# Fathers' Multiple-Partner Fertility and Children's Educational Outcomes 

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#### Abstract

: We find substantial effects of fathers' multiple-partner fertility (MPF) on children's long-term educational outcomes. We focus on the children in nuclear families - households consisting of a man, a woman, their joint children, and no other children - who are in fathers' "second families." We analyze outcomes for 80,00 children born in Norway in 1986-1988 who grew up into young adulthood with both biological parents. This analysis cannot be done using existing US data sets. Children who spent their entire childhoods in nuclear families but whose fathers had children from another relationship living elsewhere were more likely to drop out of secondary school ( $24 \% \mathrm{vs} 17 \%$ ) and less likely to obtain a bachelor's degree ( $44 \%$ vs $51 \%$ ) than children in nuclear families without MPF. Our probit estimates imply that the marginal effect of fathers' MPF is 4 percentage points for dropping out and 5 percentage points for obtaining a bachelor's degree. Our analysis suggests that the effects of fathers' MPF are primarily due to selection.


Key Words: Family structure, complex families, siblings, child welfare, educational outcomes

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## 1. Introduction

Children from nuclear families - households consisting of a man, a woman, their joint children, and no other children - have better educational outcomes than children from other family structures. ${ }^{1}$ However, not all nuclear families are the same - in some nuclear families one of the parents, usually the father, has children from a "first family" living elsewhere. Using Norwegian register data, we investigate the association between fathers' multiple partner fertility (MPF) and the educational outcomes of the children in fathers' "second families" when the second families are "stable nuclear families" - that is, nuclear families in which the children spent their entire childhoods with both biological parents.

We then turn to blended families - households consisting of a man, a woman, at least one joint child and at least one "nonjoint" child from the mother's previous relationship, and no other children. In some of these blended families the father has children from a first family living elsewhere. We investigate the association between fathers' MPF and the educational outcomes of the joint children from his second family when his second family is a "stable blended family," that is, a blended family in which the joint children spent their entire childhoods.

Our study is the first to investigate the association between fathers' MPF and children's longrun educational outcomes. To avoid dealing with the association between changes in family structure and outcomes for children, we restrict our attention to children who spent their entire childhoods with both biological parents. We find that fathers' MPF has a substantial negative association with the educational outcomes of the children in the father's second family when the second family is a nuclear family, but has no significant association when the second family is a blended family.

Although family complexity, sibling structure, and MPF are receiving increasing attention from sociologists, demographers and economists, that attention has focused on mothers' rather than fathers'

[^0]MPF. This reflects both the tradition of defining family structure as household structure and the paucity of US data on the family beyond the household. Because most US data sets are household based and because children usually remain with their mothers when unions dissolve, we know far more about the association between mothers' MPF and children's outcomes than about fathers' MPF. US data sets that document fathers' MPF usually provide little information about outcomes for children, and virtually none about long-term outcomes. In a recent issue of Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science on "Family Complexity, Poverty, and Public Policy," Furstenberg (2014) concludes:


#### Abstract

The research on the consequences of more complex families for children is still inconclusive. There are many theoretical reasons why children may fare less well when their parents have obligations to children from other partners. We know that parents who have children with more than one partner are also different in many sociodemographic and psychological ways from those whose parenting is confined to a single union. Without effectively ruling out selection, it is very difficult to conclude that complexity per se undermines good parenting, couple collaboration, and successful child development. For the time being, it makes good sense not to rush to a judgment on the questions of whether or how family complexity compromises child well-being.


We agree with Furstenberg that we should avoid rushing to judgment about the causal effect of family complexity and the role of selection, but our analysis sheds some light on these difficult questions.

To describe the association between fathers' MPF and the long-run educational outcomes of the children in fathers' second families requires a large data set that links parents to all of their children, both resident and nonresident. We also require a relatively long longitudinal data set to analyze longterm educational outcomes. No US data set satisfies these requirements. We use Norwegian register data, starting with 147,000 children born in Norway 1986-88; we focus on the almost 80,000 of these children who grew up with both biological parents. Even starting with such a large data set, when we investigate educational outcomes for joint children in stable blended families we have 3,036 children and, of those, only 505 had fathers with children from another relationship living elsewhere.

We analyze separately the children from nuclear families and the joint children from stable blended families. This restriction allows us to reduce the variation in unobserved family characteristics and isolate the association between fathers' MPF and children's educational outcomes in a simple, transparent family environment. All of the children we consider grew up with both biological parents,
the family environment often identified in the literature as associated with the best outcomes for children. We find that the educational outcomes of children from nuclear families are substantially better than those of children from stable blended families.

Steele, Sigle-Rushton and Kravdal (2009) finds that family disruption is negatively associated with children's educational outcomes in Norway, and Björklund, Ginther and Sundström (2007) finds that the association between family complexity and children's outcomes is very similar in Sweden and the United States.

Our primary goal is to describe the association between fathers' MPF and children's long-run educational outcomes. In section 2 we discuss the literatures on family structure and on fathers' MPF, and in section 3 we discuss our family structure definitions. In section 4 we establish the "stylized facts" about the association between fathers' MPF and children's educational outcomes in nuclear families and in stable blended families, using the phrase "descriptive regressions" to characterize the patterns in the data. We estimate separate descriptive regressions for nuclear families and for stable blended families. We find that in nuclear families, but not in stable blended families, fathers' MPF is negatively associated with children's long-term educational outcomes. For example, in nuclear families in which fathers had children from another relationship living elsewhere, we find that children were 4 percentage points (ppt) less likely to complete high school and 5 ppt less likely to complete college than children from nuclear families whose fathers did not have children from another relationship living elsewhere. In blended families the association between fathers' MPF is not significantly different from 0 for grades and dropping out of secondary school, but it increases the probability of low grades and decreases the probability of obtaining a bachelor's degree. After estimating the association between fathers' MPF and the educational outcomes of children in their second families, in section 5 we investigate causal mechanisms. The evidence suggests that the effects of fathers' MPF are primarily due to selection rather than to resources. Section 6 concludes.

## 2. The Family Structure and Family Complexity Literatures

Our work draws on the extensive literature on family structure and the burgeoning literature on family complexity. We first trace the evolution of the relevant literature on family structure as it relates to educational outcomes for children. We then turn to the literature on fathers' MPF. Finally, we discuss possible mechanisms linking fathers' MPF and children's educational outcomes.

### 2.1 Nuclear Families, Blended Families, and Children's Educational Outcomes

The popular literature on outcomes for children emphasizes either the distinction between single-parent families and two-parent families or between married and unmarried mothers but seldom digs deeper. The scholarly literature in demography and sociology has successively refined family structure categories. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) made an important early refinement.

Using four US data sets, McLanahan and Sandefur found that children who grew up with both biological parents had better outcomes than those who did not. ${ }^{2}$ Based on this finding, McLanahan and Sandefur mistakenly concluded that the crucial distinction was between children who grew up with both biological parents and those who did not. They based this conclusion on their finding that, on average, children who grew up with both biological parents (i.e., the children from nuclear families and the joint children in stable blended families) experienced substantially better educational and other outcomes than children from single parent families and the nonjoint children (i.e., stepchildren) in blended families. The move beyond the single-parent/ two-parent dichotomy was an important step forward, but the conclusion that the crucial dimension of family structure was growing up with both biological parents was a misstep. The misstep resulted from pooling the large number of children from nuclear families with the small number of joint children from stable blended families.

