregate wage is then given by:

\[ \log W_t = \mu \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (1 - \mu)^s \mathbb{E}_{t-s} \{ \log W^i_t \} = \log \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} - \mu \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (1 - \mu)^s \mathbb{E}_{t-s} \{ \log \lambda_t \}. \] (14)

A labor type that last updated its information set \( s \) periods ago chooses its wage today to be equal to its \( s \)-periods-ago expectation of today’s flexible wage. Thus, the aggregate wage is a weighted average of the current and all past expectations of today’s desired wage. Expectations farther in the past are given less weight because the share of labor types that are stuck with old information decays over time.

**Labor market clearing** To ensure that the labor market clears in equilibrium, aggregate labor demand must equal aggregate labor supply. To aggregate domestic individual labor demand given by equation (8), I sum across all active domestic firms using the Pareto distribution assumption. Labor market clearing then boils down to:

\[ L_t = \frac{k}{(k + 1)(k + 2)} \frac{\sigma}{W_t^{1-2\sigma}} M \left[ \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} \left( z^H_t \right)^{-(k+2)} + B \frac{\tau^2}{\epsilon_t} \left( z^F_t \right)^{-(k+2)} \right]. \] (15)
The balance of payments condition  Combining some of the equilibrium conditions above, together with the domestic firms’ aggregate profit equation and the consumer’s budget constraint gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy, which, in an open-economy setting, is simply the balance of payments condition. In other words, it states that the current account must be equal to the capital account in equilibrium:

\[ EX_t - IM_t = \epsilon_t (B_t - R_t B_{t-1}) , \]  

where \( EM_t \) and \( IM_t \), the total export and import revenues in domestic currency terms, are given by:

\[ IM_t = \int N^F_t p_t^F (\omega) q_t^F (\omega) d\omega = \frac{1}{k+2} M* \frac{\lambda_t (\tau \epsilon_t (W_t^*)^2)}{2} (z_t^F)^{-(k+2)} , \]  

(17)

\[ EX_t = \epsilon_t \int N_t^F p_t^F (\omega) q_t^F (\omega) d\omega = \frac{1}{k+2} M \frac{\lambda^* (\tau W_t^*)^{2}}{\epsilon_t} (z_t^F)^{-(k+2)} . \]  

(18)

5.4 Exchange rate policy

To pin down the nominal variables of the model, I need to determine exchange rate policy. Suppose the central bank implements monetary policy by setting the nominal exchange rate. I consider two exchange rate regimes characterized by different targeting rules. First, consider a currency union. This is equivalent to assuming that the central bank can perfectly commit to a currency peg in which \( \epsilon_t = 1 \) at every period \( t \).

Second, assume a policy of strict zero wage inflation targeting. This rule simply offsets all the distortions originating from nominal rigidities in the economy by implementing the flexible wage equilibrium, which is given by equation (6). Any movements in the real exchange rate will translate one-to-one into movements in the nominal exchange rate. This is the equivalent to a floating arrangement in this framework.\(^{51}\)

5.5 Equilibrium

I am now ready to define a rational expectations equilibrium as a set of stochastic processes \( \{z_t^H, z_t^F, z_t^F, IM_t, EX_t, L_t, N_t, B_t, R_t, P_t, \lambda_t, W_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) satisfying equations (3), (5), and (9)-(18) given the exogenous process \( \{\xi_{t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and the central bank’s policy \( \{\epsilon_{t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \). The foreign wage, \( W_t^* \), is normalized to one.

\(^{51}\)The exchange rate policy defined here can be easily generalized by assuming a rule such that:

\[ (\Pi_t^W)^{\phi_W} (\epsilon_t)^{1-\phi_W} = 1 , \]  

(19)

where \( \Pi_t^W = \frac{W_t}{W_t^*} \) is wage inflation and \( 0 \leq \phi_W \leq 1 \) is the weight that the monetary authority puts on wage stabilization. A currency union and a strict wage inflation target are the two extreme versions of this rule, with \( \phi_W \) set equal to zero and one respectively.
Appendix C.3 discusses the existence and uniqueness of the non-stochastic steady state.

6 Sudden stops and productivity

Before proceeding to the full characterization of the model’s solution, it is useful to build some intuition on the potential impact of a sudden stop on productivity. A sudden stop episode forces a real exchange rate depreciation in the domestic economy. This implies a nominal exchange rate depreciation, an internal devaluation or a combination of both depending on the exchange rate policy in place. To ease understanding, I redefine a sudden stop directly as either an exogenous fall in wages, if in the currency union regime, or as an exogenous increase in the nominal exchange rate, if in the floating arrangement. In other words, I disregard the balance of payment condition, given by equation (16), for this section and study a version of the model with a partial equilibrium flavour.

6.1 Aggregate productivity

The variable of interest is domestic aggregate productivity, which is given by:

$$Z_t^H = N_t^H \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} \Omega(z) \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz,$$

where $\Omega(z)$ is the weight used in the aggregation. It must satisfy:

$$N_t^H \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} \Omega(z) \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz = 1.$$

Aggregate productivity is normally computed as: (i) the unweighted average, $\Omega(z) = \frac{1}{N_t^H}$; (ii) the output-weighted average, $\Omega(z) = \frac{q(z)}{Q_t^H}$; or (iii) the revenue-weighted average, $\Omega(z) = \frac{r(z)}{R_t^H}$. The following Lemma establishes that $z_t^H$ is the key statistic for measuring aggregate productivity independent of the weights used in the aggregation.

**Lemma 1.** Domestic aggregate productivity, $Z_t^H$, is an increasing function of the domestic productivity threshold, $z_t^H$.

---

52 $Q_t^H$ is total domestic output given by:

$$Q_t^H = N_t^H \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} q(z) \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz,$$

and $R_t^H$ is total domestic revenue given by:

$$R_t^H = N_t^H \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} r(z) \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz.$$
Proof. See Appendix D.1

In other words, changes in productivity in this model are governed by firms’ entry and exit dynamics. This is in contrast to alternatives in the literature that either model productivity as an exogenous shock to the economy, allow for variable capacity utilization or consider R&D decisions.

Note further that, given Lemma 1, the terms (domestic) aggregate productivity and (domestic) productivity threshold, \( z^H_t \), are used interchangeably for the rest of this section.

6.2 Pro-competitive, cost and demand channels

The productivity threshold is determined by the number of firms in the market, the cost of production and the level of consumer demand; all three are potentially subject to change during a sudden stop episode. Let \( \hat{X}_t \) define the log deviation of \( X_t \) and \( \bar{X} \) be its value at steady state.

**Proposition 1.** In equilibrium:

\[
\frac{\eta}{2k + 2 \alpha \gamma} \frac{N^H_t \hat{W}_t}{z^H_t} \hat{N}_t + \sigma \hat{W}_t + \hat{\lambda}_t.
\]

**Proof.** See Appendix D.2

The intuition follows next. In the first place, a larger number of active firms in the market, \( \hat{N}_t > 0 \), implies greater competition. Given the preferences considered, enhanced competition lowers individual firm demand. This forces less productive firms out of the market as profit margins are reduced at every level of productivity. This pro-competitive effect was first introduced by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) that only considers competition in the goods market.

Second, a higher aggregate wage, \( \hat{W}_t > 0 \), lowers the firm’s profit margin by increasing the costs to all firms. Again, a higher productivity level is then required to remain profitable and select into production, therefore, aggregate productivity increases. This is what I denote the cost effect, which is the underlying mechanism in the canonical Melitz (2003) model that focuses on competition in the labor market.

Finally, higher aggregate demand from consumers, \( \hat{\lambda}_t < 0 \), raises individual firm demand at all productivity levels and loosens the minimum productivity requirement. Less productive firms have a higher chance of entering or surviving in the market. This final channel, a novelty of this model, is referred to as the demand effect.\(^{53}\)

---

\(^{53}\)There is an implicit demand effect in the baseline Melitz (2003) model too. However, the assumption of fixed production costs introduces an additional fixed cost channel (on top of the variable cost channel here considered) that exactly offsets the demand effect.
6.3 Sudden stops and productivity

The following proposition considers the effect of a sudden stop, defined as explained above, on productivity under the two alternative exchange rate regimes.

**Proposition 2.** Given a sudden stop,

1. In a floating arrangement, only the pro-competitive channel operates and productivity falls:
   \[ \hat{N}_t < 0, \hat{W}_t = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\lambda}_t = 0 \quad \text{so that} \quad \hat{z}_t^H < 0. \]

2. In a currency union, all three channel operate and the change in productivity is ambiguous:
   \[ \hat{N}_t < 0, \hat{W}_t < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\lambda}_t > 0 \quad \text{so that} \quad \hat{z}_t^H \approx 0. \]

**Proof.** See Appendix D.3

First, suppose that the nominal exchange rate depreciates one-to-one with the real exchange rate, i.e. \( \epsilon_t \) increases. Under this assumption, the cost and the demand effect are muted as the wage level remains unchanged. There is a fall, however, in the active number of firms in the domestic economy as the number of importers declines with the loss of competitiveness of foreign firms. There is an unambiguous fall in productivity as a result of this negative pro-competitive effect.

Suppose instead that the aggregate wage adjusts completely: \( W_t \) falls while the nominal exchange rate remains unchanged. Under this alternative scenario, the negative pro-competitive effect prevails as there is still a decline in importing firms. The change in wages, in addition, leads to a negative cost effect, production of goods is cheaper, and a negative demand effect, households consume less.\(^54\) In other words, all three channels are operating.

6.4 Increasing TFP in a currency union

The change in productivity after a sudden stop is ambiguous in the currency union and depends on parameter values. It is possible, nonetheless, to show under which parameterization, the demand effect dominates and productivity increases.

**Corollary 1.** Following a sudden stop in a currency union, a sufficient condition for \( \hat{z}_t^H > 0 \) is that \( 1 > \mu \sigma (1 + k) \).

**Proof.** See Appendix D.4

\(^54\)Recall that a negative demand effect is represented by a positive change in \( \hat{\lambda}_t \).
There are three key parameters for this condition to hold: the share of labor income, $\sigma$, the degree of wage rigidities, $\mu$, and the shape parameter of the productivity distribution, $k$. The share of labor income governs the mapping between the wage level and the unit production cost. As $\sigma$ increases, labor represents a greater share of the optimal input bundle and falling wages cheapen production costs by more. This reinforces the cost effect of a sudden stop. In the Melitz (2003) model, the cost channel is at its strongest featuring a linear production function which is linear in labor, $\sigma = 1$.

