Anne-Katrin Roesler - U Michigan
“Information Management in Contests, Auctions, and Matching Markets”
Date: 04/17/2017 (Mon)
Time: 3:30pm- 4:45pm
Location: Seminar will be held on-site: Social Sciences 111
Organizer: Ann Creech
Meeting Schedule: Login or email the organizer to schedule a meeting.
All meetings will be held in the same location as the seminar unless otherwise noted.
9:00am - Breakfast - Rachel Kranton - will bring speaker to Fuqua Circle Drive for first meeting
10:30am - Jim Anton A413
11:00am - Pino Lopomo Fuqua W322
11:30am - Tracy Lewis
12:00pm - Lunch - Attila Ambrus, Atila Abdulkadiroglu
1:00pm - Philipp Sadowski
1:30pm - Curt Taylor
2:00pm - Huseyin Yildirim
2:30pm - Fei Li
3:00pm - Gary Biglaiser
3:30pm - Seminar Presentation (3:30pm to 4:45pm)
6:00pm - Dinner - Curt Taylor, Philipp Sadowski, Todd Sarver
Additional Comments:
Abstract
Consider a designer who wants to maximize the participants' efforts in a contest but does not have the authority to change the rules of the game. In this setting, we study how the designer can influence the participants' incentives to exert effort by ``managing’’ the information provided to them. To analyze this question, we consider a model of a two-sided matching market with a finite number of agents, in which agents on one side of the market privately observe an informative but potentially noisy signal about their type before participating in the contest. We analyze how the informativeness of this private signal affects the equilibrium outcome. Increasing the information level of agents has two main effects: An allocation effect – a higher information level allows for a better allocation; and a competition effect - the information level affects the competition among market participants. The effect on total expected efforts depends on whether additional information is provided to agents on the short or on the long side of the market. The results obtained in the matching model can be mapped into a contest environment in two ways – one allows to replicate some standard results from the contest design literature, the other provides results on information management in contests.