Contrary to McLanahan and Sandefur's conclusion, the joint children in stable blended families - children who spent their entire childhoods with both biological parents - experienced

[^1]substantially worse outcomes than the children from nuclear families. Using US data, Ginther and Pollak (2004), Gennetian (2005), and Halpern-Meekin and Tach (2008) show that the educational outcomes of the joint children from stable blended families were substantially worse than those of children from nuclear families even though the joint children in stable blended families spent their entire childhoods with both biological parents. ${ }^{3}$ To avoid analyzing the effects of family instability on outcomes for children, we restrict our attention to children who never experience family instability - that is, to children from nuclear families and the joint children from stable blended families.

Beyond the empirical difference between McLanahan-Sandefur, on the one hand, and Ginther-Pollak, Gennetian, and Halpern-Meekin-Tach on the other, is an important conceptual difference. McLanahan-Sandefur focus exclusively on the relationship between each child and his or her parents, while Ginther-Pollak, Gennetian, Halpern-Meekin-Tach, and Tillman (2008) also consider sibling structure (i.e., the relationship of each child to the other children in the household). ${ }^{4}$ That is, unlike the family structure literature, the family complexity literature considers household sibling structure, including the presence of half-siblings and step siblings that results from repartnering and MPF.

### 2.2 Multiple Partner Fertility and Child Outcomes

Recent research has estimated the prevalence of MPF in the United States. ${ }^{5}$ For example, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health) and the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), Guzzo (2014) finds that 13 percent of men and 19 percent of women in their

[^2]forties have had children with more than one partner. Using the NSFG, Manlove et al. (2008) finds that socioeconomic disadvantage and nonmarital fertility are associated with male MPF. Using the NSFG, Guzzo and Furstenberg (2007) documents the extent and correlates of MPF and find that MPF is associated with economic disadvantage. None of these studies investigate the association between MPF and outcomes for children. ${ }^{6}$

Several recent studies have documented the prevalence of fathers' MPF and studied the relationship between fathers' MPF and child support. Using administrative data from Wisconsin, Meyer, Cancian and Cook (2005), Cancian and Meyer (2011), and Cancian, Meyer, and Cook (2011) find that MPF is very common and not fully incorporated into Wisconsin's child support policy. Cancian, Meyer, and Cook (2011) finds that 60 percent of firstborn children of unmarried mothers have half-siblings by the age of 10 . They also find that fathers with children from multiple relationships pay more in child support, but pay less per child and are more likely to fall behind in their payments. Taken together, these studies underscore the importance of fathers' MPF in formulating child-support policy, but they tell us nothing about outcomes for children.

Other recent studies have examined MPF in Norway. Lappegård and Rønsen (2013) finds a U-shaped relationship between male MPF and socioeconomic status, unlike the US where men's MPF is associated with disadvantage (Manlove et al. 2008). ${ }^{7}$ In Norway both low- and high-income men are more likely to have children with multiple partners.

Manning, Brown and Stykes (2014) suggests that attention to MPF has generated renewed interest in blended families, household sibling structure and measures of family complexity. That

[^3]paper and Brown, Manning and Stykes (2015) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to combine measures of family structure (defined as the relationship of parents to children within the household) and of household sibling structure into a measure of family complexity. Manning, Brown and Stykes (2014) examines the incidence of family complexity in the US, and find that in 200940.8 percent of children experience either sibling complexity ( 5.2 percent), parent complexity ( 28.5 percent) or both (7.1 percent). Brown, Manning and Stykes (2015) finds that sibling complexity (measured by household sibling composition) is associated with lower income and the receipt of public assistance. However, Manning, Brown and Stykes (2014 p. 54) acknowledges that their estimates of sibling complexity "...will not mirror those of parents because they exclude nonresident siblings or siblings who have formed their own, separate households..."

### 2.3 Mechanisms Linking Fathers' MPF and Children's Educational Outcomes

In economic models of investment in children, parents invest time and money in their children's human capital. ${ }^{8}$ Having financial responsibility for children in a first family creates resource competition and, hence, might reduce investments in the human capital of the children in the second family. The economic model treats family structure as either a mechanism that facilitates investment in children or as a proxy for parental investments in children.

Sociological and psychological explanations suggest that family structure could operate not only through resources but through other mechanisms as well. For example, children from nuclear families benefit from more parental support and control than children from single parent families (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1994, Hofferth and Anderson 2003). These children usually experience more consistent parenting and more supervision leading to better educational and socio-economic outcomes.

Finally, the association between fathers' MPF and outcomes for children may reflect selection - for example, unobserved parental characteristics may affect both family structure and

[^4]child outcomes through mechanisms other than resource allocation. For example, fathers' MPF may be associated with less competent or less devoted parenting and more marital conflict. Any of these may cause children to experience worse outcomes. In section 5 we discuss the roles of resources and selection as mechanisms behind the statistical association between fathers' MPF and children's educational outcomes.

## 3. Context, Family Types and Covariates

### 3.1 The Norwegian Context - Schooling and Child Support

All children in Norway attend compulsory school which they usually complete the year they reach 16. After completing compulsory school, all children are entitled to attend secondary school. Secondary schooling in Norway involves more tracking than in the United States. Students who attend secondary school must choose between a three-year academic track and a three or four-year vocational track. University or college attendance usually requires completing the academic track with grades high enough to qualify for admission.

Graduation from secondary school has become increasingly important for successful participation in further education and work, and reducing the number of early school leavers is a policy objective in Norway and in most other OECD countries (Lamb and Markussen, 2011). In Norway, more than 95 percent of those graduating from compulsory education in 2002-2004 (children born in 1986-1988) enrolled in secondary education, but only about 70 percent had completed secondary education five years later (Falch, Nyhus, and Strom, 2014).

Separated parents (both cohabiting and married) may pay child support to or receive child support from the other parent and may also receive transfers from the Norwegian social insurance system. Until 2003, child support payments depended on custody, ability to pay (income), and the total number of children. ${ }^{9}$ Required child support payments were specified as a percentage of the noncustodial parent's income and paid to the custodial parent: 11 percent of the gross income for

[^5]one child, 18 percent for two, 24 percent for three, and 28 percent for four or more children. For example, a father with one child from his first family and one child in his second family would pay his first wife 9 percent of his income in child support (18/2); a father with two children in his second family would pay his first wife 8 percent of his income (24/3). Noncustodial parents are legally obligated to provide financial support until their children turn 18 or until they complete secondary school, usually at age 19. Until 2002 the noncustodial parent also had to cover travel costs related to visits of nonresident children. For the noncustodial parent, child support expenditures were deducted from net income taxes, whereas for the custodian parent, child support was treated as taxable income.

Parents are also entitled to receive a child benefit from the Norwegian social insurance system. For each child under 18, the child benefit has been fixed since 1993 at NoK 970 (about $\$ 110$ US per month) and is exempt from taxes. If parents are married or cohabiting, the child benefit is usually transferred to the mother. In case of divorce or separation, the custodial parent receives an extended child benefit, amounting to the child benefit for one child more than she or he lives with.

### 3.2 Sample and Family Type Definitions

Our analysis is based on individual-level data from official Norwegian registers for the period 1986-2014. The registers, which cover the entire Norwegian population, are merged using unique person-specific identification codes. These registers provide information about demographic background characteristics (gender, birth year/month, link to biological parents and country of birth), socio-economic data (education, annual income and earnings), annually updated information about household composition, and continuously updated employment and social insurance status. The link to parents enables us to identify both parents' MPF and, combining this information with data on household composition, we can identify the family structures in which each child lived from birth until adulthood.