The degree of wage rigidities determines the size of the demand effect. A sudden stop here is simply an improvement in the domestic economy’s competitiveness through an exogenous decline in the wage level. As the level of wage stickiness increases and fewer labor-types are allowed to adjust, the decline in labor-specific wages, $W^i_t$, that is required to achieve the desired overall wage adjustment is larger. This leads to a larger decrease in today’s consumer wealth and, thus, a stronger demand effect of a sudden stop.

The shape parameter measures the concentration of firms at the lower end of the productivity distribution. This represents the inverse of the dispersion in firm-level productivity. As firms only differ in their productivity levels, if $k$ increases, they become more homogeneous. This strengthens the pro-competitive channel by tightening the link between the number of firms and the degree of market power among domestic competitors. The less unique a firm is, the more increased competition will lower its individual demand.

Two questions remain unanswered. First, is the above requirement satisfied under reasonable parameterization? Second, do these results hold in the fully fledged model? In what follows I discuss how to calibrate and solve for the general equilibrium version of the model.

7 Taking the model to the data

As the model cannot be solved analytically, I next explore its properties by generating impulse response functions, focusing exclusively on a risk premium shock and studying the role of specific parameters in shaping the TFP result. However, to take the model to the data, I first need to redefine one assumption and calibrate parameters using Spanish data.

7.1 Number of existing firms

The baseline model described in Section 5 is augmented to better suit the analysis that follows. In particular, the number of existing firms is allowed to vary. While this modification improves the predictive performance of the model in general equilibrium, it does not change the main conclusions derived in the previous sections as shown in full detail in Appendix E.

The pool of potentially active firms, $M$, which is assumed to be constant in the benchmark
case, now responds to a sudden stop to circumvent the production boom that the model would otherwise generate.\footnote{Note this is true independently of the exchange rate policy that is implemented.} This feature of the baseline model is common to many other papers in the sudden stop literature. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) show that standard models that abstract from financial frictions are unable to reproduce observed decreases in output. The literature has considered featuring imported intermediate goods, labor frictions, variable capacity utilization, Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences, and exogenous TFP declines. Given the new extensive margin introduced in the model, I instead assume a law of motion for the number of existing firms such that in log deviation terms:

$$\hat{M}_t = -\rho \hat{\epsilon}_t - (1 - \rho) \hat{W}_t.$$  

The interpretation is the following: additional labor, domestic or foreign, is required to set up a new firm and, thus, the pool of potentially active firms depends negatively on the cost of labor input, either the domestic wage, $\epsilon_t$, or the foreign wage in domestic currency units, $\epsilon_t$. The parameter $\rho$ measures the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign labor in setting up new firms.

This assumption captures, in essence, some of the implications of the long-run version of the baseline model. Further details of the full extension together with results are available in Section 8.3. In short, the long-run version features a fixed input requirement in the form of capital for the production of any differentiated variety. Capital is produced under perfect competition and accumulated through an investment decision. This follows closely Ottaviano (2012) in putting Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in a DSGE framework. The only difference is that the fixed input requirement is assumed to be a combination of domestic and foreign capital and, therefore, the number of potentially active firms depends on the price of both types of capital i.e. domestic wages and the exchange rate. The law of motion above builds on this relationship, however, it does not take into account the dynamic optimization problem that the long-run version entails.

### 7.2 Calibration

Table 3 provides a summary of the parameters of the model, their baseline values and the source or the empirical target. The first set of parameters are standard and, thus, values are set in line with the literature and, when possible, consistent with Spanish statistics taking the 2002-2008 period as a reference. The time period of the model is a quarter. Accordingly, the discount factor $\beta$ is chosen to be 0.99. The output elasticity parameter $\sigma$ is set to 0.64, roughly the average labor share and within the range that is common in the literature. For the elasticity of substitution for labor types and the index of wage rigidities, values are taken from Galí and Monacelli (2016) which are based on empirical studies on European countries conducted by the OECD. In terms of trade costs, $\tau$ is equal to 1.3 following Melitz and Ghironi (2005) and many
others. The steady state level of debt, $\overline{B}$, is assumed to be zero, such that trade is balanced in steady state. Regarding the preference parameters, $\alpha$, $\gamma$ and $\eta$, I borrow the values used in Ottaviano (2012), all equal to 10.

The ESEE firm-level data presented in Section 2 is then used to estimate the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, following the approach proposed by Del Gatto et al. (2006). Given the observed cumulative distribution, $G(z)$, I run the following regression for every year and industry:

$$\ln(1 - G(z)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(z) + \eta$$

where, assuming a Pareto distribution, the slope coefficient, $\beta_1$ provides a consistent estimator for $k$. For the 2002-2008 period, $k$ is estimated to be, on average, equal to 1.9, close to Del Gatto et al. (2006)’s result of 2 for a combination of European countries in the year 2000. In addition, the regression $R^2$, which is equal to 0.7, confirms that the Pareto distribution is a reasonable assumption in this setting.

The above estimation provides an additional coefficient, $\beta_0$, that maps one-to-one to the realized distribution’s cutoff, $\overline{z}^H$. I use the corresponding 2002-2008 average as a first moment target in two different ways. On the one hand, I combine it with the 2002-2008 average number of firms in the ESEE sample to back up the value of $\overline{M}$ given that the number of potentially active firms is unobservable. The corresponding expression is given by $\overline{M} = (\overline{z}^H)^k \overline{N}^H$.

On the other hand, I use $\overline{z}^H$ to determine the value of the foreign demand parameters, $A$ and $B$. To do so I proceed in three steps. First, I set the relative size of the domestic economy, $n$, to match the 12% share of all Euroarea manufacturing firms that Spanish firms represent according to Eurostat’s Business Demography Statistics. Next, I take the average 2002-08 propensity to export as an additional first moment target which combined with $\overline{z}^H$ pins down $\overline{z}^*F$ as $\overline{N}^*F = (\overline{z}^H)^k$. Third, I back up the wage level that is consistent with the estimated cutoff using a combination of equilibrium conditions (9), (10), (13) and (12) in steady state. Parameter values for $A$ and $B$ then follow naturally using equation (11) and the trade balance condition.

The risk premium parameter, $\phi$, is a theoretical shortcut to ensure stationarity in small open economy frameworks. In the current setting, it measures the severity of the current account reversal given a one standard deviation shock. Thus, I choose its value such that the second theoretical moment of output during a sudden stop exactly matches its empirical counterpart, 3% for the 2009-2013 period. Finally, as there is no obvious candidate value for the degree of complementarity between foreign and domestic labor in setting up new firms, I consider an intermediate case, $\rho = 0.5$. 

31
7.3 Impulse Responses Functions

Figure 6 summarizes the model response of key macroeconomic variables to a sudden stop. All variables, but the current account, are expressed in log deviations from steady state. The current account is expressed in levels as trade balance is assumed to hold before the realization of the shock.

As expected, a sudden stop is characterized by a depreciation of the real exchange rate and a current account surplus. The model is able to predict a slight delay in the adjustment within a currency union. This is entirely driven by nominal rigidities as the model disregards additional policy instruments available within a currency union, such as public capital inflows, that might directly cushion the adjustment in the data.

The path of TFP diverges across regimes. On the one hand, under the baseline calibration, the negative effect of a lower aggregate demand offsets the positive effect of lower production costs and fewer competing firms on the domestic productivity cutoff and, thus, TFP improves in the currency union. On the other hand, productivity falls unambiguously in the floating regime. I study the sensitivity of these results to alternative parameter values in the following section.

GDP and consumption are both measured in units of foreign currency to ease comparison with Figures 1 and 2. The model correctly predicts a fall in both variables and under both regimes. Moreover, for a similar GDP decline, the fall in consumption is larger in the currency union, consistent with the aggregate data. The response of employment does not fully match the data: while the event study in Section 3 suggests employment in a floating arrangement is unchanged or slightly decreasing, the model predicts a minor increase. On the other hand, there is a clear decline in employment within a currency union both in the model and in the data.

Impulse response functions for all other endogenous variables can be found in Figure A.2. The current account surplus is explained by a simultaneous increase in export and decline in imports. In the currency union, there is an immediate decline in the price index while wages fall in a staggered fashion. In the floating regime, the exchange rate depreciates on impact with wages and prices remaining unchanged. In both regimes, the number of firms and, thus, the number of varieties falls with the shock.

7.4 Sensitivity of the TFP fact

The analytical results of Section 6 point to three structural parameters as the main determinants of the overall response of TFP: the degree of wage rigidities, $\omega$, the share of labor income, $\sigma$, and the shape parameter of the productivity distribution, $k$. I next embed the analysis within the general equilibrium framework.

The upper left graph of Figure 7 plots the immediate impact of TFP, in log deviations from
steady state, for both the currency union and the floating arrangement regimes for \(0.1 \leq \omega \leq 0.9\). By definition, under the floating arrangement wages are stabilized completely and, thus, there is no effect of wage frictions whatsoever. For the currency union, nevertheless, higher wage flexibility (higher \(\omega\)) leads to a smaller increase in TFP.\(^{56}\)

The upper right graph of Figure 7 decomposes the effect of a sudden stop on TFP into the demand, pro-competitive and cost effects for the currency union as defined in Proposition 1.\(^{57}\) As wages become more flexible, the unit production cost falls by more. The opposite is true for the demand effect: when more labor types are allowed to adjust their wages, the labor-specific wage declines by less and, thus, the required increase in marginal utility of wealth is smaller \(i.e.\) the positive contribution of negative demand shrinks. The magnitude of the pro-competitive effect also varies with the degree of wage flexibility. The intuition relies on second round effects: as wages fall by more and the increase in productivity cutoff is smaller, the reduction in the number of competitor declines and the pro-competitive effect weakens.

Panels (b) and (c) perform the same exercise for \(0.1 \leq \sigma \leq 0.9\) and \(1.5 \leq k \leq 2.5\) correspondingly. On the one hand, as the share of labor falls, the drop in wages that is required to regain international competitiveness increases substantially in a currency union. The greater the fall in wages, the stronger the demand effect and the larger the improvement in TFP. Once again, there is little change in the floating arrangement as the adjustment of the exchange rate is not affected by the production structure of the economy. On the other hand, the shape parameter measures the relative number of low-productivity firms; as it increases, there is a higher concentration of firms in the lower end of the productivity scale. According to the results depicted in Figure 7, the behavior of TFP is robust, even in quantitative terms, to different parameterizations of \(k\). Although the size of pro-competitive effect increases with \(k\), as anticipated in Section 6, in general equilibrium there is an offsetting increase in the demand effect.

