Utku Unver - Boston College

Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange

    Date:  02/26/2018 (Mon)

    Time:  3:30pm- 4:45pm

    Location:  Seminar will be held on-site: Social Sciences 111

    Organizer:  Huseyin Yildirim, Ph.D.

Meeting Schedule: Login or email the organizer to schedule a meeting.

    All meetings will be held in the same location as the seminar unless otherwise noted.

   10:00am - Huseyin Yildirim meets at the hotel.

   11:00am - Jim Anton Fuqua A 413

   11:30am - Pino Lopomo Fuqua W322

   12:00pm - Lunch, Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Aram Grigoryan

   12:30pm - Lunch

    1:00pm - Lunch

    1:30pm - Atila Abdulkadiroglu

    2:00pm - Curt Taylor, SS315

    2:30pm - Todd Sarver

    3:00pm - Gary Biglaiser

    3:30pm - Seminar Presentation (3:30pm to 4:45pm)

    6:00pm - Huseyin Yildirim, Fei Li

    Additional Comments:  ABSTRACT: Living donor liver transplantation is widespread in parts of the world and living donor liver exchange has already been practiced in several countries to overcome blood- type incompatibilities. A living donor can donate either his smaller left lobe or the larger right lobe, although the latter is substantially safer for the donor. Despite the elevated risk to donor, right-lobe donation is often utilized due to size compatibility requirements with the patient. We model liver exchange as a market design problem, focusing on the logistically simpler two-way exchanges. As a first step and assuming there are only two patient/donor sizes, we introduce an efficient algorithm when only the safer left-lobe donation is feasible. We then introduce an individually rational, Pareto-efficient, and incentive-compatible mechanism that truthfully elicits the right-lobe donation willing- ness of donors, and finally extend these results to a general model with an arbitrary number of patient/donor sizes. From a theoretical side, this generalization requires new tools for mechanism design regarding bilateral exchanges on a partial-order induced preference relation with multiple classes of indifferences. By simulations, we show that the number of transplants can increase substantially as liver exchange is utilized and as the willingness rates of donors increase for right-lobe donation.