By an "eligible child" we mean a child who spent his or her entire childhood with both biological parents either in a nuclear family or a stable blended family. To avoid repeating the
cumbersome phrase "eligible child or children," as a shorthand we use "eligible child," recognizing that in some families there is more than one eligible child. We include all eligible children in our analysis rather than selecting a single "focal child" from each family.

Our starting point is the population of 146,923 children born in Norway from January 1, 1986 through December 31, 1988 with Norwegian-born parents registered as living in Norway. Of these, 79,466 ( 54 percent) lived with both biological parents at least until the age of 18 .

For our empirical work, we define a nuclear family as a household in which the eligible child spent his or her entire childhood living with both biological parents and in which all the other children in the household are also joint children. We define a stable blended family as a household in which the eligible child spent his or her entire childhood living with both biological parents and, for some portion of his or her childhood, living with at least one half-sibling. From the standpoint of the eligible child, our nuclear families and blended families are "stable" in the sense that the eligible child spent his or her entire childhood with both biological parents. By restricting our attention to nuclear families and stable blended families, we ensure that the eligible child experienced no family structure transitions. For stable blended families, we further restrict our attention to those in which all nonjoint children in the household are the mother's children. Because children generally remain with their mothers when parents separate, this is the leading case. We use the following taxonomy of family types to analyze the effects of fathers' MPF:

- Simple Nuclear families (NFo): the eligible child grew up in a stable nuclear family. Neither the father nor the mother had children from another relationship.
- Complex Nuclear Family (NF+): the eligible child grew up in a stable nuclear family. The father, but not the mother, had at least one child from another relationship living elsewhere.
- Simple Blended Family (BFo): the eligible child grew up in a stable blended family. All nonjoint children in the household were the mother's children and neither the father nor the mother had children from another relationship living elsewhere.
- Complex Blended Family ( $\mathbf{B F}+$ ): the eligible child grew up in a stable blended family. All nonjoint children in the household were the mother's. The father but not the mother had at least on child from another relationship living elsewhere.

Table 1 shows the distribution of eligible children by family type. The vast majority ( 90.7 percent) of eligible children grew up in simple nuclear families ( $\mathrm{NFo}=72,052$ ).$^{10}$ Because the fathers' children from previous unions most often live with their biological mothers, most children whose fathers had children from previous relationships living elsewhere grew up in complex nuclear families ( $\mathrm{NF}+=3,208$ ). Most eligible children in blended families belong to simple blended families $(B F o=2,531)$ - that is, their fathers did not have children from another relationship living elsewhere. About 20 percent grew up in complex blended families $(\mathrm{BF}+=505)$.

### 3.3 Outcome Variables and Explanatory Variables

We use four measures of educational outcomes. Our first two measures are based on the grades received at completion of compulsory school. The children in our data receive grades going from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest) in 11 subjects. Our first measure, Grades, is a normalized variable calculated by converting grades to a distribution with mean 0 and variance 1 . We also use the grades obtained in the three core subjects (Mathematics, Norwegian and English) to construct Low Grades, a dummy which is equal to one if the child received a grade below 4 in all three core subjects, indicating very weak qualifications for attending secondary school. Our third measure, Dropout, is an indicator variable for not completing secondary school by age 22 . Our fourth measure, Bachelor's, is an indicator variable for whether the child completed a bachelor's degree or higher by age 26.

[^6]Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show the average of each of our four educational outcomes by family type. The ordering of outcomes by family type is the same for each outcome. The children from simple nuclear families do best, followed by complex nuclear families, simple blended families, and complex blended families. (The confidence intervals for simple and complex blended families overlap.)

In our analyses we control for both family and child characteristics. For parents we include age, marital status and dummy variables for educational level when the child was born. For the years when the child is 0 to 18 years old, we also calculate the percentage of time that: i) the child lives in an urban location; ii) the mother is out of the labor force; iii) the father is out of the labor force; iv) the mother receives a disability pension; and v) the father receives a disability pension. For mothers' and fathers' annual earnings and for total household net financial wealth, we averaged variables measured over the years when the child was 0 to 18 years old. For children we include information on gender, month and year of birth, birth order (from the perspective of the mother), number of full siblings, and an indicator of whether the child moved to a different municipality during schooling age 6-18.

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables by the four family types. We see strong positive selection on these observable explanatory variables into simple nuclear families (NFo). As we move from simple nuclear families to complex blended families, the likelihood that parents were not married at the birth of the child increases. Mothers in nuclear families are much more likely than those in blended families to have at least some university education; 30 percent of mothers in simple nuclear families and 26 percent of those in complex nuclear families have at least some university education. In blended families, only 16 percent have any university education. As the education figures suggest, income and wealth are higher in simple nuclear families than in other family types. Parents are less likely to be disabled in nuclear families than in blended families.

## 4. Descriptive Regressions

We begin by comparing educational outcomes of children from nuclear families with those of joint children from stable blended families, controlling for family economic resources and observable parental and child characteristics. Then we turn to fathers' MPF, first comparing the educational outcomes of children in simple nuclear families with those of children in complex nuclear families, and then comparing outcomes of children in simple blended families with those of children in complex blended families, again controlling for family economic resources and observable parental and child characteristics. All of the children in our MPF comparisons are from fathers' second families.

We consider four indicators of children's educational outcomes: normalized grades from compulsory school (Grades); the probabilities of low grades (Low Grades); dropping out of secondary school by age 22 (Dropout); obtaining a bachelor's degree by age 26 (Bachelor's). We always consider the educational outcomes of children who spent their entire childhoods with both biological parents. Every child from a nuclear family satisfies this requirement, but only joint children from stable blended families satisfy it.

We use OLS and probit regressions to examine the association between fathers' MPF and children's educational outcomes. For child $i$ consider the following outcome equation:

$$
H C_{i}=F S_{i}+W_{i}+X_{i}+u_{i}
$$

where $H C_{i}$ measures a child's educational outcome, $F S_{i}$ measures family and sibling structure, $W_{i}$ observable parental characteristics, $X_{i}$ individual child characteristics, and $u_{i}$ is the error term. When we compare blended with nuclear families, we include a dummy variable for the joint children in stable blended families. We then analyze separately nuclear and blended families, controlling for fathers' MPF

Our first specification includes all nuclear and stable blended families and controls for family structure, gender and birth year. Our second specification adds controls for county of residence and parents' education and age. Our third specification, which we call our "comprehensive specification," includes controls for county of residence, parental age, education, parity, labor force and
disability status, household size, income, wealth and mobility patterns.
Thus far we have referred to "children's educational outcomes" without distinguishing between boys and girls. There is now an extensive literature on the gender gap in education. ${ }^{11}$ Boys are more likely to drop out of secondary school, less likely to go to college, and those who go to college are less likely to graduate. Our final specification interacts the child's gender with our measures of family structure and fathers' MPF in order to test for the effect of fathers' MPF on gender differences.