8 Extensions

This section briefly introduces a number of extensions to the baseline framework and discusses how the previous results are affected.

8.1 A model with capital

The analysis has so far abstracted from the role of capital. This is due to two reasons: first, there is already a number of papers (Reis (2013), García-Santana et al. (2016) and Gopinath et al. (2017)) which have extensively studied the role of physical capital in the context of capital

\(^{56}\)While Figure 7 depicts the immediate effect of a sudden stop shock on TFP, conclusions remain true if the cumulative effect on TFP is considered. Results available upon request.

\(^{57}\)Note that for the floating arrangement it is still the case that only the pro-competitive channel operates.
flows. Instead, this paper aims at incorporating an alternative yet complementary explanation to the discussion. Second, the firm-level evidence presented in Section 4 is supportive of theories that focus on the composite variable input, and not only on capital. Nonetheless, this extension incorporates explicitly pre-installed physical capital as a second factor of production.

The setting is standard: the production function is Cobb-Douglas in labor, $L_t$, and pre-installed capital, $K_{t-1}$. Capital goods are owned by the representative consumer and rented to firms in exchange of a rental rate $\kappa_t$. The stock of capital accumulates driven by the investment decision by the representative consumer and the rate at which it depreciates, $\delta$. Appendix F.1 formalizes this extension and provides details on the resulting equilibrium conditions.

Figure A.3 plots the impulse responses of GDP, consumption, employment, productivity, the current account and the real exchange rate index to a sudden stop shock as defined above. The differences in TFP response across regimes is still noticeable. However, the dynamics depicted do not match those in Figure 6 completely. For example, in a currency union the reversal of the current account only holds on impact, net exports fall shortly after and stabilize at a negative level. The rest of macroeconomic variables behave as predicted. In a floating regime, the reversal lasts slightly longer and as long as the current account is positive, the qualitative results of Figure 6 hold. For completeness, Figure A.4 plots the impulse response of the three new variables: investment, price of capital and the unit cost of production.

8.2 Extensive versus intensive margin

To account for the decline in firm-level TFP growth observed during the two Spanish sudden stops reported in Section 4, I augment the baseline model by assuming that firms’ effectiveness in transforming inputs into output depends on (i) an aggregate time-varying component, $Z_t$; and (ii) a constant firm-specific component, $z$. The former is represented as an AR(1) process in logs and the latter is drawn from a Pareto distribution as in the baseline setting.

A sudden stop is redefined as a positive realization of the country-specific risk premium, $\xi_t$, with a simultaneous negative shock to the aggregate component of firm productivity, $Z_t$. Details of the formalization of this extension are relegated to Appendix F.2. The predicted response of macroeconomic variables is unchanged, at least qualitatively, as depicted by Figure A.5.

The main difference involves the variable of interest: aggregate domestic productivity. While in the baseline set-up it was sufficient to measure the effect of a sudden stop on the domestic productivity threshold as summarized by Lemma 1; under the new framework, the common component, $Z_t$, also affects aggregate TFP directly. Figure A.6 decomposes the effect of a sudden stop on aggregate productivity into the contribution of the productivity threshold (the extensive margin) and that of the common shock (the intensive margin). The right panel fully matches the 2009-13 sudden stop as summarized by Table 1. Firm-level TFP is declining over time, however, the exit of unproductive firms completely counteracts the negative effect and
productivity increases overall. The left panel is only partly in line with the 1992-93 episode.
While Table 1 shows a decline in firm-level TFP, the observed contribution of the extensive
margin is negligible instead of negative as predicted by the model.

8.3 Long-run analysis

This extension studies a long-run version of the baseline model that fully endogenizes the number
of existing firms, $M_t$, in line with Ottaviano (2012). The previous framework is augmented by (i)
allowing for investment in capital shares; (ii) introducing a new sector that produces capital; and
(iii) imposing a fixed input requirement in terms of capital in the production of differentiated
varieties.

In particular, the representative consumer is allowed to buy shares, $x_t$, of the economy’s capital
stock, $K_t$, at price $V_t$. While capital is assumed to fully depreciate after one period; the
investment entitles the representative consumer to a fraction of next period’s aggregate firm
profit. The consumer budget constraint is correspondingly adjusted to read:

$$\int_{N_t}^{\infty} p_t(\omega) q_t(\omega) d\omega + \epsilon_t B_t + x_t V_t K_t = \int_0^1 W_t^i L_t^i d\omega + x_{t-1} \Pi_t + \epsilon_{t-1} R_{t-1} B_{t-1}. $$

Capital is supplied under perfect competition by a second sector in the economy. A new unit
of capital is produced by combining domestic and foreign units of labor using a Cobb-Douglas
production technology: $K_t = (l_t^{k,H})^\rho (l_t^{k,F})^{1-\rho}$. Given the fixed capital requirement, the
production of capital determines how many firms will be able to enter the market, $M_t = K_t f E_t$.
There is a one-period-time-to-build-lag such that firms that enter at time $t$, will only be able
to produce, provided that they satisfy the corresponding productivity threshold condition, in
period $t+1$.

Appendix F.3 describes in greater detail the full equilibrium of this version of the model. It is
relevant, however, to highlight one key new optimality condition that emerges from this set-up:

$$M_t = \left( \frac{\rho}{W_t} \right)^\rho \left( \frac{1-\rho}{\epsilon_t} \right)^{1-\rho} \beta E_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \Pi_{t+1} \right]. \tag{20}$$

Intuitively, a lower price of capital encourages investment and increases the number of existing
firms. As capital is produced under perfect competition, price is equal to marginal cost and,
thus, a function of the price of both types of labor. The price of foreign labor is equal to the
foreign wage, which is normalized to one, in domestic currency units i.e. the nominal exchange
rate. This relationship is captured in reduced form by the law of motion proposed in Section 7.

---

58 I deviated from Ottaviano (2012) in two ways. First, I introduce foreign labor in the production of capital
to ensure a direct role for the nominal exchange rate in firm entry. Second, I consider that while capital fully
depreciates, all new units of capital are available for production the following period. The timing is slightly
adjusted: investment takes places, next period firms are set-up and capital depreciates.
In addition, the number of existing firms is also dependent on the discounted expected profits, as profits represent the return on capital investment. This inter-temporal dimension is missing in the previous analysis, however, solving for this long-run version of the model shows that the main conclusions derived above hold.

Figure A.7 plots the impulse responses of the same variables as the original Figure 6, following a sudden stop. The predictions are qualitatively unchanged. The shape of responses is slightly changed because of the delay in adjustment caused by the new timing assumption. The only remarkable difference refers to the relative ordering of GDP and the real exchange rate: in this version, GDP falls by more in the floating arrangement while the real depreciation is less pronounced in the currency union. The opposite is true in the baseline results.

9 Welfare

Once that the model has proved to correctly capture the macroeconomic dynamics that follow a sudden stop episode under the two alternative policy regimes in Section 7, it can then be used to conduct normative analysis.

9.1 Output loss

I evaluate the performance of exchange rate regimes by comparing the cumulative real output loss resulting from a sudden stop. The reason is two-fold: first, preferences in the model are non-standard, rendering utility-based measures of welfare controversial. Second, output can be easily measured in the empirical data and it is explicitly targeted by policymakers all around the world.

In greater detail, I compute the discounted sum of percentage deviations of realized output from its steady state level following a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium:

\[
\text{output loss} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \frac{Y_t - \bar{Y}}{\bar{Y}} \right),
\]

Figure 8 plots the ratio of the cumulative output loss of a sudden stop under a currency union to that under a floating arrangement for different degrees of nominal rigidities, with \(1 - \omega = 0\) representing a world of perfectly flexible wages. If the ratio is above one, the floating arrangement generates a lower output loss than the currency union and viceversa. Results of the model are summarized by the blue solid line. As can be seen, the desirability of the floating arrangement is increasing in wage stickiness. However, for a wide range of nominal rigidity levels, a currency union performs better in output loss terms.
The second result might feel counter-intuitive since I have argued that in the currency union productivity increases through a welfare-diminishing mechanism: a fall in domestic demand. It is key, however, to understand that a fall in wages and a rise in nominal exchange rates have opposing effects on the number of existing firms, $M_t$. While the former increases $M_t$ by cheapening domestic labor, the latter decreases $M_t$ by making foreign labor more expensive. In a currency union, the increase in $M_t$ can partly cushion the fall in the number of active domestic firms, $N_{t}^{d} = \frac{M_t}{(z_H t)^k}$, resulting from the increased productivity requirement. If this effect is big enough, the cumulative loss of output is actually smaller than in a floating arrangement as the negative impact of the sudden stop on $N_{t}^{d}$ is reduced.

To give a sense of how far the calibrated economy is from the indifference point, where the ratio is exactly one, the shaded area in Figure 8 displays the range of values of wage stickiness that have been used by the literature. While the baseline calibration of $\omega$ is purposely conservative, $1 - \omega = 0.8$, micro-evidence from the ECB Wage Dynamic Networks has found that the quarterly frequency of unconditional wage adjustments ranges between 20% and 35% i.e. $1 - \omega \in (0.65,0.8)$. According to this, which policy regime generates lower output losses after a sudden stop remains an unsettled question.

**The Friedman view** How do these findings compare to the inherited wisdom on the fixed versus floating debate? The standard case for flexible exchange rates, as first proposed by Friedman (1953), can be summarized in two claims. First, in a world of perfectly flexible wages, a nominal depreciation and an internal devaluation would lead to the same economic outlook. Second, it is the pervasiveness of nominal rigidities, however, that justifies the desirability of floating: when prices do not adjust, quantities do, thus, the lack of wage adjustment in fixed exchange rate regimes leads to suboptimal unemployment and output loss.

To capture the predictions of this traditional view, I modify the baseline model in two ways: shutting down entry and exit firm dynamics and imposing linear production in labor. The former requires featuring a fixed number of homogeneous firms in terms of productivity. The latter consists of setting the labor share, $\sigma$, equal to one. The resulting output loss ratio is depicted by the red dashed line in Figure 8, an upward-sloping convex curve that starts at exactly the indifference point. Consistent with the two claims above, a floating arrangement always performs better; with the exception of a perfectly flexible wage world, in which the floating arrangement is equivalent to a currency union.

