Melissa Dell - Harvard University/Society of Fellows
The Historical State and Long-Run Development in Vietnam
Date: 12/03/2014 (Wed)
Time: 3:30pm- 5:00pm
Location: Seminar will be held on-site: Social Sciences 111
Organizer: Xiao Yu Wang
Meeting Schedule: Login or email the organizer to schedule a meeting.
All meetings will be held in the same location as the seminar unless otherwise noted.
10:00am - Xiao Yu Wang
10:30am - Marcos Rangel
11:00am - Duncan Thomas
11:30am - Kehinde Ajayi
12:00pm - (12pm-1:15pm) Lunch w/ Nixon Li, Jose Martinez, and Veronica Montalva
1:15pm - Rob Garlick
1:45pm - Daniel Yi Xu
2:15pm - Xiaoxue Zhao
2:45pm - Erica Field
3:15pm - seminar prep
3:30pm - Seminar Presentation (3:30pm to 5:00pm)
6:00pm - Dinner w/Xiao Yu Wang, Duncan Thomas
Additional Comments: Abstract: This study examines how the organization of the historical state conditions modern governance and economic outcomes in Vietnam. It uses a regression discontinuity design to compare villages in Vietnam that were part of the centralized, bureaucratic state of Dai Viet prior to French colonization to nearby villages that were tributaries of Cambodia, which operated through a patron client model. Dai Viet governed through a centralized, competitively-selected bureaucracy and villages were the fundamental unit of political organization, whereas Cambodia employed a hierarchy of looser patron-client relationships in which the village played a less central role. RD results document that while geographic characteristics are balanced when comparing historically bureaucratic and patron client villages, political and economic outcomes differ sharply. In historically bureaucratic villages, local governments have been more active in the post-colonial period: detailed data on village governance from the 1960s and 70s document that village councils in historically bureaucratic areas met more often to discuss local development projects and implemented more of these projects. Local governments are more likely to be elected instead of appointed, and they collect more taxes. In historically bureaucratic areas, village heads have greater authority over the police, and the local state also provides more public goods – such as health services, education, and roads. Social capital is also higher in historically bureaucratic villages. During the Vietnam War, historically bureaucratic areas experienced less conflict, less covert activity, more local government propaganda, and their residents were less likely to be named by the National Police as Viet Cong suspects. Both historically and today, bureaucratic villages have higher agricultural output. Moreover, their residents are more likely to be engaged in industry and household expenditure is higher. These results are consistent with cross-country patterns in Asia, which show a strong correlation between being governed by a bureaucratic state historically and economic prosperity today.