### 4.1 Comparing Nuclear Families and Blended Families

Table 4 shows estimates of our four educational outcomes with an indicator for stable blended families. We find that joint children from stable blended families have substantially worse educational outcomes than children from nuclear families. When we add more control variables to the model, the coefficients on blended families decrease in size, in some cases by more than 75 percent, indicating that selection on observables plays a substantial role in the association between blended families and educational outcomes. Despite the fact that children in stable blended families are reared by both biological parents until age 19, they have significantly lower grades and are 2 ppt more likely to have grades that are alarmingly low in core subjects controlling for other observables ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ). Compared with children from nuclear families, children from stable blended families are 3 ppt more likely to drop out of secondary school increasing the likelihood of dropping out to 20 percent for blended families, and 3.6 ppt less likely to obtain a bachelor's degree by age 26 , reducing the probability of a bachelor's degree in blended families to 48 percent. Our point estimates confirm the results found in Falch, Nyhus, and Strom (2014) that boys have significantly worse educational outcomes than girls.

[^7]
### 4.2 The Effect of Fathers' MPF and Nonresident Half-Siblings

We next investigate the effect of fathers' MPF on educational outcomes for the children in fathers' second families. Since the estimates reported in Table 4 establish that children from nuclear families have better educational outcomes than children from stable blended families, we estimate separate regressions for nuclear families and blended families.

We begin with nuclear families. Table 5 reports estimates of the effect of fathers' MPF on children's educational outcomes. As we progressively add control variables, the coefficients on family structure become smaller in magnitude, again reflecting selection on observables. In the discussion that follows, we rely primarily on our comprehensive specification (specification 3 ). Fathers' MPF has a significant detrimental effect on all measures of children's educational outcomes. Estimates from the comprehensive specification indicate that fathers' MPF is associated with $10 \%$ of a standard deviation of lower grades ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), a 3.2 ppt increase in the probability of having low grades, a 3.9 ppt increase in the probability of dropping out of secondary school ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), increasing the likelihood to over 21 percent, and a 5.2 ppt decrease in the probability of obtaining a bachelor's degree ( $\mathrm{p}<.001$ ), decreasing the likelihood to 46 percent. These coefficients are somewhat larger than the estimated effect of blended families compared with nuclear families presented in Table 3.

In our fourth specification we interact gender (male=1) with NF+ families. In each specification, the interaction term is not significantly different from zero implying that in nuclear families the gender disparities in children's educational outcomes are unaffected by fathers' MPF.

We now turn to stable blended families. Table 6 reports estimates of the effect of fathers' MPF on children's educational outcomes analogous to those for nuclear families reported in Table 5. Average grades are 8 percent of a standard deviation lower ( $\mathrm{p}<.11$ ) and the probability of dropout is higher, but the statistical significance is marginal at best ( $\mathrm{p}<.11$ ). Children from complex blended families ( $\mathrm{BF}+$ ) are also $5 \mathrm{ppt}(\mathrm{p}<.06)$ less likely to obtain a bachelor's degree than children from simple blended families ( BFo ). Children from complex blended families are 6.7 ppt ( $\mathrm{p}<.02$ ) more
likely to have very low grades compared with those from simple blended families. As in nuclear families, we find no significant effects of gender interacted with $\mathrm{BF}+$, implying that gender disparities are unaffected by fathers' MPF.

In the appendix, we pool nuclear and blended families and include controls for $\mathrm{NF}+$, BFo , and $\mathrm{BF}+$. We tested whether the coefficients on $\mathrm{NF}+, \mathrm{BFo}$ and $\mathrm{BF}+$ were significantly different from one another and failed to reject those tests. Thus, half-siblings, regardless of where they reside, are associated with worse educational outcomes for children who were reared by both biological parents.

## 5. Resources and Selection as Mechanisms of Disadvantage

Parents' education and resources (time and money) affect children's outcomes, although we know little about their relative importance or about interactions between them. We investigate whether competition for resources between children in fathers' first and second families explains why fathers' MPF is associated with worse educational outcomes for the children in fathers' second families. We use two strategies to investigate the resource hypothesis. The first uses the age difference between the children in the father's first and those in his second family as a proxy for the intensity of resource competition. When the age difference is small, the resource competition hypothesis predicts that competition will be more intense and, hence, that educational outcomes for the children in the father's second family will be worse than when the age difference is large. The second strategy uses the number of children in the father's first family as a proxy for the intensity of resource competition. When the number of children in the father's first family is large, the father's child support obligation is large, thus reducing the resources available to the children in his second family. Hence, when there are more children in his first family, the resource competition hypothesis predicts that educational outcomes for the children in his second family will be worse than when there are fewer children in his first family. We do not find significant resource effects on child
educational outcomes using either of these strategies. This conclusion holds for both time and money, but the conclusion for money is strengthened by child support laws.

As discussed earlier, Norwegian child support law requires noncustodial fathers to pay child support to their first families until the children reach the age of 19 . We use the number of nonresident half-siblings and the age difference between the children in the father's first family and those in his second family to investigate the effect of the transfers required by Norwegian law. When there is only one nonresident half-sibling, the required transfer is lower than when there is more than one. When the age difference is small, more will be transferred to the children in the father's first family during the childhood of the children in his second family.

### 5.1 Age Differences between Children

The closer in age the children in the father's first family are to those in his second family, the less time and money will be available for the children in the second family. If resource competition causes the worse outcomes for children in the father's second family, then more years with a nonresident half-sibling under the age of 20 should lead to worse outcomes. But if selection causes the worse educational outcomes of the children in fathers' second families, then these coefficients should be independent of the age difference between the children. To test the age-difference hypothesis, we included dummy variables for the number of years (0-5, 6-10 and 11+) an eligible child has a nonresident half-sibling who is less than 20 years old and multiply them by the number of nonresident half-siblings in those age categories. This provides a measure of the amount of child support paid during the childhood of the eligible child. In Table 7 we report the results for our comprehensive specification which includes a full set of controls. We tested whether the coefficients from 1-5 and 6-10 years and 6-10 and 11-plus years were significantly different from one another. Although the probabilities of low grades and dropping out increase in size the longer a father has financial responsibility for nonresident half-siblings, these coefficients are not significantly different from one another for any outcome. Thus, the age-difference strategy provides no support for the
resource competition hypothesis. In nuclear families, the association between having nonresident half-siblings that are younger than 20 years old for $11+$ years is largest and statistically significant for all outcomes; however the statistical tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effect of having half-siblings that age for $0-5$ years and $11+$ years is the same.

For stable blended families, we find no statistically significant effect of having nonresident siblings close in age. Table 8 shows the blended family. After controlling for all covariates in the comprehensive specification, we find no significant effects of having half-siblings closer in age for any outcome.

### 5.2 Number of Children

The more children in the father's first family, the less time and money will be available for the children in his second family. For this test of the resource hypothesis, we add controls for one nonresident half-sibling or two or more nonresident half-siblings. ${ }^{12}$ The average number of nonresident half-siblings in NF+ families is less than 2, with 70 percent of NF+ children having one nonresident half-sibling. For nuclear families we report the estimates from the simple and comprehensive specification in Table 8. The results show that for all educational outcomes, the coefficient on two or more nonresident half-siblings is slightly larger, but not significantly different than that for one nonresident half-sibling.

We found that having two or more nonresident half-siblings was not significantly different than having only one nonresident half-sibling in NF+ families: both reduced educational outcomes compared with NFo children by a similar amount.