In short, the normative implications of the model match the second claim of the standard argument but disagree regarding the first: it is still the case that increases in wage stickiness are relatively more harmful within currency unions; but accounting for firm dynamics, makes a

---

59 See Druant et al. (2009) and Le Bihan et al. (2012).
60 A more detailed description of this version of the model together with the corresponding equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix F.4.
currency union more desirable if wages are sufficiently flexible.

### 9.2 Other welfare-relevant measures

Findings are robust to considering an alternative performance measure: consumption loss. Figure A.8 plots the ratio of the cumulative consumption loss of a sudden stop under a currency union v.s. a floating arrangement for different degrees of nominal rigidities. The cumulative consumption loss is computed as explained above. The shape of the two curves remains unchanged: both are increasing and convex with the plot representing the Friedman view starting at exactly one. The main difference, however, lies on the relative steepness. Wage rigidities are increasingly more harmful in terms of consumption relative to output losses for the Friedman view while the opposite is true for the baseline model. In addition, the indifference point in Figure A.8 takes place at a higher level of wage stickiness.

Finally, for completeness, I also compute a utility-based measure of welfare as it is standard in the literature. As there is no closed-form representation of the welfare function, I evaluate welfare losses numerically. In particular, I compute the fraction of labor, $\lambda L$, that equates the conditional expectation of future utility along the equilibrium as of time zero to its value in the non-stochastic steady state.\(^{61}\). The interpretation is the following: the welfare loss associated to a sudden stop under a given exchange rate regime is the extra amount of labor that the consumer is willing to supply (amount of leisure given up) in steady state to remain indifferent between a world with and without a sudden stop episode. $\lambda L$ is implicitly given by the expression:

$$
E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(q_t^r(\omega), L_t^r z) \right] = U(q(\omega), (1 + \lambda L) L),
$$

where $q_t^r(\omega)$ and $L_t^r$ represent the optimal consumption and labor supply paths associated to a particular exchange rate policy $r$ and the right-hand side term measures utility at the non-stochastic steady state. The left-hand side of equation (21) is approximated to second-order.

Figure A.9 shows the corresponding welfare loss ratio, which follows closely the pattern depicted by Figure A.8. This should not be surprising provided that consumption enters the utility function and, thus, determines the welfare measure directly.

---

\(^{61}\) As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I consider the conditional rather than the unconditional expectation because different policy regimes tend to have different stochastic steady states. Note that although this strategy computes the constrained policy rule associated with a particular initial state of the economy, this is precisely the state that is of interest for my analysis: the non-stochastic steady state.
10 Conclusion

This paper revisits a classical question in International Macroeconomics: how does exchange rate policy affect macroeconomic performance after a shock? While the literature has commonly praised the advantages of exchange rate flexibility, it has often overlooked the response of productivity. I study the question anew in the context of a sudden stop, emphasizing the divergence in TFP patterns that emerges across exchange rate regimes in the aggregate data and relating them to observed differences in firm dynamics at the micro-level.

The empirical analysis of the paper delivers two main findings. First, TFP systematically collapses under a flexible exchange rate arrangement while it improves, albeit moderately, within a currency union. Second, the difference in productivity growth is largely explained by the reallocation of resources from unproductive exiting firms to productive survivors. While this cleansing effect is quantitatively noticeable after an internal devaluation, it is absent during a nominal depreciation in the cases considered here.

I develop a model that is able to rationalize these empirical facts by endogenizing productivity and incorporating demand effects. The model features three key elements: firm selection, variable markups and elastic labor supply in a small open economy DSGE setting. When jointly combined, productivity is determined by the number of firms (pro-competitive mechanism), the marginal utility of wealth (demand mechanism) and the unit cost of production (cost mechanism). The effect of a sudden stop on productivity works through the combination of each of these channels and depends directly on the degree of currency appreciation vis-à-vis wage devaluation.

Simulations of the model show how accounting for firm dynamics changes the relative macroeconomic performance of exchange rate regimes after a shock. While increased wage flexibility is still desirable within a currency union, greater firm heterogeneity and lower labor income shares also contribute towards smaller output losses after a sudden stop. Importantly, regimes perform differently, even in the extreme case of perfect flexibility.
References


Cavallo, E. A. and J. A. Frankel (2008). Does Openness to Trade Make Countries More Vulner-


## Tables

### Table 1: Decomposition of TFP growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productivity growth (%)</td>
<td>-10.87</td>
<td>10.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shares of productivity growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent firms share</th>
<th>-11.20</th>
<th>3.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Within firm share</td>
<td>-9.69</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between firm share</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-term share</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net entry share</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Productivity growth refers to accumulated growth for the considered period. Base and final years are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the second episode. Incumbent and net entry shares add up to productivity growth. Within firm, between firm and cross-term shares add up to incumbent shares. Entrants’ and exiters’ shares add up to net entry share.

Source: ESEE data and own calculations.

### Table 2: Reallocation and TFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exit Labor growth (continuers &amp; exiters)</th>
<th>Labor growth (continuers only)</th>
<th>Capital growth (continuers &amp; exiters)</th>
<th>Capital growth (continuers only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>7.619***</td>
<td>7.769***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$tf_{pt}$</td>
<td>-0.041***</td>
<td>0.980*</td>
<td>1.060**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
<td>(0.498)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ss_1$</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.582</td>
<td>-0.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.886)</td>
<td>(0.883)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ss_1 * tf_{pt}$</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(1.095)</td>
<td>(1.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ss_2$</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>-7.115***</td>
<td>-6.811***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.813)</td>
<td>(0.800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ss_2 * tf_{pt}$</td>
<td>-0.031***</td>
<td>1.637**</td>
<td>1.804**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(0.815)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 34,854 30,861 28,275 30,861 28,275
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes: Regression for exit is a linear probability model where exit=1 if the firm reports positive activity in period $t$ and no activity in period $t+1$. Employment and capital growth are measured from period $t-1$ to period $t$. $tf_{pt}$ is the log firm-level TFP, $ss_1$ is a dummy equal to one for years 1992-1993 and $ss_2$ is a dummy equal to one for years 2009-2013. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by industry; ***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, and *$p<0.10$.  

45
Table 3: Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Calibration target/source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$  Discount factor</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>Annual real return on bonds is 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$ Index of wage rigidity</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Gali and Monacelli (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$ Elasticity of substitution (labor)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Gali and Monacelli (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$ Iceberg trade cost</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Ghironi and Melitz (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$ Preference parameter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ottaviano (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$ Preference parameter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ottaviano (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$ Preference parameter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ottaviano (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{B}$ Steady state level of debt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Steady state trade balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$ Labor share</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>National Accounts Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$ Relative size of SOE</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>Business Demographic Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k$ Shape productivity parameter</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Estimated from ESEE data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$ Foreign demand parameter</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Domestic productivity cutoff (1.55 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B$ Foreign demand parameter</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Share of exporting firms (63.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$ Number of total firms</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>Active domestic firms (75.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$ Risk premium parameter</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Output volatility (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures

Figure 1: Sudden stops in a floating arrangement

Notes: This figure plots the response of macroeconomic variables to a sudden stop under a floating arrangement. The black and red solid lines depict the mean and median path of the corresponding variables while the black dashed lines represent standard error bands. The two vertical lines show the start and end of an average episode. Output, consumption, employment and productivity are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from an extrapolated linear trend calculated from periods $t - 5$ to $t - 2$. Current account is expressed as a share of GDP and the real exchange rate (RER), calculated as an index, is expressed in levels.

Source: IFS, WDI, Total Economy Database and own calculations.
Figure 2: Sudden stops in a currency union

Notes: This figure plots the response of macroeconomic variables to a sudden stop under a currency union. The black and red solid lines depict the mean and median path of the corresponding variables while the black dashed lines represent standard error bands. The two vertical lines show the start and end of an average episode. Output, consumption, employment and productivity are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from an extrapolated linear trend calculated from periods $t - 5$ to $t - 2$. Current account is expressed as a share of GDP and the real exchange rate (RER), calculated as an index, is expressed in levels.

Source: IFS, WDI, Total Economy Database and own calculations.
Figure 3: Average change in log (TFP) by percentile

Notes: This graph plots the average change in log (TFP) by percentile of the distribution. It compares the average TFP of firms in a given quantile before and after each of the two sudden stops. As this is an unbalanced panel, firms are allowed to change quantiles and even exit the sample during the transition. The corresponding base and end years are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the second episode. To account for variability, the vertical lines represent error bands.

Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
Figure 4: Differences between high and low productivity firms

(a) Exit rate

(b) Labor growth (continuers & exiters)

(c) Labor growth (only continuers)

Notes: This figure depicts the predicted difference in probability of exit (panel A, low minus high) and the predicted difference in labor growth rate (panels B and C, high minus low) between a firm one standard deviation above the sectoral mean and a firm one standard deviation below the sectoral mean. Figures are computed from models estimated in Table 2.
Figure 5: Evolution of allocative efficiency measures

Notes: This figure plots the within-industry dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital and labor over time. The numbers depicted are relative to 1990, which is normalized to one. Marginal revenue products are measured at the firm-level according to the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework. Standard deviations at the sector level are aggregated using time-invariant labor weights.

Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
Figure 6: Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop

Notes. These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium. All variables but the current account are expressed in log deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.
Figure 7: The TFP fact - robustness to alternative calibrations

(a) The role of wage rigidities

(b) The role of the labor share

(c) The role of the shape parameter

Notes: This figure documents the sensitivity of the TFP fact to different model parameterizations. Panel (a) focuses on different degrees of wage rigidities - higher $\omega$ implies lower rigidities. Panel (b) allows for plausible calibrations of the labor share - higher $\sigma$ implies a larger labor share. Panel (c) explores alternative values of the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution - higher $k$ implies lower dispersion of productivity draws. The first column plots the immediate response of TFP to a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium in log deviations terms. The second column breaks down the immediate response of TFP into the demand, the pro-competitive and the cost channels as defined by Proposition 1.
Figure 8: Currency union versus floating arrangement

Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the output loss under a currency union to the output loss under a floating arrangement following a sudden stop. The output loss is calculated as the discounted sum of output log deviations after a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium. The blue solid line refers to the baseline model. The red dashed line refers to a version of the model with no firm dynamics (firms are homogeneous and the number of firms is constant) and linear production in labor ($\sigma = 1$). The shaded area shows the range of plausible values for the wage rigidity parameter as discussed by the literature.
Appendices

A Aggregate data appendix

A.1 Identifying sudden stops: algorithm

The following algorithm combines elements of Calvo et al. (2004) and Cavallo and Frankel (2008).