The analysis for blended families is more complicated because blended families also receive child support from the mother's first partner. The average number of nonresident half-sibs in $\mathrm{BF}+$ is less than 2 , with 63.5 percent of BF+ children having one nonresident half-sibling. We add controls

[^8]for having two or more resident half-siblings (indicating a larger transfer of resources from the first partner into the household, one nonresident (indicating some resource drain also out of the household), and two or more nonresident half-siblings (indicating an even larger drain of resources out of the household). The results are reported in Table 10. In our comprehensive specification, the coefficient on two or more resident half-siblings is positive for three of the five educational outcomes, but they are not statistically significant. The signs of the estimated effects are consistent with the resource hypothesis, and having two or more nonresident half-siblings is significantly correlated with negative outcomes in compulsory school. ${ }^{13}$

### 5.3 Father's Income

In Table 11, we investigate whether fathers' income quartile has a significant impact on children's educational outcomes. We include controls for income quartile and then interact it with fathers' MPF for our nuclear family sample. The point estimates on fathers' MPF in Table 11 do not differ substantially from those observed in Table 5. In the first model, we do see an income gradient with all educational outcomes: the higher the income, the better the educational outcome of the child. However, these income effects fall considerably in the complete specification. Furthermore, none of the coefficients on income interacted with fathers' MPF are statistically significant.

Taken together, these results suggest that resources (or lack thereof) cannot explain the MPF results that we are observing. The MPF effects are not explained by resource competition from having half-siblings who are close in age. Nor are these results explained by having larger numbers of half-siblings. Finally, fathers' income has no impact on the MPF point estimates. Since we have examined children in stable families that do not experience significant transitions, this cannot be the mechanism. Instead, these findings are most consistent with selection: unobserved parental characteristics that affect both family structure and child outcomes through mechanisms other than resources.

[^9]
## 6. Discussion and Conclusion

Until very recently, the family structure and family complexity literatures have been about household structure and household complexity. Because children generally remain with their mothers when their parents separate, discussions have focused on mothers' MPF and generally ignored fathers' MPF. Indeed, US data tell us little about the family beyond the household. Recent research on family complexity has investigated sibling structure but, at least in part because of data limitations, we know virtually nothing about the effects on children in fathers' second families of his children from other relationships living elsewhere. We have avoided the limitations of US data by using Norwegian register data to investigate the effects of father's MPF on the children in fathers' second families.

We began by revisiting a classic family structure issue, comparing the long-run educational outcomes for children in nuclear families with those of joint children in stable blended families. Like the children in nuclear families, the joint children in stable blended families spent their entire childhoods with both biological parents. We found that the joint children in stable blended families had substantially worse educational outcomes than the children in nuclear families - lower grades, a higher probability of very low grades, a higher probability of dropping out of secondary school, and a lower probability of obtaining a bachelor's degree.

Turning to fathers' MPF, we analyzed separately children from nuclear families and the joint children from stable blended families. For nuclear families, we find that fathers' MPF is associated with substantially worse educational outcomes. The differences are somewhat larger than the difference between joint children in stable blended families and the children in nuclear families. For blended families, we found that fathers' MPF is associated with worse educational outcomes, but the estimated effects of fathers' MPF were significant for only two of the four educational outcomes: having low grades and obtaining a bachelor's degree.

Our results show that fathers' multiple-partner fertility warrants far more attention than it has thus far received.

Finally, we investigated the more difficult question of the causal mechanisms behind our descriptive findings: when the father's second family is a nuclear family, why do the children have worse educational outcomes than children from nuclear families in which the fathers do not have children elsewhere? And when the father's second family is a blended family, why does his MPF have only marginally significant effect on children's educational outcomes? Using the age difference between the children in the father's first and second families and using the number of children in his first family, we found no support for the resource competition hypothesis. Because we do not find significant support for the resource competition hypothesis, we conclude that the deleterious effects fathers' MPF on children's educational outcomes is primarily due to selection. More generally, our results show that the family beyond the household affects outcomes for children.

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Figure 1: A) Normalized total exam scores by family structure. B) Probability of low exam scores by family structure.


Figure 2: A) Probability of dropping out of secondary school by family structure. B) Probability of obtaining a bachelor's degree by family structure.

## Table 1: Sample, Family Type and Siblings

\# Children born in 1986-1988 by Norwegian born parents ..... 146,923
\# Children living with both biological parents until age 18 ..... 79,466
\# Children in Simple Nuclear Families (NFo) ..... 72,052
\% one full sibling ..... 38.8
\% two or more full siblings ..... 58.5
\# Children in Complex Nuclear Families (NF+) ..... 3,208
\% one full sibling ..... 46.6
\% two or more full siblings ..... 42.7
\% one half-siblings ..... 70.0
\% two or more half-siblings ..... 30.0
\# Children in Blended families (BFo) ..... 2,531
\% one full sibling ..... 48.0
\% two or more full siblings ..... 21.1
\% one half-siblings ..... 75.5
\% two or more half-siblings ..... 24.5
\# Children in Complex Blended families (BF+) ..... 505
\% one full sibling ..... 34.4
\% two or more full siblings ..... 10.3
\% one resident half-siblings ..... 52.4
\% two or more resident half-siblings ..... 47.6
\% one nonresident half-siblings ..... 63.5
\% two or more nonresident half-siblings ..... 36.5
\# Children in other family types ..... 1,170

[^10]Table 2: Educational Outcomes by Family Type

| Family type: | Outcome: | n | mean | std.dev |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Simple Nuclear | Grades | 70,992 | 0.222 | 0.992 |
| NFo | Low Grades | 72,052 | 0.252 |  |
|  | Dropout | 71,910 | 0.172 |  |
|  | Bachelor's | 71,930 | 0.513 |  |
| Complex Nuclear | Grades |  |  |  |
| NF+ | Low Grades | 3,147 | -0.155 | 1.013 |
|  | Dropout | 3,208 | 0.300 |  |
|  | Bachelor's | 3,201 | 0.240 |  |
|  |  | 3,202 | 0.442 |  |
| Simple Blended | Grades | 2,483 | -0.347 | 0.074 |
| BFo | Low Grades | 2,531 | 0.364 |  |
|  | Dropout | 2,523 | 0.288 |  |
|  | Bachelor's | 2,523 | 0.365 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Grades | 497 | -0.446 | 1.094 |
|  | Low Grades | 505 | 0.394 |  |
|  | Dropout | 504 | 0.339 |  |
| BF+ | Bachelor's | 504 | 0.333 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates

| Variable | Simple Nuclear Family (NFo) |  | Complex Nuclear Family (NF+) |  | Simple Blended Family (BFo) |  | Complex Blended Family (BF+) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mean | Std.dev. | Mean | Std.dev. | Mean | Std.dev. | Mean | Std.dev. |
| Parents cohabit at birth | 0.134 |  | 0.296 |  | 0.395 |  | 0.556 |  |
| \# Full Siblings | 1.814 | 1.060 | 1.480 | 0.962 | 0.965 | 0.902 | 0.575 | 0.742 |
| Age father | 30.899 | 4.881 | 35.387 | 6.085 | 32.026 | 5.399 | 37.284 | 6.733 |
| Age mother | 28.414 | 4.522 | 29.248 | 4.599 | 31.299 | 4.631 | 32.434 | 4.885 |
| Fathers education: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary school | 0.178 |  | 0.255 |  | 0.237 |  | 0.262 |  |
| Some secondary | 0.182 |  | 0.249 |  | 0.214 |  | 0.304 |  |
| Secondary school | 0.329 |  | 0.270 |  | 0.322 |  | 0.234 |  |
| University/College | 0.310 |  | 0.219 |  | 0.225 |  | 0.196 |  |
| Educ missing | 0.002 |  | 0.006 |  | 0.002 |  | 0.004 |  |
| Mothers education: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Primary school | 0.264 |  | 0.296 |  | 0.420 |  | 0.388 |  |
| Some secondary | 0.213 |  | 0.250 |  | 0.287 |  | 0.303 |  |
| Secondary school | 0.215 |  | 0.190 |  | 0.131 |  | 0.137 |  |
| University/College | 0.307 |  | 0.262 |  | 0.160 |  | 0.166 |  |
| Educ missing | 0.001 |  | 0.003 |  | 0.003 |  | 0.006 |  |
| Earnings father | 451.7 | 239.8 | 412.0 | 226.5 | 405.3 | 182.9 | 401.9 | 222.1 |
| Earnings mother | 210.1 | 119.9 | 226.5 | 127.6 | 185.9 | 113.1 | 197.9 | 125.1 |
| Wealth Household | 1307.5 | 4945.9 | 1258.6 | 7060.6 | 980.3 | 2378.9 | 1252.1 | 3394.2 |
| Percent of Childhood: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban Area | 75.116 | 42.361 | 74.921 | 42.182 | 68.086 | 45.640 | 73.028 | 43.447 |
| Father No Earnings | 2.794 | 12.739 | 9.000 | 23.308 | 3.719 | 14.357 | 9.165 | 23.711 |
| Mother No Earnings | 8.101 | 21.764 | 9.851 | 23.998 | 11.899 | 25.885 | 13.376 | 27.267 |
| Mother Disabled | 2.624 | 12.768 | 8.061 | 22.186 | 4.153 | 16.388 | 9.041 | 23.405 |
| Father Disabled Receiving Social Assistance | 3.780 | 15.569 | 5.445 | 18.566 | 8.323 | 22.469 | 10.315 | 24.301 |
| Household size | 4.683 | 0.968 | 4.352 | 0.875 | 4.978 | 0.913 | 4.761 | 0.856 |
| Family moved 7-17 | 0.548 |  | 0.563 |  | 0.556 |  | 0.583 |  |
| Observations | 72052 |  | 3208 |  | 2531 |  | 505 |  |

Table 4: Marginal effects of Family Type on Educational Outcomes. Nuclear vs. Blended Families

| VARIABLES | Grades (1) | Grades (2) | Grades (3) | Low <br> Grades (1) | Low Grades (2) | Low Grades (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Blended Family | $\begin{gathered} -0.375^{* * *} \\ {[0.019]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.180^{* * *} \\ {[0.018]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.073 * * * \\ {[0.019]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.117^{* *} * \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.049 * * * \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 0.019* } \\ & \text { [0.009] } \end{aligned}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 0.314^{* * *} \\ {[0.014]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.685^{* * *} \\ {[0.111]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.166^{* * *} \\ {[0.125]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
| Observations | 77,119 | 77,118 | 77,118 | 78,296 | 78,295 | 78,295 |
| R-squared | 0.082 | 0.259 | 0.281 |  |  |  |
| VARIABLES | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout <br> (2) | Dropout <br> (3) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (2) | Bachelor's (3) |
| Blended Family | $\begin{gathered} 0.122^{* * *} \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 * * * \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 * * * \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.154^{* * *} \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.085 * * * \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.036^{* *} \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 78,138 | 78,137 | 78,137 | 78,159 | 78,158 | 78,158 |

OLS Estimates of Grades; Probit estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's; coefficients are marginal effects. Robust Standard errors in brackets. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.001,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05$

Table 5: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF on Children's Educational Outcomes
Nuclear Families

| VARIABLES | Grades (1) | Grades (2) | Grades (3) | Grades <br> (4) | Low Grades (1) | Low Grades (2) | Low Grades (3) | Low <br> Grades (4) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nuclear Family+ | $\begin{gathered} -0.182 * * * \\ {[0.018]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.138^{* * *} \\ {[0.017]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.100^{* * *} \\ {[0.017]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.115 * * * \\ {[0.023]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.051^{* * *} \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.044^{* * *} \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032^{* * *} \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.045 * * * \\ {[0.013]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Nuclear Family+ * Male |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.031 \\ {[0.032]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.021 \\ {[0.015]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 0.323^{* * *} \\ {[0.014]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.739^{* * *} \\ {[0.114]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.225^{* * *} \\ {[0.127]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.224^{* * *} \\ {[0.127]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Observations R-squared | $\begin{gathered} 74,139 \\ 0.079 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 74,139 \\ 0.257 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 74,139 \\ 0.278 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 74,139 \\ 0.278 \end{gathered}$ | 75,260 | 75,260 | 75,260 | 75,260 |
| VARIABLES | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout <br> (2) | Dropout <br> (3) | Dropout <br> (4) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (2) | Bachelor's <br> (3) | Bachelor's <br> (4) |
| Nuclear Family+ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 * * * \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.060 * * * \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.039 * * * \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034^{* *} \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.077^{* * *} \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.069 * * * \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.052^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.064 * * * \\ {[0.014]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Nuclear Family+ * Male |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ {[0.013]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ {[0.020]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 75,111 | 75,111 | 75,111 | 75,111 | 75,132 | 75,132 | 75,132 | 75,132 |

Robust Standard errors in brackets. OLS estimates of Grades; Probit Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's.
Probit coefficients are marginal effects. ${ }^{* * *} p<0.001,{ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{*} p<0.05$

Table 6: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF on Children's Educational Outcomes Blended Families

| VARIABLES | Grades (1) | Grades (2) | Grades (3) | Grades <br> (4) | Low Grades (1) | Low Grades (2) | Low Grades (3) | Low <br> Grades (4) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Blended Family+ | $\begin{gathered} -0.087 \\ {[0.052]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.112 * \\ {[0.050]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.080 \\ {[0.050]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.097 \\ {[0.066]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.028 \\ {[0.024]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 * * \\ {[0.028]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.067^{*} \\ & {[0.029]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.073 \\ {[0.041]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Blended Family+ * Male |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.033 \\ {[0.091]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.010 \\ {[0.050]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.097 \\ {[0.083]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.846 * * \\ {[0.660]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.875 * * \\ {[0.717]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.867 * * \\ {[0.717]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,980 | 2,979 | 2,979 | 2,979 | 3,036 | 3,035 | 3,035 | 3,035 |
| R-squared | 0.067 | 0.244 | 0.283 | 0.283 |  |  |  |  |
| VARIABLES | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout <br> (2) | Dropout (3) | Dropout <br> (4) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (2) | Bachelor's (3) | Bachelor's <br> (4) |
| Blended Family+ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.051^{*} \\ & {[0.023]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.047 \\ {[0.025]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.040 \\ {[0.026]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ {[0.036]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.031 \\ {[0.023]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.053 * \\ {[0.026]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.052^{\sim} \\ & {[0.027]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.050 \\ {[0.037]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Blended Family+ * Male |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.027 \\ {[0.047]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.005 \\ {[0.051]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 3,027 | 3,026 | 3,026 | 3,026 | 3,027 | 3,026 | 3,026 | 3,026 |

Robust Standard errors in brackets. OLS estimates of Grades; Probit Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's. Probit coefficients are marginal effects. ${ }^{* * *} p<0.001,{ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{*} p<0.05 \sim p<.10$.