- Use IMF Balance of Payment annual data for all available countries in the period 1990-2015.
- Drop (i) small countries - in terms of population (below 1 million inhabitants) and in terms of wealth (below 1 billion USD); (ii) countries with incomplete time series.
- Compute year-to-year changes in the financial account.
- Compute rolling averages and standard deviations of the change in the financial account with a window length equal to ten years. Check that at least 60% of the observations in the window are available, otherwise set to missing.
- Identify reversal episodes as subsequent country-year observations that show reductions in the financial surplus half a standard deviation above the mean change as calculated in the previous step. Classify the first and last country-year observation as the start and end of each episode.
- Filter to keep reversal episodes that contain at least one country-year observation with a reduction in the financial surplus one standard deviation above the mean change.
- Filter again to keep reversal episodes that are accompanied by a fall in GDP per capita during the same year or the year that follows immediately after.
- Filter again to keep reversal episodes that are accompanied by a fall in the current account deficit during the same year or the year that follows immediately after. Surviving episodes are classified as sudden stops.

Note that two further refinements are made. First, one year episodes starting in 2009 are dropped from the final sample as they simply capture the global trade collapse that followed the burst of the 2008 financial crisis instead of a country-specific reversal of capital flows. Second, I collapse adjacent sudden stops into the same episode if the gap among the end of the former and the start of the latter is only one year.
B Firm-level data appendix

B.1 Production function estimation

This appendix reviews the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction to the proxy approach to production function estimation. I augment it to account for attrition as first proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).

Consider the standard model,

\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_k^k k_{it} + \beta_l^l l_{it} + \omega_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \]  

(22)

where \( y_{it} \) is value added, \( k_{it} \) is capital and \( l_{it} \) is labor input. \( \omega_{it} \) is unobserved firm-level TFP and modelled as a Markov chain, \( \omega_{it} = g(\omega_{i,t-1}) + \xi_t \).

Under the assumptions:

1. There exists an observable input or choice variable \( m_{it} = f_t(k_{it}, l_{it}, \omega_{it}) \) such that \( f_t \) is strictly monotonic in \( \omega_{it} \).
2. \( \omega_{it} \) is the only econometric unobservable in the mapping above.

The production function, equation (22), can be rewritten as:

\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_k^k k_{it} + \beta_l^l l_{it} + f_t^{-1}(k_{it}, l_{it}, m_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}, \]

where all regressors are now observable.

**First stage** As opposed to the standard proxy approach (Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)), allowing for labor dynamics with functional dependence prevents me from identifying the labor coefficient, \( \beta_l^l \), in the first stage. Instead, in the first stage I am only able to remove the shock \( \epsilon_{it} \) from the dependent variable \( y_{it} \) by treating \( f_t^{-1} \) non-parametrically and recover \( \Phi_{it} \) from:

\[ y_{it} = \Phi_{it}(k_{it}, l_{it}, m_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}. \]

**Second stage** A firm will continue to operate provided its productivity level exceeds the lower bound: \( \chi_{it} = 1 \) if \( \omega_{it} \geq \omega_{it} \), where \( \chi_{it} \) is a survival indicator variable. I estimate the survival probability, \( \hat{P}_{it} \), by fitting a probit model on capital, labor and the proxy variable:

\[ P_{it} \equiv Pr\{\chi_t = 1 | \omega_{it}, I_{t-1}\} = h_t(k_{it-1}, l_{it-1}, m_{it-1}), \]

where \( I_{t-1} \) is the information set at time \( t - 1 \).
**Third stage** Given guesses for $\beta_k$ and $\beta_l$, it is possible to obtain the residuals

$$\hat{\omega}_{it} = \hat{\Phi}_{it} - \beta_k k_{it} - \beta_l l_{it},$$

and, exploiting the Markov chain assumption on $\omega_{it}$, obtain the corresponding residual $\hat{\xi}_{it}$ by simply regressing $\hat{\omega}_{it}$ on $\hat{\omega}_{it-1}$ and $\hat{P}_{it}$. $\beta_k$ and $\beta_l$ are estimated using the following GMM criterion function:

$$\frac{1}{N} \frac{1}{T} \sum_i \sum_t \left( \hat{\xi}_{it} k_{it} \right) = 0.$$

**B.2 Allocative efficiency**

This appendix summarizes the Hsieh and Klenow (2017) argument that resource misallocation can hinder aggregate productivity.

As explained in the main text, consider a framework with a final good featuring a CES production function in differentiated intermediates goods that are imperfectly substitutable. Intermediate good producers have standard Cobb-Douglas production technologies, with capital share $\alpha$, and are subject to firm-specific exogenous wedges that distort (i) output, $\tau^y_{it}$, and (ii) capital relative to labor, $\tau^k_{it}$. The individual intermediate good producer optimization problem delivers the following first-order conditions with respect to labor, $l_{it}$, and capital, $k_{it}$:

$$MRPL_{it} = \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\mu} \right) \left( \frac{P_{it} Y_{it}}{L_{it}} \right) = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \tau^y_{it}} \right) W_t,$$

$$MRPK_{it} = \left( \frac{\alpha}{\mu} \right) \left( \frac{P_{it} Y_{it}}{K_{it}} \right) = \left( \frac{1 + \tau^k_{it}}{1 - \tau^y_{it}} \right) R_t,$$

where $P_{it} Y_{it}$ is firm nominal value added, $W_t$ is the cost of labor, $R_t$ is the cost of capital and $\mu$ is the constant markup of price over marginal cost.

Define physical and revenue productivities at the firm-level as

$$TFPQ_{it} \equiv A_{it} = \frac{Y_{it}}{K_{it}^{\alpha} L_{it}^{1-\alpha}},$$

and

$$TFPR_{it} \equiv P_{it} A_{it} = \frac{P_{it} Y_{it}}{K_{it}^{\alpha} L_{it}^{1-\alpha}}.$$

By substituting equations (23) and (24) into equation (26),

$$TFPR_{it} = \mu \left( \frac{MRPK_{it}}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{MRPL_{it}}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} = \mu \left( \frac{R_t}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{W_t}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{1 + \tau^k_{it}}{1 - \tau^y_{it}} \right)^{\alpha},$$

57
it follows that optimal allocation of labor and capital ensures that firms with higher $\text{TFPQ}$ expand production such that they charge lower prices than more unproductive firms and $\text{TFPR}$ is equalized across plants. In other words, dispersion in $\text{TFPR}$ is solely driven by the presence of firm-specific distortions in this model. Such distortions can lower aggregate TFP by the following expression:

$$\text{TFPR}_t = \left[ \sum_{i=1} \left( A_{it} \frac{\text{TFPR}_{it}}{\text{TFPR}_{it}} \right)^{\sigma-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}},$$

where $\overline{\text{TFPR}}_t$ is the revenue weighted average TFPR.

C  Model appendix

C.1  A model of two large countries: the limit case

This appendix shows that the assumptions required to treat Home as a small open economy can be derived from the steady state version of a model with two countries which are symmetric in everything except size i.e. Home is assumed to be small relative to Foreign. In particular, if the two countries are endowed with $n$ and $n - 1$ shares of the world’s total number of potentially active firms, $\bar{M}$,

$$M = n\bar{M}, \quad M^* = (1 - n)\bar{M}, \quad n \in [0, 1],$$

then the limit case to be considered is one in which $n \to 0$. The productivity cutoffs of this model would be given by the steady state versions of equations (9) and (10) together with:

$$z^*F = \frac{\gamma + \eta N}{\bar{M} + \eta P^*} (W^*)^\sigma,$$

$$z^*H = \frac{\gamma + \eta N^*}{\bar{M}^* + \eta P^*} (W^*)^\sigma,$$

The number of active firms in Home and Foreign is given by equation (12) and

$$N^* = (1 - n)M^* (z^H)^{-k} + n\bar{M} (z^F)^{-k},$$

while the aggregate price level is summarized by equation (13) and

$$P^* = \frac{2k + 1}{2k + 2} \frac{(W^*)^\sigma N^*}{z^H}.$$
Finally, the balance of payments condition in a zero trade balance steady state can be rewritten as

\[ \frac{n}{1-n} = \frac{\lambda}{N^*} \left( \frac{W^*}{W} \right)^{2\sigma} e^{\beta \left( \frac{z^*}{z} \right) - (k+2)} \]  

To summarize, for a given \( n \), the equilibrium in the model with two countries can be described by Equations (9), (10), (12), (13), (27)-(66) with nine unknown variables \( \{z^H, z^F, z^{*H}, z^{*F}, N^*, N, P, P^*, W\} \), taking foreign labor input as the numeraire \( W^* = 1 \).

This system, however, can be further collapsed into three equations in three unknowns, namely, \( z^H, z^{*H} \) and \( W^* \):

\[ \alpha \left[ 1 - \theta \right] z^H W = W^\sigma \left[ \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} \left( \frac{1}{z^H} \right)^k M \left( n + (1-n) \left( \frac{W^\sigma}{\tau \epsilon} \right) \right) \right] \]

\[ \alpha \left[ 1 - \theta \right] z^{*H} = \left[ \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} \left( \frac{1}{z^{*H}} \right)^k M \left( 1 - n + n \left( \frac{\epsilon}{\tau W^\sigma} \right) \right) \right] \]

\[ \frac{n}{1-n} = \frac{W^{2\sigma(k+1)-1}}{e^{2k+1}} \left( \frac{z^{*H}}{z^H} \right)^{(k+2)} \]

As \( n \to 0 \), Equation (38) simplifies to

\[ \alpha \gamma \left[ 1 - \theta \right] z^{*H} = \left[ \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} \left( \frac{1}{z^{*H}} \right)^k M \right] \]

which solves for \( z^{*H} \) as a function only of parameters. I have, thus, proved the first assumption: the foreign domestic productivity cutoff is not affected by changes at Home for \( n \) small enough.

Note that due to the Pareto distribution assumption, \( z^{*H} \), cannot fall below one, the minimum value for productivity. Therefore, I need distinguish between two different cases. Suppose

\[ \alpha \gamma \left[ 1 - \theta \right] < \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} M \]

then the solution to the above equation is larger than one. Once, I have solved for \( z^{*H} \), the foreign demand for the domestic variety is given by

\[ q^F(z) = \frac{1}{\gamma + \eta N^*} \left( \alpha + \frac{\eta}{\gamma} \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta} \right) p^F(z) - \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta} \gamma P^* \]

where \( N^* = M (z^{*H})^{-k} \) and \( P^* \) is a function of \( z^{*H} \) as given by Equation (30), and, thus, constant.

Suppose, instead, the opposite is true, and the inequality given by Equation (35) does not hold. In such a case, \( z^{*H} \) remains at one so that all foreign firms produce, \( N^* = M \). This also means,
that the choke price for Foreign is not binding\textsuperscript{62} and a new equation for the aggregate price level in Foreign is required. In particular, the new price level is given by

\[ P^* = \left( \frac{2}{M} - \frac{\eta}{\gamma + \eta N^*} \right)^{-1} \left[ \frac{\alpha \gamma - \theta}{\gamma + \eta N^*} + \frac{1}{\beta k + 1} \right] . \]

The rest of the argument follows: foreign demand for the domestic variety is given by Equation (36) which implies that \( A \) and \( B \) in Equation (7) are constants as none of the foreign variables \( i.e. z^H, N^* \) and \( P^* \), are affected by changes in Home.

**C.2 Equilibrium summary**

Endogenous variables: \( z^H_t, z^F_t, z^F_t^*, L_t, N_t, B_t, R_t, P_t, \lambda_t, W_t, \epsilon_t \)

Equilibrium conditions:

\[ z^H_t = \frac{\gamma + \eta N_t}{\lambda_t} + \eta P_t W_t^\sigma, \quad (37) \]

\[ z^F_t = \frac{\gamma + \eta N_t}{\lambda_t} + \eta P_t W_t^\sigma (38) \]

\[ z^F_t^* = \frac{B \tau W_t^\sigma}{A - \epsilon_t}, \quad (39) \]

\[ N_t = M(z^H_t)^{-k} + M^*(z^F_t)^{-k}, \quad (40) \]

\[ P_t = \frac{2k + 1}{2k + 2} \frac{W_t N_t}{z_t^H}, \quad (41) \]

\[ L_t = \frac{k}{(k + 1)(k + 2)} \sigma W_t^{2\sigma - 1} M \left( \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} (z^H_t)^{-(k+2)} + \frac{B_t^2}{\epsilon_t} (z^F_t^*)^{-(k+2)} \right) , \quad (42) \]

\[ 1 = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \left( \frac{\epsilon_{t+1}}{\epsilon_t} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \right) , \quad (43) \]

\[ R_t = R_t^* + \phi \left( e^\beta - B_t - 1 \right) + \left( e^\epsilon_{t-1} - 1 \right) , \quad (44) \]

\[ MB^* \frac{(\tau W_t^\sigma)^2}{\epsilon_t} (z^F_t^*)^{-(k+2)} - M^* \frac{\lambda_t (\tau \epsilon_t (W_t^*)^{\sigma})^2}{\gamma} (z^F_t)^{-(k+2)} = 2(k + 2) \epsilon_t (B_t - R_{t-1} B_{t-1}) , \quad (45) \]

\[ W_t = \prod_{s=0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-s} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_t} \right)^{\mu(1-\mu)^s}} \right) , \quad (46) \]

monetary policy rule. \textsuperscript{62}The maximum price faced by foreign consumers is actually lower than the choke price they would be willing to pay.
C.3 Existence and uniqueness of steady state

This appendix solves for the steady state of the model and shows that it is unique provided $\bar{B} = 0$. To ease notation, I drop all time subscripts. The steady state is summarized by one equation in one unknown, which can be solved numerically provided parameter values.

Start by rewriting the wage equation in steady state as

$$\lambda = \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{W}. \quad (48)$$

Combine (37) and (41) to get

$$z^H \alpha \gamma = W^\sigma \lambda \left( \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} N \right). \quad (49)$$

Rewrite $z^F$ as a function of $z^H$, given equations (37) and (38),

$$z^H = \frac{\tau \epsilon}{W^\sigma} z^H, \quad (50)$$

and plug into equation (40)

$$N = \left( \frac{1}{z^H} \right)^k \left( M + M^* \left( \frac{W^\sigma}{\tau \epsilon} \right)^k \right).$$

which can now be combined with equation (48) and (49) such that

$$z^H \alpha \gamma = \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{W^{1-\sigma}} \left( \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} \left( \frac{1}{z^H} \right)^k \left( M + M^* \left( \frac{W^\sigma}{\tau \epsilon} \right)^k \right) \right). \quad (51)$$

Next, note that in steady state the interest rate is given by $R = \frac{1}{\beta}$ and bond holdings are $B = \bar{B}$ (see equations (43) and (44) respectively). Imposing this on the balance of payment condition, (45), together with equations (39), (48) and (50), delivers

$$M \frac{A^{k+2}}{B^{k+1}} \frac{\epsilon^{k+1}}{(\tau W^\sigma)^k} - M^* \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{W^{\sigma(k+2)-1}}{\gamma} \frac{(z^H)^{-(k+2)}}{(\tau \epsilon)^k} = -2(k + 2) \epsilon \frac{(1 - \beta)}{\beta} \bar{B}. \quad (52)$$

Equation (52) can be rewritten in terms of $z^H$ and then plugged into equation (51). This would deliver a system of one equation in one unknown: if the economy is embedded in a currency union, the exchange rate is equal to one and the unknown is $W$. If the economy has a floating arrangement, the wage level is equal to the target and the unknown is $\epsilon$. In any case, there exists a steady state equilibrium.
Impose that trade balance holds in equilibrium ($B = 0$). Equation (52) is simplified to

\[
\frac{1}{z^H} = \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\theta} M A^{k+2} \frac{\epsilon^{k+2}}{B^{k+1} W^{2\sigma(k+1)-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{k+2}},
\]

and can now substitute for $z^H$ in equation (51) as follows

\[
\alpha \gamma - \frac{1}{\theta} = \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\theta} M A^{k+2} \frac{\epsilon^{k+2}}{B^{k+1} W^{2\sigma(k+1)-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{k+2}} \left[ \left( M + M' \left( \frac{w^\sigma}{\tau^2} \right)^k \right) \right].
\]

The left hand side is a positive constant. The right hand side is:

1. A monotonically decreasing function in $W$ with positive limit of zero and a negative limit of $+\infty$ in the currency union regime.
2. A monotonically increasing function in $\epsilon$ with positive limit of $+\infty$ and a negative limit of zero in the currency union regime.

Thus, in both cases, there exists a unique solution.

**D Proofs**

**D.1 Proof of Lemma 1**

*Proof.* Unweighted average productivity is given by

\[
\tilde{z}_t^H = \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} z \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz = \frac{k}{k-1} z_t^H.
\]

Average productivity weighted by output is given by

\[
\hat{z}_t^H = \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} z \frac{q(z)}{q(z_t^H)} \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz.
\]

Noting that \( \frac{g(z)}{q(z_t^H)} = \frac{z-z_t^H}{z_t^H-z_t^H} \frac{\hat{z}_t}{z} \), the above expression simplifies to \( \hat{z}_t^H = \tilde{z}_t^H \).

Average productivity weighted by revenue is given by

\[
\bar{z}_t^H = \int_{z_t^H}^{\infty} z \frac{r(z)}{r(z_t^H)} \frac{g(z)}{1 - G(z_t^H)} \, dz.
\]

Noting that \( \frac{r(z)}{r(z_t^H)} = \frac{z^2-(z_t^H)^2}{(z_t^H)^2-(z_t^H)^2} \frac{(\tilde{z}_t)^2}{z^2} \), the above expression simplifies to \( \bar{z}_t^H = \frac{2k^3}{(2k-1)(k^2-1)} \tilde{z}_t^H \).

\[\square\]
D.2 Proof of Proposition 1

**Proof.** By combining equations (9) and (13), the domestic productivity threshold can be rewritten as

\[
z_H^t = \frac{\lambda_t W_t^\sigma}{\alpha \gamma} \left[ \gamma + \frac{\eta}{2k+1} N_t \right]. \tag{53}
\]

To derive the expression in Proposition 1 log-linearize equation (53) around its steady state. □

D.3 Proof of Proposition 2

**Proof.** To see this formally, combine equations (9), (10), and (12) to rewrite the equilibrium number of active firms in the domestic market as

\[
N_t = \left( \frac{1}{z_H^t} \right)^k \left[ M + M^*(\frac{W_t^\sigma}{\tau (W_t^*)^\sigma} \epsilon_t) \right],
\]

and combine with the expression for \(z_H^t\) above, equation (53), to get

\[
z_H^t - \frac{\eta}{2k+2} \frac{\lambda_t W_t^\sigma}{\alpha \gamma} \left( \frac{1}{z_H^t} \right)^k \left[ M + M^*(\frac{W_t^\sigma}{\tau (W_t^*)^\sigma} \epsilon_t) \right] = \frac{\lambda_t W_t^\sigma}{\alpha}, \tag{54}
\]

from here it is straightforward to see that there is a negative relationship between \(z_H^t\) and \(\epsilon_t\), i.e. the left-hand side of equation (54) is increasing in both \(z_H^t\) and \(\epsilon_t\). It then follows that \(\zeta_{z_H^t,\epsilon} = \frac{\partial z_H^t}{\partial \epsilon} \frac{\epsilon}{z_H^t} < 0\).

The relationship between \(z_H^t\) and \(W_t\) is less obvious. The right-hand side of equation (54) is decreasing in wages as \(\lambda_t W_t^\sigma \propto \frac{1}{W_t^\sigma \epsilon_t}\) by Lemma 2. The left-hand side, however, depends on parameter values and, thus, \(\zeta_{z_H^t,W_t} = \frac{\partial z_H^t}{\partial W_t} \frac{W_t}{z_H^t} \geq 0\).

□

**Lemma 2.** There is a negative relationship between the marginal utility of income and the wage level.

**Proof.** In steady state, wages are equalized across labor types and equation (14) can be rewritten as

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta} \frac{1}{W_t}.
\]

During the dynamics, the negative relationship still holds as

\[
\lambda_t \propto \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta} \frac{1}{W_t^\sigma}.
\]

□
D.4 Proof of Corollary 1

Proof. Suppose $\mu \sigma < \frac{1}{1 + \tau}$, then the left-hand side of equation (54) is increasing in wages. Thus, there is an unambiguous negative relationship between $z_t^H$ and $W_t$ that ensures $\zeta_{z_t^H, W_t} = \frac{\partial z_t^H}{\partial W_t} \frac{W_t}{z_t^H} < 0$. □

E Auxiliary assumption

This appendix discusses how the auxiliary assumption introduced in Section 7.1, the law of motion for existing firms, changes results derived in Section 6.