Table 7: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF on Educational Outcomes Nuclear Families, Controlling for Number and Years of Overlap with Nonresident Half-Siblings

| VARIABLES | Grades <br> (1) | Grades <br> (3) | Low Grades (1) | Low Grades (3) | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout (3) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0-5 Years Overlap | -0.144*** | -0.085* | 0.025 | 0.011 | 0.051** | 0.026 | -0.044* | -0.035 |
| With Half Sibs | [0.041] | [0.040] | [0.019] | [0.019] | [0.017] | [0.017] | [0.021] | [0.024] |
| 6-10 Years Overlap | -0.151*** | -0.081** | 0.036* | 0.023 | 0.050*** | 0.028* | -0.053** | -0.036* |
| With Half Sibs | [0.031] | [0.028] | [0.015] | [0.015] | [0.014] | [0.013] | [0.016] | [0.018] |
| 11+ Years Overlap | -0.214*** | -0.115*** | 0.069*** | 0.043*** | 0.087*** | 0.050*** | $-0.102^{* *}$ | -0.067*** |
| With Half Sibs | [0.025] | [0.023] | [0.012] | [0.012] | [0.011] | [0.010] | [0.012] | [0.014] |
| Constant | 0.323*** | -2.228*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | [0.014] | [0.128] |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0-5 Years = 6-10 |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |
| Years Overlap |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6-10 Years = 11+ |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |
| Years Overlap |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 74,139 | 74,139 | 75,260 | 75,260 | 75,111 | 75,111 | 75,132 | 75,132 |
| R-squared | 0.080 | 0.278 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Robust Standard errors in brackets. OLS estimates of Grades. NS: Difference in coefficients not statistically different from zero, $\mathrm{p}<0.05$. Probit Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's. Probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Probit coefficients are marginal effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.001,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05$

Table 8: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF on Educational outcomes
Blended Families, Controlling for Number and Years of Overlap with Nonresident Half-Siblings

| VARIABLES | Grades <br> (1) | Grades (3) | Low Grades (1) | Low <br> Grades (3) | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout <br> (3) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0-5 Years Overlap | 0.004 | -0.069 | -0.032 | 0.070 | 0.071 | 0.082 | -0.003 | -0.074 |
| With Half Sibs | [0.102] | [0.100] | [0.044] | [0.061] | [0.054] | [0.056] | [0.045] | [0.052] |
| 6-10 Years Overlap | -0.028 | 0.013 | 0.060 | 0.086 | 0.029 | 0.012 | -0.033 | -0.031 |
| With Half Sibs | [0.097] | [0.087] | [0.046] | [0.049] | [0.044] | [0.044] | [0.045] | [0.047] |
| 11+ Years Overlap | -0.156* | -0.124 | 0.042 | 0.059 | 0.049 | 0.040 | -0.043 | -0.055 |
| With Half Sibs | [0.069] | [0.064] | [0.032] | [0.037] | [0.032] | [0.033] | [0.030] | [0.033] |
| Constant | -0.096 | -1.815* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | [0.083] | [0.722] |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0-5 Years $=6-10$ |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |
| Years Overlap |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6-10 Years = 11+ |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |
| Years Overlap |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,980 | 2,979 | 3,036 | 3,035 | 3,027 | 3,026 | 3,027 | 3,026 |
| R-squared | 0.068 | 0.284 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Robust Standard errors in brackets. OLS estimates of Grades. NS: Difference in coefficients not statistically different from zero, $\mathrm{p}<0.05$. Probit Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's. Probit coefficients are marginal effects.
*** $p<0.001,{ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{*} p<0.05$

Table 9: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF on Educational Outcomes Nuclear Families, Controlling for Number of Half-Siblings

| VARIABLES | Grades (1) | Grades (3) | Low Grades (1) | Low Grades (3) | Dropout (1) | Dropout (3) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nuclear Family 1 Half Sib | $\begin{gathered} -0.183 * * * \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.094^{* * *} \\ {[0.019]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.054^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.031^{*} * \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 * * * \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.039 * * * \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.077 * * * \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.046 * * * \\ {[0.012]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Nuclear Family 2+ Half Sibs | $\begin{gathered} -0.179 * * * \\ {[0.033]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.115^{* * *} \\ {[0.031]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.044^{* *} \\ & {[0.015]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.032^{*} \\ & {[0.016]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 * * * \\ {[0.014]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.041^{* *} \\ {[0.014]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.075 * * * \\ {[0.016]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.068^{* * *} \\ {[0.018]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 0.323^{* * *} \\ {[0.014]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.223 * * * \\ {[0.127]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 Half = 2+ Half Sibs |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |  | NS |
| Observations | 74,139 | 74,139 | 75,260 | 75,260 | 75,111 | 75,111 | 75,132 | 75,132 |
| R-squared | 0.079 | 0.278 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Probit Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's. Probit coefficients are marginal effects.
OLS estimates of grades
Robust Standard errors in brackets. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.001,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05$
NS: Difference in estimated coefficients not statistically different.

Table 10: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF on Educational Outcomes
Blended Families, Controlling for Number of Half-Siblings


Robust Standard errors in brackets. OLS estimates of Grades. NS: Difference in estimated coefficients not statistically different from zero, p<0.05.
Probit Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's. Probit coefficients are marginal effects.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table 11: Estimates of Effect of Fathers' MPF Interacted with Income Quartile, Nuclear Families

| VARIABLES | Grades <br> (1) | Grades (3) | Low Grades (1) | Low Grades (3) | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout (3) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nuclear Family + | $\begin{gathered} -0.123^{* * *} \\ {[0.036]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.085^{*} \\ {[0.033]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.056 * * \\ {[0.019]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.047^{*} \\ & {[0.019]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.049 * * \\ {[0.017]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 0.039* } \\ & \text { [0.017] } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.060^{* *} \\ {[0.020]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.056^{* *} \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income Quartile 3 | $\begin{gathered} -0.211^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.078 * * * \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 0.011* } \\ & {[0.005]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.044^{* * *} \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.007 \\ {[0.004]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.125^{* * *} \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.028^{* * *} \\ {[0.006]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income Quartile 2 | $\begin{gathered} -0.358^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.048 * * * \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.124^{* *} * \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023^{* *} * \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.085^{* * *} \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ {[0.004]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.196^{* * *} \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.054^{* * *} \\ {[0.006]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income Quartile 1 | $\begin{gathered} -0.513^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.103^{* * *} \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.178 * * * \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.044^{* * *} \\ {[0.006]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.146 * * * \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.029 * * * \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.278^{* * *} \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.097 * * * \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income Quartile 3 <br> * Nuclear + | $\begin{gathered} -0.031 \\ {[0.051]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.027 \\ {[0.046]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.012 \\ {[0.023]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.014 \\ {[0.023]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.035 \\ {[0.023]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026 \\ {[0.022]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.006 \\ & {[0.028]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ {[0.029]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income Quartile 2 <br> * Nuclear + | $\begin{gathered} -0.071 \\ {[0.050]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.080 \\ {[0.046]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.022 \\ {[0.022]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.012 \\ & {[0.022]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.012 \\ {[0.020]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ {[0.020]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ {[0.027]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.007 \\ & {[0.029]} \end{aligned}$ |
| Income Quartile 1 <br> * Nuclear + | $\begin{gathered} -0.003 \\ {[0.047]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.037 \\ {[0.043]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.020 \\ & {[0.021]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.027 \\ & {[0.020]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.003 \\ & {[0.018]} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ {[0.026]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ {[0.027]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 0.596^{* * *} \\ {[0.015]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -2.239 * * * \\ {[0.124]} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 74,139 | 74,139 | 75,261 | 75,261 | 75,112 | 75,112 | 75,133 | 75,133 |