The law of motion can be written in levels as

$$M_t = \bar{M} \epsilon_t \rho_t \left( \frac{W_t}{\bar{W}} \right)^{1-\rho}.$$ (55)

The definition of aggregate productivity and the equilibrium condition for the domestic productivity threshold remain unchanged. Therefore, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 still hold.

The proof of Proposition 2 needs to be adjusted slightly to read:

Proof. To see this formally, combine equations (9), (10), (12) and (55) to rewrite the equilibrium number of active firms in the domestic market as

$$N_t = \left( \frac{1}{z_t^H} \right)^k \frac{M}{\epsilon_t' \left( \frac{W_t}{\bar{W}} \right)^{1-\rho}} \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - n}{n} \left( \frac{W_t^\sigma}{\tau (W_t^\sigma)^\gamma \epsilon_t} \right)^k \right],$$

and combine with the expression for $z_t^H$ above, equation (53), to get

$$z_t^H - \frac{\eta}{2k + 2} \frac{\lambda_t W_t^\sigma}{\alpha \gamma} \left( \frac{1}{z_t^H} \right)^k \frac{M}{\epsilon_t' \left( \frac{W_t}{\bar{W}} \right)^{1-\rho}} \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - n}{n} \left( \frac{W_t^\sigma}{\tau (W_t^\sigma)^\gamma \epsilon_t} \right)^k \right] = \frac{\lambda_t W_t^\sigma}{\alpha},$$ (56)

from here it is straightforward to see that there is a negative relationship between $z_t^H$ and $\epsilon_t$ i.e. the left-hand side of equation (54) is increasing in both $z_t^H$ and $\epsilon_t$. It then follows that $\zeta_{z_t^H, \epsilon_t} = \frac{\partial z_t^H}{\partial \epsilon_t} \frac{\epsilon_t}{z_t^H} < 0$.

The relationship between $z_t^H$ and $W_t$ is less obvious. The right-hand side of equation (54) is decreasing in wages as $\lambda_t W_t^\sigma \propto \frac{n}{W_t^\sigma}$ by Lemma 2. The left-hand side, however, depends on parameter value and, thus, $\zeta_{z_t^H, W_t} = \frac{\partial z_t^H}{\partial W_t} \frac{W_t}{z_t^H} \geq 0$. □

Given the modified proof of Proposition 2, the corresponding Corollary should now read

---

64
Corollary 2. Following a sudden stop in a currency union, a sufficient condition for \( \hat{z}_t^H > 0 \) is that 
\[
1 + \mu (1 - \rho) > \mu \sigma (1 + k).
\]

Proof. Suppose \((1 + k) \mu \sigma < \mu (1 - \rho)\), then the left-hand side of equation \((56)\) is increasing in wages. Thus, there is an unambiguous negative relationship between \(z_t^H\) and \(W_t\) that ensures 
\[
\zeta_{z_t^H, W_t} = \frac{\partial z_t^H}{\partial W_t} \frac{W_t}{z_t^H} < 0.
\]

However, as \(\mu > 0\) and \(1 - \rho > 0\), it is the case that the sufficient condition in Corollary 1 is more restrictive than that in Corollary 2 i.e. 
\[
1 + \mu (1 - \rho) > 1 > \mu \sigma (1 + k).
\]

F Extensions to the model

F.1 A model with capital

This appendix describes a version of the baseline model that features pre-installed capital as the second input in the production of differentiated varieties. In particular, the unit cost of production is now given by 
\[
c_t = \left( \frac{W_t}{\sigma} \right)^\sigma \left( \frac{\kappa_t}{1 - \kappa_t} \right)^{1 - \sigma}, \tag{57}
\]
where \(\kappa_t\) is the rental price of capital.

The evolution of the capital stock, \(K_t\), is determined by investment by the representative consumer and depreciation. The budget constraint is accordingly modified to read:
\[
\int_{N_t} p_t (\omega) q_t (\omega) d\omega + \epsilon_t B_t + V_t K_t = \int_0^1 W_t^i L_t^i \, di + \Pi_t + \epsilon_t R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + V_t (1 - \delta) K_{t-1} + \kappa_t K_{t-1},
\]
where \(V_t\) is the price of capital and \(\delta\) is the depreciation rate.

There is an additional equilibrium condition governing the optimal capital choice:
\[
V_t = \beta E_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left( (1 - \delta) V_{t+1} + \kappa_{t+1} \right) \right], \tag{58}
\]
and a transversality condition that ensures the absence of bubbles in equilibrium:
\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \beta^T E_t \lambda_{t+T} K_{t+T} = 0. \tag{59}
\]

In addition, capital market clearing ensures that capital supplied by the representative household
is equated to the aggregate demand by firms:

\[ K_{t-1} = \frac{M_t}{(k+1)(k+2)} \frac{(1-\sigma)c_t^2}{\kappa_t} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} (z_t^H)^{-(k+2)} + \frac{B\tau^2}{\epsilon_t} (z_t^k)^{-(k+2)} \right]. \quad (60) \]

The rational expectations equilibrium of this extension is the set of stochastic processes \( \{z_t^H, z_t^F, z_t^{*F}\}, IM_t, EX_t, L_t, N_t, B_t, R_t, P_t, \lambda_t, W_t, \kappa_t, c_t, V_t, M_t, K_{t-1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) satisfying equations (3), (5), (12), (14), (57)-(60) and

\[
\frac{z_t^H}{c_t} \left( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{\lambda_t} + \eta P_t \right) = \gamma + \eta N_t, \\
\frac{z_t^F}{\tau \epsilon_t c_t^*} \left( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{\lambda_t} + \eta P_t \right) = \gamma + \eta N_t, \\
z_t^{*F} = \frac{B \tau c_t}{A \epsilon_t}, \\
M_t = \frac{1}{\epsilon_t^2 \epsilon_t^{1-\sigma}}, \\
P_t = \frac{2k + 1 c_t N_t}{2k + 2 z_t^H}, \\
L_t = \frac{M_t}{(k+1)(k+2)} \frac{\sigma c_t^2}{\kappa_t} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} (z_t^H)^{-(k+2)} + \frac{B\tau^2}{\epsilon_t} (z_t^k)^{-(k+2)} \right], \\
EX_t - IM_t = \epsilon_t(B_t - R_{t-1}B_{t-1}) + V_t(K_t - (1-\delta)K_{t-1}), \\
IM_t = \frac{1}{k+2} M_t \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\tau c_t c_t^*}{2} \right)^{-(k+2)}, \\
EX_t = \frac{1}{k+2} M_t \frac{B \tau c_t}{\epsilon_t} \left( \frac{z_t^{*F}}{2} \right)^{-(k+2)},
\]

given the exogenous process \( \{\xi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and the central bank’s policy \( \{\epsilon_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \). The foreign unit production cost, \( c_t^* \), is normalized to one.

This extension of the model is parametrized following the same principles as the baseline framework. This implies setting, \( A = 1.123, B = 0.540 \) and \( \phi = 0.012; \) all other values are unchanged. In addition, the depreciation rate, \( \delta \), is set to 2.5\% following Melitz and Ghironi (2005) among many others.

### F.2 Extensive versus intensive margin

This appendix describes a version of the baseline model that accounts for common shocks to firm-level productivity. Suppose the efficiency of a firm in transforming the input bundle into output is described by the composite \( Z_t z \), where \( Z_t \) is a new time-varying common component and \( z \) is the firm-specific productivity level drawn from a Pareto distribution as described in
Section 5.

The definition of the rational expectations equilibrium has to be adjusted slightly. In particular, equilibrium conditions (9), (11), (13), (15) and (18) are substituted by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\z_t^H &= \gamma + \eta N_t \frac{W_t^\rho}{\lambda t} + \eta P_t \frac{Z_t}{1}, \\
\z_t^*F &= B \frac{\tau W_t^\rho}{\lambda t} Z_t, \\
P_t &= \frac{2k + 1}{k + 1} W_t^\rho N_t, \\
L_t &= \left(\frac{k + 1}{k + 2}\right) \frac{M}{W_t} \left(\frac{W_t}{Z_t}\right)^2 \left[\frac{\lambda t}{\gamma} (\z_t^H)^{-(k+2)} + B \frac{\tau^2}{\epsilon_t} (\z_t^*F)^{-(k+2)}\right], \\
E X_t &= \frac{1}{k + 2} M \frac{B}{2} \frac{\tau W_t^\rho}{\lambda t} \frac{Z_t^2}{\epsilon_t} (\z_t^*F)^{-(k+2)}.
\end{align*}
\]

and \( Z_t \) is assumed to be an exogenous AR(1) process with auto-correlation coefficient equal to 0.99.

In addition, aggregate productivity will now be determined by both the productivity cutoff and the shock to the common component. In particular, unweighted and average productivity weighted by output are both given by: \( \frac{k}{k-1} Z_t \z_t^H \). Average productivity weighted by revenue is given by: \( \frac{2k^3}{(2k-1)(k^2-1)} Z_t \z_t^H \).

F.3 Long-run analysis

This appendix describes a long-run version of the baseline model where the number of existing firms, \( M_t \), is endogenous. The set-up follows Ottaviano (2012) in putting Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in a DSGE framework. The key innovation is the introduction of capital which is supplied by a second sector, accumulated by consumers and required for the set-up of firms producing the differentiated varieties. In what follows, I highlight how these assumptions and new implications fit into the set-up presented in Section 5.

The representative household As explained in the main text, the representative consumer is allowed to buy shares, \( x_t \), of the economy’s capital stock, \( K_t \), at price, \( V_t \). While capital is assumed to fully depreciate after one period; the investment entitles the representative consumer to a fraction of next period’s aggregate firm profit. The consumer budget constraint is correspondingly adjusted to read:

\[
\int_{0}^{N_t} p_t (\omega) q_t (\omega) d\omega + \epsilon_t B_t + x_t V_t K_t = \int_{0}^{1} W_t^\rho L_t^r \; dt + x_{t-1} \Pi_t + \epsilon_t R_{t-1} B_{t-1}.
\]
Regarding the household’s optimization problem, there is an additional optimality condition describing the purchase of capital shares. In particular:

\[ 1 = \beta E_t \left[ \frac{\Pi_{t+1} K_{t+1}}{V_t K_t} \right]. \]

Capital investment is encouraged when the price of capital is low or when expected future returns are high. Given risk aversion, returns are adjusted by the stochastic discount factor: returns are more desirable whenever the marginal utility of income is higher.

**Production of capital**  
Capital is produced under perfect competition using a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines units of domestic labor, \( l_{t}^{k,H} \) and foreign labor, \( l_{t}^{k,F} \):  

\[ K_t = \left( l_{t}^{k,H} \right)^{\rho} \left( l_{t}^{k,F} \right)^{1-\rho}. \]

Producers of capital choose labor inputs such that costs are minimized. For this analysis, only the demand for domestic labor is relevant,

\[ l_{t}^{k,H} = \left( \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \frac{\varepsilon_t}{W_t} \right)^{1-\rho} K_t. \] (61)

**Production of differentiated varieties**  
I assume that \( f_E \) units of capital are required for a firm to produce a differentiated variety. The timing is such that the fixed entry cost is due one period before the firm is able to start production. This implies that the realization of the firm’s productivity draw is still unknown. The resulting free-entry condition pins down the number of firms that will be potentially active in period \( t+1 \), denoted by \( M_t \):

\[ M_t = \frac{K_t}{f_E}. \] (62)

**Aggregation and market clearing**  
The number of active firms in the domestic market, \( N_t \), has to be modified to account for the new timing assumption. In particular, the number of firms at time \( t \) will depend on the number of firms that paid the fixed capital requirement in period \( t-1 \) such that:

\[ N_t = M_{t-1} \left( \frac{1}{z_{t}} \right)^k + M^* \left( \frac{1}{z_{t}} \right)^k. \] (63)

Aggregate labor demand is augmented to include the domestic labor input used in the production of capital as given by equation (61), such that the labor market clearing condition now reads:

\[ L_t = \frac{k}{(k+1)(k+2)} \frac{\sigma}{W_t^{1-2\sigma}} M_{t-1} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t (z_{t}^{H})^{-(k+2)}}{\gamma} + B_{t}^{T} \left( z_{t}^{*F} \right)^{-(k+2)} \right] + \left( \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \frac{\varepsilon_t}{W_t} \right)^{1-\rho} f_E M_t, \] (64)

where the free market condition, equation (62), is used to substitute for capital.
Given the capital investment decision, aggregate profit is now a variable of interest. It is computed by summing profits of domestic and export sales. More precisely,

$$\Pi_t = k^{2+1}k^{2+2}W^{2+2}M_{t-1} \left[ \frac{\lambda_t}{\gamma} (z_t^H)^{-(k+2)} + B \frac{z_t^F}{\epsilon_t} (z_t^{F*)}^{-(k+2)} \right]. \tag{65}$$

A new market clearing condition for capital ensures that demand by consumers is equated to supply by producers. Given the perfect competition assumption, this simply implies that the price of capital is equal to its marginal cost. Formally,

$$V_t = \left( \frac{W_t}{\rho} \right) \rho \left( \frac{W_t^{*}}{1-\rho} \right)^{1-\rho}. \tag{66}$$

As the consumer’s budget constraint has been modified, the resulting balance of payment condition is:

$$EX_t - IM_t = \epsilon_t (B_t - R_t B_{t-1}) + \left( \frac{W_t}{\rho} \right) \rho \left( \frac{W_t^{*}}{1-\rho} \right)^{1-\rho} (1-\rho) f_E M_t. \tag{67}$$

where $EM_t$ and $IM_t$, the total export and import revenues in domestic currency terms, are given by:

$$EX_t = \frac{1}{k+2} M_{t-1} \frac{B}{2} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\epsilon_t} \right)^2 (z_t^{*F})^{-(k+2)}, \tag{67}$$

and equation (17) respectively. Note that the above balance of payment condition is derived by imposing that, in equilibrium, capital shares add up to one.

**Solving the model** The rational expectations equilibrium of this extension is the set of stochastic processes $\{z_t^H, z_t^F, z_t^{*F}, IM_t, EX_t, L_t, N_t, B_t, R_t, P_t, \lambda_t, W_t, M_{t-1}, \Pi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying equations (3), (5), (9)-(11), (13), (14), (17), (20), (63)-(67) given the exogenous process $\{\xi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and the central bank’s policy $\{\epsilon_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$. The foreign wage, $W_t^{*}$, is normalized to one.

This extension of the model is parametrized following the same principles as the baseline framework. The additional parameter $f_E$ is calibrated such that the economy starts at the same steady state as the baseline.

**F.4 The Friedman view**

This appendix describes a version of the baseline model with no firm dynamics. Suppose there is a fixed number of firms, all of which feature the same productivity level. While the solutions to the household’s and the (representative) firm’s optimization problems are unchanged, the choke price is no longer a relevant variable, provided that there is positive production in all markets. In other words, the equilibrium cannot be written in terms of productivity thresholds.
Instead, the rational expectations equilibrium is now defined as the set of stochastic processes
\( \{ q^H_t, q^F_t, q^*_F_t, p^F_t, p^*_F_t, L_t, B_t, R_t, \lambda_t, W_t, \epsilon_t \}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) satisfying (3), (5), (14),
\[
q^H_t = \frac{1}{2\gamma + \eta(N^H_t + N^F_t)} \left( \alpha - \frac{\lambda_t W_t^\sigma}{Z_t} \right),
\]
\[
q^F_t = \frac{1}{2\gamma + \eta(N^H_t + N^F_t)} \left( \alpha - \frac{\lambda_t \tau \epsilon_t}{Z_t} \right),
\]
\[
q^*_F_t = \frac{1}{2} \left( A - B \frac{\tau W_t^\sigma}{\epsilon_t Z_t} \right),
\]
\[
L_t = \frac{\sigma}{W_t^{1-\sigma}} \frac{N^H_t}{Z_t} \left( q^H_t + \tau q^*_F_t \right),
\]
\[
p^F_t = \frac{1}{2\gamma + \eta(N^H_t + N^F_t)} \left( \frac{\alpha^\gamma}{\lambda_t} - \left( \gamma + \eta(N^H_t + N^F_t) \right) \frac{\tau \epsilon_t}{Z_t} \right),
\]
\[
p^*_F_t = \frac{1}{2B} \left( A + B \frac{\tau W_t^\sigma}{\epsilon_t Z_t} \right),
\]
\[
\epsilon_t N^H_t p^*_F_t q^*_F_t - N^F_t p^*_F_t q^*_F_t = \epsilon_t (B_t - R_{t-1} B_{t-1}),
\]
given the exogenous processes \( \{ Z_t, N^H_t, N^F_t, \xi_t \}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and the central bank’s policy \( \{ \epsilon_t \}_{t=0}^{\infty} \).

I need to re-calibrate some of the parameters before solving this version of the model. I set \( Z_t = 1 \), \( N^H_t = n \bar{M} \) and \( N^F_t = (1-n) \bar{M} \) at all times where \( n \) and \( \bar{M} \) are calibrated as in the baseline model. The debt elasticity of interest rate, \( \phi = 2.1 \), is set again to match output volatility.
Figures

Figure A.1: Effect of a sudden stop in the distribution of TFP

(a) 1992-93 episode

(b) 2009-13 episode

Notes: This graph plots kernel density estimates for firm-level log (TFP) before and after a sudden stop. Panel (a) refers to the 1992-93 episode, while Panel (b) focuses on the 2009-13 episode. The corresponding base and end years are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the second episode.

Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
Figure A.2: Impulse response functions

**Notes:** These figures plot the IRFs of all endogenous variables to a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium. All variables but bonds, $B_t$, are expressed in log deviations from steady state. The holding of bonds, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.
Figure A.3: A model with capital - Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop

Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation positive shock to the country-specific risk premium in a version of the model featuring pre-installed physical capital as described in Appendix F.1. All variables but the current account are expressed in log deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.

Figure A.4: A model with capital - other variables

Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of investment, the unit cost of production and the rental rate of capital to a one standard deviation positive shock to the country-specific risk premium in a version of the model featuring pre-installed physical capital as described in Appendix F.1. All variables are expressed in log deviations from steady state.
Figure A.5: Extensive versus intensive margin - Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop

Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation positive shock to the country-specific risk premium and a one standard deviation negative shock to the aggregate component of firm TFP. All variables but the current account are expressed in log deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.

Figure A.6: Extensive versus intensive margin - TFP decomposition

Notes: These figures decompose the overall response of TFP to a sudden stop as described above into the change in the aggregate component of firm-level productivity (the intensive margin) and the change in the productivity threshold (extensive margin). All variables are expressed in log deviations from steady state.
Figure A.7: Long-run analysis - Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop

Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation positive shock to the country-specific risk premium in the long run version of the model as described in Appendix F.3. All variables but the current account are expressed in log deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the consumption loss under a currency union to the consumption loss under a floating arrangement following a sudden stop. The consumption loss is calculated as the discounted sum of consumption log deviations after a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium. The blue solid line refers to the baseline model. The red dashed line refers to a version of the model with no firm dynamics (firms are homogeneous and the number of firms is constant) and linear production in labor ($\sigma = 1$). The shaded area shows the range of plausible values for the wage rigidity parameter as discussed by the literature.
Figure A.9: Currency union versus floating arrangement

Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the welfare loss under a currency union to the welfare loss under a floating arrangement following a sudden stop. The welfare loss is calculated as the share of steady state employment that makes the representative consumer indifferent between the steady state and the dynamic equilibrium path after a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium. The blue solid line refers to the baseline model. The red dashed line refers to a version of the model with no firm dynamics (firms are homogeneous and the number of firms is constant) and linear production in labor ($\sigma = 1$). The shaded area shows the range of plausible values for the wage rigidity parameter as discussed by the literature.
Table A.1: List of sudden stops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>start year</th>
<th>end year</th>
<th>exchange rate</th>
<th>country</th>
<th>start year</th>
<th>end year</th>
<th>exchange rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.2: Moments of the distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992-93 episode</th>
<th></th>
<th>2009-13 episode</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pre-sudden stop</td>
<td>sudden stop</td>
<td>pre-sudden stop</td>
<td>sudden stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mode</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skewness</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>-2.37</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kurtosis</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min</td>
<td>-3.73</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
<td>-9.07</td>
<td>-3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table summarizes moments of the distribution of firm-level log (TFP) before and after a sudden stop. The first two columns refer to the 1992-93 episode, while the last two focus on the 2009-13 episode. The corresponding base and end years are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the second episode. Source: ESEE data and own calculations.