Robust Standard errors in brackets. OLS estimates of Grades. NS: Difference in estimated coefficients not statt Estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's. Probit coefficients are marginal effects.
*** $p<0.001$, ${ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{*} p<0.05$

APPENDIX TABLE: Marginal effects of Fathers' Multiple Partner Fertility on Education Nuclear and Blended Families

| VARIABLES | Grades <br> $\mathbf{( 1 )}$ | Grades <br> $\mathbf{( 2 )}$ | Grades <br> $\mathbf{( 3 )}$ | Low <br> Grades (1) | Low <br> Grades (2) | Low <br> Grades (3) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nuclear Family + | $-0.180^{* * *}$ | $-0.139^{* * *}$ | $-0.100^{* * *}$ | $0.050^{* * *}$ | $0.045^{* * *}$ | $0.033^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.017]$ | $[0.016]$ | $[0.016]$ | $[0.008]$ | $[0.009]$ | $[0.009]$ |
| Blended Family | $-0.367^{* * *}$ | $-0.172^{* * *}$ | $-0.075^{* * *}$ | $0.115^{* * *}$ | $0.047^{* * *}$ | $0.020^{*}$ |
|  | $[0.020]$ | $[0.018]$ | $[0.019]$ | $[0.010]$ | $[0.009]$ | $[0.009]$ |
| Blended Family + | $-0.444^{* * *}$ | $-0.260^{* * *}$ | $-0.126^{* *}$ | $0.138^{* * *}$ | $0.079^{* * *}$ | 0.038 |
|  | $[0.043]$ | $[0.039]$ | $[0.039]$ | $[0.022]$ | $[0.021]$ | $[0.020]$ |
| Constant | $0.321^{* * *}$ | $-1.838^{* * *}$ | $-2.299^{* * *}$ |  |  |  |
| Observations | $[0.014]$ | $[0.107]$ | $[0.120]$ |  |  |  |
| R-squared | 77,120 | 77,119 | 77,119 | 78,298 | 78,297 | 78,297 |
|  | 0.083 | 0.258 | 0.280 |  |  |  |


| VARIABLES | Dropout <br> (1) | Dropout <br> (2) | Dropout (3) | Bachelor's <br> (1) | Bachelor's <br> (2) | Bachelor's <br> (3) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nuclear Family + | $\begin{gathered} 0.070 * * * \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.062^{* * *} \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.040 * * * \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.077^{* * *} \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.071^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.054^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Blended Family | $\begin{gathered} 0.118^{* * *} \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.066^{* *} \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030^{* * *} \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.151^{* * *} \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.081^{* * *} \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.036^{* *} \\ {[0.012]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Blended Family + | $\begin{gathered} 0.171^{* * *} \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.112^{* * *} \\ {[0.020]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.064^{* * *} \\ {[0.018]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.175 * * * \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.113^{* * *} \\ {[0.024]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.061^{*} \\ & {[0.025]} \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 78,139 | 78,138 | 78,138 | 78,160 | 78,159 | 78,159 |

OLS Estimates of Grades; Probit estimates of Low Grades, Dropout and Bachelor's; coefficients are marginal effects. Robust Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The US Census defines a "traditional nuclear family" as a household consisting of a man, a woman, their joint children, and no one else; the census definition further specifies that the parents are married. We depart from the Census definiton by not requiring marriage. In our analysis, we define a nuclear family as one in which there are no nonjoint children, but we include the small number of families in which other adults (e.g., grandparents) are present.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ McLanahan and Sandefur used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men and Women (NLSY), the High School and Beyond Study (HSB), and the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH).

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Ginther-Pollak, Gennetian, and Halpern-Meekin-Tach found virtually no difference between the educational outcomes of the joint children and the nonjoint children in blended families. In contrast, Case, Lin and McLanahan (2000) and Evenhouse and Reilly (2004) used sibling difference models and found that stepchildren had worse outcomes.
    ${ }^{4}$ Or, equivalently, Ginther-Pollak and Gennetian consider not only each child's relationship to the parents but also the structure of the household (i.e., nuclear family versus blended family). Using Swedish and US data, Björklund, Ginther and Sundström (2007) found that educational outcomes are more negatively associated with the number of half-siblings than with the number of full siblings. They also found that having lived with half-siblings is negatively associated with educational outcomes even after controlling for the total number of half and full siblings.
    ${ }^{5}$ For a collection of authoritative articles on MPF and other forms of family complexity, see Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (2014) on "Family Complexity, Poverty, and Public Policy."

[^3]:    ${ }^{6}$ US Fragile Families data provide information about the association between fathers' MPF and outcomes for young children in the father's first family. For example, Carlson and Furstenberg (2007) finds that MPF measured by the father having a child with another woman is negatively associated with the quality of the mother's relationship with the children in his first family. Bronte-Tinkew, Horowitz and Scott (2009) finds that for children under the age of 36 months, a father having a child with another woman is positively associated with externalizing behavior and negatively associated with the physical health of children in his first family. Tach, Mincy, and Edin (2010) finds that father involvement with the children in his first family drops when the father has a child with another woman. For our purposes, there are two critical limitation of the Fragile Families data. First, it focuses on the children in the father's first family while we are concerned with the childen in his second family. Second, because the Fragile Families children are still relatively young, we cannot observe their long-run educational outcomes or any other adult outcomes.
    ${ }^{7}$ Mothers' MPF is associated with economic disadvantage and low educational outcomes in the United States, Australia, Norway and Sweden (Thomson et al., 2014).

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ Biblarz and Raftery (1999) argues that living in a "two-biological-parent family" should matter because two parents can provide more resources than one.

[^5]:    ${ }^{9}$ The pre-2003 rules were established in 1989 but built on earlier legislation. Until 1989 contribution levels were set by local public authorities.

[^6]:    ${ }^{10}$ The remaining 1,170 children are classified as living in other types of blended families, including families with nonresiding half-siblings on mother's side ( 300 cases), families with residing half-siblings solely on father's side ( 664 cases) and families with residing step siblings We see no justification for pooling these cases with the leading case. We treat eligible children with stepsiblings as a separate category; none of the children in our four basic categories have stepsiblings. Missing data on outcome variables is mainly due to death or migration after the age of 18 .

[^7]:    ${ }^{11}$ See, for example, Autor and Wassermann (2013), Autor et al. (2016), Bailey and Dynarski (2011), Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy (2010), and Diprete and Buchmann (2013). Falch, Nyhus, and Strom (2014) show that boys have worse educational outcomes than girls in Norway.

[^8]:    ${ }^{12}$ Assuming there is one joint child in the home, if the father has one child outside of the home he pays 18 percent of his income for two children in child support with 9 percent being sent to the noncustodial child. If the father has two children outside of the home ( 3 children total) he pays a total of 24 percent of his income in child support with 12 percent being sent to the noncustodial children.

[^9]:    ${ }^{13}$ The coefficients on two-plus resident half-siblings were significantly different than two-plus nonresident half-siblings for the outcomes of grades, low grades and bachelor's degrees: more nonresident half-siblings lead to worse outcomes for children in complex blended families. One nonresident sibling results in a significantly higher probability of low grades ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ) and a significantly lower probability of a bachelor's degree ( $\mathrm{p}<.05$ ) compared with two resident halfsiblings.

[^10]:    Note: Complex defined as having nonresident half-siblings.

